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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a detailed investigation of 
predicting of corporate financial failure, using two 
traditional (Altman and Taffler) Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis models on companies whose equities are traded 
on the London Unlisted Securities Market (USM) and on 
those that have passed or graduated from the USM to a 
full listing. The primary objective was to see if the 
two models can be effectively used in the context of 
the USM to either to predict or at least indicate 
symptoms of financial collapse. Secondly, ratios were 
taken for further discriminant analysis to see if 
better ratios can be identified and predictions 
developed from one or a group of ratios. In this study 
consideration also has been given to the limited 
progress in developing the underlying theory of 
bankruptcy. 
The Altman and Taffler MDA models were tested on the 
USM data. Their predictions compared favourably with 
those of a multi-discriminant model that was derived 
from the USM data. However, it was found that all three 
models gave mediocre and late predictions of individual 
company bankruptcy. The research found that MDA 
analysis of company failure had to be supplemented by a 
more behavioural and subjective approach to the 
question of company failure in order to be useful. Even 
iii 
so, the dissertation is able to end with some useful 
pointers for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES. 
The purpose of this research is to assess whether 
traditional established Z-score anlysis methodology 
exemplified by the Altman (1968) and Taffler (1977. 
1982) is valid in a distinct identifiable market place: 
in this case the UK Unlisted Securities Market (USM) in 
order to:-
i) - ascertain if a reliable classification can be 
achieved. 
ii) - to ascertain if there are distinct individual 
ratios that discriminate and hence classify companies 
as potential successes or failures more effectively 
than the multi-ratio Z-score models that have been 
developed. In adopting this approach. it will be 
particularly noted if any of the Beaver (1967) ratios 
are still effective discriminators. 
iii) - to see if there is any evidence of a response 
to the demand for a more theoretical or conceptual 
approach. 
In adopting this objective. the research is responding 
in part to Lev's appeal (1974) for a more conceptual 
approach. and also the views expressed by Marais 
(1979), Zimmer (1983). and Robertson (1984) on the need 
for an appropriate underlying theory. 
The Basic Hypothesis 
It is expected that both the Altman and Taffler models 
1 1 
will correctly classify successful USM companies as 
being consistently above the bench mark score for 
success, and likewise the failed (however defined) 
companies will be below the benchmark score for 
. 
for failure. It is likely that there will be a large 
band of companies that are in the Altman "grey area." 
In performing further discriminant analysis, it is 
expected that a criteria for success/failure will be 
identified, which mayor may not prove more reliable 
than the traditional Z-score models. 
Definitions 
It is first necessary to define Multi-Discriminant 
Analysis. (MDA) In the context of predicting 
bankruptcy, this is a statistical technique that 
identifies a particular linear combination of key 
ratios which will permit the differentiation 
between "successful" or "non-failing" companies, and 
"unsuccessful" or "fai led" companies. The approach IS 
to use scores derived by substituting a company's 
ratios into the combination of ratios. "Failure" or 
"non-failure" is predicted on the basis of cut off 
values above which failure is deemed unlikely, and 
below which failure is almost inevitable. Thus, 
conclusions may be drawn about the financial health of 
the company under review, and its possible future. Such 
analysis discriminates between companies on the road to 
12 
success and likely to remain there. and those who are 
heading for failure. It is advocated that the advantage 
of such a technique is to predict failure long before 
the total failure occurs, and as such, permit avoiding 
action to be taken in time.(Kharbanda and Stallworthy 
1985 and Pitt Francis 1982) 
The definitions of "Success" and "Failure" 
1 Success 
In the initial classification of success and failure 
for this study, there are two tiers of success that can 
be identified. In the first tier, are those USM 
companies which have "graduated" from the USM to the 
full listings. Progression through the listing is 
perceived as an inherent measure or at least a 
characteristic of success. As such, the hypothesis will 
expect that they are consistently above any bench mark 
of failure. In the second tier are USM companies that 
making progress, but have remained in the Unlisted 
Securities Market. It is likely that these will still 
demonstrate all the characteristics of success, but at 
a lower level than that of the graduates. It is 
possible also that their performance may be more 
erratic. 
In the analysis that provides the basis for chapter 8 
the basis of the definition for "success" has been 
altered to include only those companies that have 
consistent records of growth and profitability. In 
13 
adopting this approach, we are responding to the 
theoretical notions of Robertson (1984) and to the 
methodology suggested by Lev (1974) i.e. to identify 
potential inherent characteristics and see if they 
differ between companies with prospects of long term 
success and those who in the short term are potential 
failures. 
2 Failure 
Companies defined as having failed will be initially 
identified from KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock USM Survey 
as those which have had their quotation suspended or 
cancelled. This is close to the definition used by 
Booth (1983). However, this category can include 
suspensions/cancellations for reasons other than 
financial failure. Thus from this category must be 
derived companies that have got into receivership or 
administration. This is in keeping with the definitions 
of inter alia (citations in Karels and Prakash 1987) 
Altman (1968, 1973), Taffler and Tishaw (1977), and 
Taffler (1982). To these definitions must be added a 
merger under $425 of the Companies Acts 1985 and 
permission to reorganise. Such inclusions would include 
reference to the Court quoted by Taffler, and equate 
with the Chapter XI of Altman, Blum (1974) and Elam 
(1975). Inevitably, such an approach will create the 
problem that the as percentage of failures among USM 
14 
companies, is very small, the sample will also be very 
small. 
The Choice of the Selection of the USM 
The USM has been chosen because:-
(i) Little research has been undertaken on USM 
companies. 
(ii) The nature of the companies will be very different 
from the traditional manufacturing companies studied by 
Altman, but nearer perhaps to the wider variety of 
companies studied by Taffler. This will in part respond 
to the suggestion of Marais (1979) that Z-score models 
should be tested in different conditions with different 
companies and different types of companies. Success in 
this area will further create a valid response to the 
criticism that Z-models lack universal applicability. 
(iii) USM companies are small by the standards of the 
1980s, although of comparable size when measured in 
historic monetary terms to those selected by Altman. 
(Chapter 4) 
(iv) Although managerial style and structure are beyond 
the scope of this study, the nature of USM companies is 
typically that of small closely structured firms, with 
directors involved in the day to day operations and 
management process. 
(v) While they operate in a wide range of sectors 
within the listings, they favour certain sectors, and 
15 
are often in specialist marketing niches within those 
sectors. 
(vi) Selecting the USM responds to three of the 
arguments raised by Lev. Primarily, when criticising 
the prediction claims he suggested "that the fai led 
companies in the samples were. on average younger than 
nonfailed ones." (p149) The USM is a young market with 
a large proportion of young companies, and as such will 
eliminate this particular problem. Secondly, since 
establ ished ratios wi 11 be used, there is 1 ess 
"trial and error" involved in the methodology. 
(vii) Finally the USM is a small enough market to take 
either very large samples or complete populations to 
avoid any selection bias. 
Consequently, in the context of the criteria outlined 
above, the USM companies wi 11 provide a useful out of 
sample test of established methodology. 
Methodology 
First of all, in selecting a particular type of 
company, or listings sector, the pattern established by 
Thomas and Evanson (1987) who investigated retail 
pharmacies may be followed. Equally, by taking models 
developed in the 1960s and early 1970s, it will be 
possible to see if changes in economic conditions have 
an impact, and if the changes in economic, political 
and even organisational environment may effect the 
predictive value of classic MDA models. This may help 
16 
to answer criticisms levelled by Joy and Telleson 
( 1975) • 
To that end therefore. the approach will be to survey 
USM companies over the period 1982-1987. This will thus 
cover the early but not the pioneer years of the USM. 
through the bullish years prior to both "Big Bang" and 
the October 1987 crash. Altman and Taffler Z-scores 
will be calculated for each company for each of the 
five years~ although it is recognised that due to post 
1982 entries into the market, and post 1982 
acquisitions~ not all the companies have the full five 
years of data. It should be further noted that by 
adopting this approach, the paired sample technique 
used by Altman and indeed more recently by Barnes 
(1990), yet criticised by Lev and others~ will not be 
employed. The reasoning for this lies In the fact that 
to apply such an approach effectively to the USM would 
require excluding many of the small sectors where there 
are either no failures, and/or no companies to 
effectively make meaningful comparisons. Initially, 
a population of the graduates will be identified and 
statistically analysed for the pattern of scores and 
how effectively they classify corporations. Secondly, 
the exercise will be repeated taking a sample of USM 
companies that have not graduated to the full listing. 
As already indicated, the hypothesis suggests that 
17 
these will show Z-scores indicative of long term 
survival. but are likely to be below those of the 
graduates who could be perceived as being the "high 
flyers." Finally. the "failures" however' defined will 
be identified and similarly analysed. In analysing the 
failures. attention will be paid to the perceived 
symptoms and possible underlying theory of corporate 
failure. This will involve looking at the 
characteristics, measures or events suggested by 
Zimmer. Robertson and Lau (1986). 
Having examining the predictive performance of the 
established Z-scores. further analysis of selected 
ratios will be undertaken to see if individual ratios, 
or groups of ratios can improve the existing 
traditional methodology. This will highlight the 
characteristics of the graduates, the sample and those 
in the failure zone. 
On final point needs to be added. Robertson advocated 
that meaningful predictive analysis should be 
straightforward and rely on readily available data. In 
making the analysis, therefore, a strongly pragmatic 
approach has been adopted. 
18 
CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTIVARIATE DISCRIMINATE APPROACH 
This chapter and the next two trace the historical 
development of the Multivariate Discriminate Approach 
leading to a discussion of the models tested in this 
thesis. In addition, they will review the literature. and 
provide a background to the development of the Unlisted 
Securities Market and hence to the companies that form 
the subject of this dissertation. 
Historical Background 
The technique of accounting ratio analysis as a means 
whereby the potential solvency of a business might be 
assessed, can be traced back to the post Civil War 
reconstruction period in the United States. 
Opportunists were anxious to take advantage of bulk 
discounts available on a variety of goods and needed 
short term loans to finance the venture. The finance 
was granted and the loan was to be repaid after the 
goods had been sold. The banks who were making the 
short term loans required a current statement of assets 
and liabilities to assess the creditworthiness of the 
applicant. By the 1890s, requests for financial 
statements by banks from loan applicants had become an 
accepted custom and there was progress towards a 
formalisation of the assessment procedure (Dev 1974). 
Late in the nineteenth century, a pioneer of financial 
19 
statement analysis. J G Cannon. (1899) established 
three "rul es of credit science." These were:-
1 Quick assets only are the basis for loans. 
2 Fixed assets are only considered as giving an unknown 
(assumed unquantifiable) support to the quick assets. 
3 The debt limit of the borrower has been exceeded when 
his liabilities exceed 50% of his quick assets. 
It should be emphasised that in these rubrics, quick 
assets equate with current assets and not just monetary 
current assets. 
It is Cannon's Rule 3 that introduced the idea of the 
traditional 2:1 ratio, since it was felt that current 
liabilities should be paid out of current assets. To 
allow for shrinkage and loss of value in a break up 
situation. an allowance had to be built in and 50% was 
generally regarded as sufficient (Wall 1919). 
Inevitably, while this ratio became the most widely 
used in assessing solvency. there were voices of 
dissent. Lincoln (1926) summarised the shortcomings, 
while at the same time advocating the need for 
additional ratios, consideration of general business 
conditions, the nature of the business itself, the 
character of the management, the age of the business, 
and even its geographical location. All these, Lincoln 
argued. could have an influence upon the current ratio. 
Contemporaneously, however, Wall, along with R W Duning 
20 
(1928) had developed and tested seven ratios on 981 
financial statements to supplement the classic current 
2:1 ratio, and even went on later to formulate a crude 
index of credit strength using arbitarily assigned 
weights. While this approach met with much criticism 
at the time, Dev (1974) argues that it was an important 
contribution, indeed, Iia naive attempt to formulate a 
multivariate linear discriminant function." 
The onset of the depression years of the 1920s and 
1930s led researchers to examine the characteristics 
of failed companies. One such study, by FitzPatrick 
(1931) took twenty known companies that had failed 
during the 1920s, and computed 13 different ratios for 
several years before failure. From the trends inherent 
in the final two years' ratios, the four "best" ratios 
were identified. FitzPatrick followed this study up by 
similar conmparative analysis of successful companies 
(1932). The details of the inter-war studies are listed 
in Tab 2.1.(Kumar 1986) It will be noticed that these 
univariate exercises worked in a common direction, i.e. 
to identify a ratio or a group of ratios that appeared 
to indicate that the company under review was likely to 
collapse and attempt to ascertain how early the 
collapse could be reliably predicted. 
Review of the Inter-war studies 
In considering the relevance of these studies to the 
21 
contemporary Multi Discriminant Analysis approach f it 
is worth noting that four ratios are highly ranked 
Table 2.1 Summary of Univariate Analysis (Kumar 1986) 
Author(s) Date No of ratios Comments 
/firms used 
Smith 1930 24/29 
FitzPatrick 1931/2 13/20 
Ramser/Foster 1931 33/51 
Smith Be 
Winakor 
Merwin 
Tamari 
(approx) 
1935 21/183 
1942 Many/200 
1964 10/28 
Identified four 
particularly useful 
ratios. 
Favoured net profit 
: net worth as the 
best indicator. 
Successful firms had 
better ratios than 
those that failed. but 
there were 
contradictions. Seemed 
to find more good 
discriminators than 
other researchers. 
Identified working 
capital:total assets 
as the best ratio. 
Winakor also introduced 
means (w) of ratios. 
Again rated the working 
capi tal :total assets 
as the best ratio. 
Post WW2 working in 
Israel. Favoured three 
ratios f the quick or 
"acid test" ratio, 
net worth:total 
liabilities and net 
________________________________ ~p~r~owf~iwt~:~s~a~l~e~s __________ __ 
across the six studies. 
Net worth:fixed assets was ranked second by FitzPatrick 
in 1931, but is highly regarded in five of the six 
studies. 
22 
Working capital :total assets appears four times, and is 
regarded as "the best" by Smith and Winakor and Merwin. 
FitzPatrick's "best" ratio; net profit:net worth 
appears in three studies, although two of them are by 
Fitzpatrick. Also included on three occasions is net 
worth:total liabilities, ranked third by FitzPatrick. 
Perhaps the most significant attribute of this ratio is 
that it is the only one to be included in any of the 
post-war univariate studies reviewed by Dev. Tamari 
(1964) includes the ratio in his 1964 Israeli study. 
The contribution of W H Beaver 
Beaver (1967, 1968) was among the first to focus on the 
ability of ratios to predict. The perceived over-riding 
shortcoming of any ratio analysis is that it is based 
upon historic data and past events. Thus Beaver began 
to look at the ability of ratios to predict. As a 
result, the emphasis in his study of ratios was the 
prediction of important events, one of which was 
failure. Over the period 1954-64, Beaver analysed 79 
firms using the paired sample approach, i.e. taking 79 
firms that had not failed and 79 that had failed of 
similar size from the same industrial sector. Financial 
data for the five years up to the failure was then 
analysed using 30 different ratios. 
Beaver's results revealed cashflow/total debt as the 
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most reliable discriminating variable. Over the period 
from five years before failure, surviving companies 
maintained a consistent average ratio of 0.45:1, while 
failed firms fell away sharply from 0.15:1 five years 
before failure, to a negative ratio between two and 
three years before final collapse. It is. however, 
noteworthy that Beaver's second choice was net 
profit/total assets, a ratio given the greatest weight 
by Altman and included by Ramser and Foster in their 
long list of discrimatory ratios. Beaver found that 
where this ratio began to deteriorate below a positive 
figure, failure followed. In this case, Beaver found 
that the negative ratios began to appear some 3~ years 
before the final collapse. Beaver·s third choice was 
was total debt/total assets. This approach is not 
dissimilar to Taffler's choice of placing total 
liabilities over assets. Beaver again found that failed 
firms revealed a marked increase in debt which occurred 
three years before failure. 
Beaver claimed that his cashflow/total debt ratio was 
viable for predicting business failure. claiming that 
it was a reliable indicator some five years before the 
event. This claim was based upon the smallest 
percentage error. (Only 10% of firms misclassified one 
year before failure, and only 22% five years before.) 
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The development of the MDA approach 
The 1960s saw the emergence of the Multi Discriminant 
Analysis [MDAJ approach to financial ratio analysis. 
Although explained in more detail in chapter 8, 
discriminant analysis is a statistical technique which 
derives a mathematical linear function enabling the 
researcher to classify data by placing it into a 
particular mutually exclusive group such as a company 
likely to fail, or enabling the identification of the 
most powerful discriminating variable(s). In the 
context of financial analysis, financial ratios are 
selected to form the basis of the prediction. By using 
several ratios, any inherent disadvantages arising from 
using a single ratio in isolation purport to be 
eliminated. It is the identification of a powerful 
discriminating ratio(s) that the pre-1939 researchers 
cited by Dev and Kumar were ostensibly working towards. 
The original usage of discriminate analysis dates from 
the 1930s. R A Fisher first employed the technique in 
1936 to solve problems in physical anthropology and 
biology. (liThe Use of Multiple Measurements in 
Taxonomic Prob1ems" in the Annals of Eugenics. [No 7 
September 1936 pp179-188J) Early social science 
applications appeared in 1954 by Tatsuoka and Tiedman 
in the context of physiological and educational 
testing. (Review of Educational Research 24 pp402-420) 
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Other applications such as in political theory, law and 
medical research are cited by Klecka (1980). 
The initial progress towards employing the methodology 
in a financial context was made in the field of credit 
control analysis in the 1940s. The application of such 
techniques to assess credit worthiness for used car 
loan applications, was recorded by D D Durand in 1941 
and in the context of installment creditworthiness by 
Myers and Forgy in 1963. 
In the realm of corporate financial standing and 
financial management, J E Walter [1959J used the MDA 
approach for investment classifications, emphasising 
the level of Price/Earnings ratio, while K V Smith 
(1965) used the approach to classify investment 
securities. 
In selecting the variables, certain constraints must be 
observed. 
(i) No variable may be the combination of another 
variable. 
(ii) No two variables that are perfectly correlated may 
be used simultaneously. These two strictures are 
result of the mathematical requirements of the 
technique, but Klecka (1980) argues that they 
make sense intuitively. Clearly, two variables 
that were perfectly correlated would either work 
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together or in opposition when combined. The 
important feature must be that differing 
characteristics must be combined together. 
(iii) Many applications require that the population 
covariance matrices are equal. Inevitably 
populations of failures, as a percentage of the 
total number of businesses in any form of 
listing, is likely to be small. As a result, it 
is unlikely that there will be any significant 
difference between covariant matrices due to the 
small sample of failures. 
(iv) Each sample group should be drawn from 
populations that have multivariate normal 
distributions. This enables the precise 
computation of tests of significance. However, 
recent evidence suggests that with dichotomous 
variables, the methodology is still valid. 
In the light of these important comments we can now 
consider the first Multi-discriminant equation 
developed by E I Altman. 
Altman's Discriminating Analysis 
E I Altman (1968) was the pioneer user of multi-
discriminant analysis in a financial context. The 
initial research used MDA to distinguish between 
bankrupt and nonbankrupt manufacturing firms in the 
period betwen 1946-1965. As with Beaver, a paired 
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sample approach was employed, matching 33 bankrupt and 
33 nonbankrupt firms on industry and asset size. Asset 
size was defined as between $1-$25 million. Twenty-two 
variables were originally selected, measured in the 
year before bankruptcy, and considered for the 
discriminate function. The combination finally 
involving the most significant variables and the 
estimated discriminate function is:-
Z = O.12Xl + O.14X2 + O.33X3 + O.06X4 + O.10X5 
where Z was the weighted average index, indicating the 
overall health of the company under review and 
Xl = working capital/total assets 
X2 = retained earnings since inception/total assets 
X3 = earnings before taxes and interest/total assets 
X4 = market value of equity/book value of total debt 
X5 = sales/total assets 
The value of Z finally calculated, is expressed as a 
percentage. In the original work undertaken by Altman, 
three groups can be identified. In the prediction of 
bankruptcy, if the value of Z was >2.9 (later modified 
to 2.7) this implied that failure was unlikely, while 
if it was <1.8, then failure was certain. In between 
1.8 and 2.9 was a grey area, where the outcome was 
uncertain, but such companies might be suspect. 
The ultimate equation is developed from a large number 
of variables, but only the set of variables that 
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finally "best" distinguishes or identifies which 
grouping is appropriate is employed. In adopting that 
approach, Altman is following the methodology of the 
pre-war workers. 
Review of Altman-s ratios 
Altman's first ratio. working capital:total assets IS 
the second most popular among the pre-war workers. 
Indeed. two researchers, namely Smith & Winakor (1935) 
and Merwin (1942) regard it as the "best". Altman then 
then moves onto profitability_ deemed to be the most 
important indicator of health, and hence has the 
highest weighting. However, amongst the pre-war 
studies, only Ramser and Foster (1931) regard this as a 
good discriminator, although in the post-war era, 
Beaver, (1967) reverting back to single discriminating 
ratios, ranked it second best. 
The three other ratios selected are: 
(i) Retained earnings. or reserves:total assets is a 
response to the perennial problem of what Argenti 
(1976) describes as corporate infant mortality. It 
also anticipates the Lev (1974) comment about the 
exclusion of age in any paired sample analysis. 
Indeed, Lev cites Dun and Bradstreet data which 
clearly shows an association between youth and 
failure rate in the post war era. Altman was thus 
looking for a period of stability in which a 
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company can build up reserves, and the lack of 
such reserves is a pointer to an unhappy short-
term future. Consequently, this ratio was accorded 
the second highest weighing after profit. Among 
the pioneer workers, only the Smith study of 1930 
recognises this ratio among four eventually 
identified. 
(ii) Sales:total assets is employed in the Ramsey and 
Forster study's numerous ratios. 
(iii) Market value of equity:Total book value of debt 
The choice of this last ratio is unique to Altman. 
Although given the least weighting, it indicates the 
measure of stock market confidence in a corporation, as 
well as its current level of gearing. This latter 
attribute arises because the ratio is the reciprocal of 
one of the gearing ratios. It should, however, be 
emphasised that it is the book value of debt that is 
used, and no attempt is made to bring in a market value 
of debt or to assess the interest cover. It should also 
be noted that this approach differed from the Beaver 
1968 approach, where again market prices were brought 
in. Altman was bringing confidence into the equation, 
while Beaver compared market prices with the ratios to 
see which was more reliable. 
Altman claimed a success rate of 95% in the year before 
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bankruptcy, 72% in the two years prior to bankruptcy, 
but only 48% in the third year and 36% in the fifth 
year. However, he did notice that the most serious 
deterioration in ratios occured between the second and 
third year prior to collapse. Altman's estimation 
sample correctly identifed 31 of the 33 bankrupt firms 
and 32 of the 33 nonbankrupt firms. To validate the 
equation, Altman also gathered further data on 25 
bankrupt firms and 66 nonbankrupt firms in a holdout 
sample. The model correctly identifed 24 of the 25 
bankrupt firms and 52 of the 66 nonbankrupt firms. 
The use of a holdout sample is important 
methodologically. Knowledge of a firm's ratios and 
whether it went bankrupt or not is used to determine 
the discriminant function and the "optimal" Z score 
cutoff for the estimation sample. This uses hindsight. 
When the function and the "cutoffs" are used on another 
sample. the hindsight factor is not present and the 
function may not predict as well. The fact that it did, 
adds considerable credibility to the function's 
predictive ability (Gupta, 1983). 
One additional comment is merited in respect of 
Altman's practice of having total assets as the 
demoninator in four of his five ratios. More recent 
work, (Sundarsanan & Taffler, 1986) concerned about the 
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impact of size as a potential for distortion in the 
analysis, concludes that Total Assets is one of the two 
most suitable denominators or deflators for this 
purpose. It is possible Altman considered this when 
developing his model for proprietary use in the 19705. 
The Problem of an American based model 
Altman's initial work was based on American companies 
and has a perceived inherent American bias. In an 
attmept to counter this, and in the wake of the Rolls-
Royce collapse, the Englishman John Argenti (1983) made 
some tentative adjustments to the original Altman score 
to make it more relevant to the UK situation. In the 
event, Argenti found that Rolls-Royce survived far 
longer than the ratios suggested, ICI and GEC were 
were consistently in the IIgreyll area yet neither have 
ever been in any sort of financial difficulty, while 
British Leyland, clearly in trouble, showed a grey 
ratio of similar proportions. Argenti thus suggested 
that for British companies, the figures should be >2.0 
and <1.5, producing a very much reduced grey area of 
uncertainty. Inman (1982) similarly tested the 
unmodified Altman against three collapsed UK companies. 
(Lesney, Stone-Platt and Dunbee-Marx) The results 
obtained showed a progressive decline, with a slipping 
under the 2.9 threshold within two years of collapse. 
However, no data produced a figure below 1.8. What was 
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interesting was that Inman found that when the model 
was tested on non-failed examples, the traditional 
engineering and electrical manufacturing companies 
showed scores above 2.9, the overseas trader and hotel 
and catering sector were consistently below 2.9 and 
even producing scores below those of the companies 
tested that had collapsed. This may anticipate the 
David Pitt Francis (1988) view, that one of the main 
drawbacks of any Z-score prediction, is that it cannot 
be universally applied. The best that Inman could 
conclude was that the scores indicated likely trouble 
and that urgent management action was needed if long 
term survival was to be achieved. Thus it could be 
argued that Altman did not readily predict UK collapses 
and showed other major UK corporations firms (such as 
LONRHO) apparently in the "grey" area. 
This perceived problem has however remained. Wood and 
Peisse, 1989) see them as substantial. but not 
critical. Rather, they argue that the initial Altman 
model is robust, with few exclusions or exceptions 
being claimed about its performance. Indeed, it is 
common to provide Z-scores commercially for single 
companies, both UK and non-UK based upon the American 
model. Indeed, commercial users wi 11 be more 
interested in scanning affinity groups rather than 
randomised samples, it may be argued that an industry 
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set provides a more realistic test in any event. 
Development of Altman's work 
Irrespective of the reservations cited above, Altman 
was aware of any perceived shortcomings. During the 
1970s, he made modifications to his formula to 
improve its accuracy and to widen its appeal .(1977) For 
private companies, with little or no movement in shares 
and hence no real market price, book value was used to 
derive the value of X4 and a discriminate of U.S. private 
company data produced a set of different weightings:-
Z = O.717Xl + O.84X2 + 3.107X3 + O.42X4 + O.995X5 
From this formula, the revised cut off points become:-
>2.9 all is likely to be well, while the lower limit of 
the "at risk" or grey area goes down to >1.2. 
Altman also recognised that certain industries are 
highly sensitive, and as such, the asset turnover 
fraction was removed. In this case, the resulting 
revised formula became:-
Z = 6.56Xl + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 
and the resulting scores became:-
>2.6 implied safety and unlikely to fail, 
<1.1 was the portent of failure. 
In the late 1970s, Altman along with Haldeman and 
Narayanan (1977) developed a proprietary model. This 
included both small companies i.e. <$25 million asset 
value, a wider range of manufacturing companies and 
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also retail organisations. Greater care was taken in 
developing the model. using bank data on lending 
losses and lending rates as well as taking into 
consideration accounting procedural developments. 
notably the requirement in the United States to 
capitalise leases. (The FAS8's SF AS 13 was issued in 
November 1976, some considerable time before SSAP21 was 
introduced in the UK.) The other procedural concessions 
made to comply with uniformity of presentation were:-
- adding back any contingency provisions (FASS/SSAP18) 
- netting off minority interests into the liabilities 
- introducing non-consolidated subsidiaries (i.e those 
exempt under the rather subjective paragraph 21 of 
SSAP14 [pre ED48J) 
- goodwill was written off (SSAP22/ED47) 
- R&D was written off (SFAS2/SSAP13) 
In addition, there was a greater emphasis in the choice 
of company, matching for industry and year between 
success and failure. The final model develops a Zeta-
score and uses seven ratios namely:-
- return on total assets 
- stability of earnings 
- debt service. which is a logarithmic relationship 
between interest coverage, working capital and total 
debt. (Such a variable is not linearly dependant on 
on the others, but it is likely to have a non-normal 
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distribution.) 
- cumulative profitability - retained earnings:total 
assets 
- capitalization - common equity (ordinary shares) to 
the total capital and is averaged over a five year 
term. Essentially, this is gearing. 
- liquidity - the current ratio 
- size of firms based on total tangible assets 
This model was called Zeta to distinguish it from the 
earlier models. It will also be noted that there is a 
strong trend evident in this formula, responding 
perhaps to the views expressed in the early 1960s, 
namely that ratios in a single year were not reliable 
indicators. The end result was a model that claimed to 
be sUbstantially more reliable and less erratic than 
the earlier Z-scores. When tested against the records 
of 64 companies that had filed for bankruptcy, a 90% 
accuracy within one year was claimed, and a better than 
60% even up to five years. (Table 2.2) 
Table 2.2 Comparative percentage error rates 
Z versus Zeta 
Year from Collapse Z% Zeta% 
1 5 5 
2 28 10 
3 52 22 
4 71 33 
5 64 37 
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While the improvement and hence apparent better success 
rate would appear to be impressive, it should not be 
forgotten that the revised model was developed in a 
somewhat different economic climate and with possibly 
different companies. In any case, this model will not 
be considered in this study, primarily because it is not 
readily available and secondly, due to the trend 
element, it does not readily lend itself to companies 
who have only been in the listings less than 10 years 
and in many cases even shorter periods. 
One final point about the Altman models needs to be 
made. Johnson (1970) criticised Altman by arguing that 
the ratios do not predict, but that the two groups of 
corporations have dissimilar ratios. The corporations 
that had collapsed had differing values for the chosen 
ratios from from those that survived. For a ratio to 
unequivocably predict. the ratio must imply failure or 
non-failure from certain results. 
This criticism may strike at the very basis of the Altman 
and other methodolgy. For Johnson's view to be valid, it 
must imply that a ratio can be identified, universally 
applied and make a clear distinction between survival 
and failure. That no such approach appears to have been 
adopted, or even proved to be practical, is, in itself 
interesting. The Johnson debate does not appear to have 
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been taken up to any great extent in subsequent 
literature. However, it provides for a transition point 
from Altman, who presented a predictive model and 
Taffler, who will appear more equivocal in his 
conclusions. 
The Taffler Model 
In the United Kingdom, a proprietary model has been 
developed by R J Taffler. This is designed to be more 
appropriate to the UK commercial environment and to 
have wider industrial application than that of the 
American Altman. This was eventually outlined in 1977 
and has also become the basis of the PAS-score marketed 
by Performance Advisory Services Limited. 
After testing more than 80 different ratios, the four 
best discriminators were eventually isolated to give 
the basic equation:-
Z = CO + C1Rl + C2R2 + C3R3 + C4R4 
From the 1977 model, values can now be put to the 
coefficients Cl-4 and the result is:-
Z = CO + O.53Rl + O.13R2 + O.18R3 + O.16R4 
where:-
Rl = Profit before taxation/Current liabilities 
R2 = Current assets/Total liabilities i.e total debt 
R3 = Current liabilities/Total assets 
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R4 is described as the "No credit interval" and is 
defined as:- Immediate assets - Current liabilities 
Operating costs - Depreciation 
R1 rightly concentrates on the ability to generate 
profit as a potential for generating cash to pay 
liabilities. In this, the Beaver/Blum approach is 
satisfied, in that the cash "reservoirll is being 
filled. Equally, where the loss exceeds the current 
liabilites, the strain on the reservoir is emphasised. 
However, the choice of a ratio of profit to current 
liabilities is a departure from the traditional 
thinking of the earlier univariate ratios. 
R2 is an extension of the traditional current asset 
ratio. Although asset backing is considered important, 
the model may suffer from the almost traditional 
"blinkered" outlook that the current ratio must be 2:1. 
This belief is emphasised when it is recalled that the 
original basis of the 2:1 was a procedure that put 
greater emphasis on current assets rather than any fixed 
asset collateral. Since contemporary UK clearing banking 
procedures tend to favour fixed assets as primary 
collateral, and the current ratio found little favour 
among the pre-war workers, this may be an inherent 
drawback within the model. 
R3 likewise looks at asset cover and perhaps considers 
the "over trading" syndrome where fixed assets are 
being financed out of current liabilities, usually 
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demonstrated by a persistently high overdraft, well up 
to the limit, and a high creditor level, well out of 
line with what might be expected for the industry under 
review. However, it can have the effect of countering 
any adverse indications highlighted by R2. 
R4, by introducing net immediate assets considers the 
amount by which monetary working capital i.e. debtors 
and cash exceed current liabilities. In adopting this 
approach, the quick asset ratio is emulated. However, 
while this provides a valuable indicator as to just how 
quickly the organisation can pay pressing creditors and 
develops the reservoir idea still further, where there 
is a high costilow margin or loss situation, the impact 
of the negative numerator is sUbstantially reduced by 
the large denominator. 
The constant CO was not included in the 1977 discourse, 
and has yet to permeate the literature. (e.g. Braganza 
1989) However, since a constant only moves the axis, it 
does not influence the interpretation in the slightest 
way. As such, therefore it can be ignored.(Wood and 
Piesse 1989) 
None of the Taffler ratios can be recognised in the 
"best discriminators table" drawn up by Dev (1974). Also 
R1 and R4 are ratios that divided flows by stocks and 
vice-versa, so that the numerator and denominator have 
inconsistent dimensions. Conversely, however, it may be 
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argued that the un~onventional nature of the formula 
tends to answer the inherent problem emphasised by 
Tamari, namely that of window dressing. Additionally, 
it must also be emphasised that Taffler does not regard 
the model as a tool for predicting failure per set 
Rather, if a company has a low score, «0.2 is quoted in 
the 1982 paper) it is exhibiting characteristics of 
companies that have historically failed. In adopting this 
position, Taffler is thus closer to the views expressed 
by Johnson, that failed corporations have ratios with 
different values from those which are perceived 
successful, and as such, any company exhibiting such 
ratio values could be deemed to be in likely danger of 
short term failure. 
Conversely, a positive score (and certainly >0.2) is 
indicative of survival. With the element of overlap, 
and evidence from the research reported below, (Chapter 
5) the nearest Taffler comes to an Altman-style "grey 
area" is where the score is between 0 and 0.3. 
It is worth adding, from a methodological viewpoint, 
that Taffler's prediliction for cash based and perhaps 
unconventional ratios, largely excludes any of the 
identified "size deflators" that have concerned other 
later researchers, including Taffler himself. 
Criticisms of the Z-score Approach 
Almost inevitiably, a substantial number of criticisms 
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have been voiced about the operational shortcomings of 
Z-score analysis. These criticisms appear to fall into 
three broad categories:-
(i) The lack of underlying theory 
(ii) The lack of information 
(iii) Are Z-scores any more reliable? 
(i) The Lack of Unde~lyin9 Theo~y 
This is perhaps where the most serious concern has been 
exp~essed about the lack of any theory about bankruptcy 
or company failure of any kind. Gambling (1985) 
describes the Z-score approach as being rather like a 
decla~ation that the cause of death is dying. By 
contrast, a more operational view was expressed by Pitt 
Francis (1988) who emphasised the lack of universal 
definitions causing a blurring of the distinction 
between short term and long term creditors and the 
problem of general applicability. In part, this point 
may have been answered by Lau (1986), who brings into 
her calculations the possibility of ratios being out of 
step with the industry sector under review.(Chapter 3) 
This point about definitions can be dramatically 
observed when comparing Altman and Beaver. Of Beaver's 
79 companies, only 56 were actually bankrupt, the 
others having failed to pay preference dividend or 
defaulted on loans while one had serious overdraft 
problems. By contrast, Altman selected only firms that 
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were legally bankrupt, in receivership or had the right 
to reorganize under Chapter XI of the National 
Bankruptcy Act. 
Lev (1974) argues that lacking such theory, there is a 
tendency for researchers to adopt a trial and error, 
intuitive and data-availability orientated approach 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986). The results are thus often 
inconsistent and any attempt at generalisation becomes 
impossible. Secondly, Lev points out that since the 
studies are retrospective, (i.e. after the failure 
event,) the sample selection tends to be biased. He 
also suggests that the failed companies were of 
different ages to the non-failed. It is likely that the 
failed companies are younger. This study, by focussing 
on the youthful companies of the USM, may in part 
answer that difficulty. Lev is also critical of the 
paired sample approach and even suggests that non-
accounting data should be included, citing by way of 
example, the Beaver (1968) attempt to introduce market 
prices. 
Lev suggests that prospective analysis may be the way 
forward. This would involve an a priori knowledge of 
the characteristics of failure, then taking a random 
sample of firms using the performance over time to 
detect associations between economic characteristics 
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and the causes of failure. 
The nearest to any form of theory as such, has come 
from Robertson (1983). In developing his own Z-score 
(infra Chapter 3) he has identified four key elements 
in company failure. These are trading stability, 
declining profits, 
declining working capital, 
and increase in borrowings. In many 
respects these are similar to the components identified 
by the banking orientated LENS study of Zimmer (1980) 
and Houghton (1984) and tested statistically by 
Houghton and Woodliff (1987). Like Robertson, the 
emphasis was upon:-
Profitability measured by Profit before Tax (c/f Altman); 
Total Assets 
Liquidity measured by the Quick or Acid Test Ratio: 
Dividend policy measured by the reciprocal of dividend 
cover i.e. Ordinary Dividend (c/f Lau and Gentry et al); 
Ordinary Earnings 
Cashflow generation measured by the reciprocal of 
Beaver's highly acclaimed ratio, i.e Total Debt; 
Cashflow 
Gearing measured by Long Term Debt 
Shareholders' Equity. 
Clearly the profit and gearing ratios respond to 
Robertson's view, and the addition of the liquidity ratio 
partly impinges upon the third component viz., the impact 
of declining working capital. Essentially, if any model 
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development or "best ratio ll is to be considered, then it 
is well to test existing models against the Robertson 
criteria. 
Trading stability 
Altman considers trading stability in the context of his 
sales:total assets ratio. As the market share is lost, so 
this ratio will slow down, because stock is not being 
shifted. The ratio could be exacerbated further by 
increased debtors, since a failing company, conscious of 
loss of market share may adopt a policy of Itsal es at any 
price", the pr'ice being increased credit,(C/f Tamari). 
Taffler does not bring sales into his model, although 
both the Tamari (1964) and Edminster (1972) models 
contain sales based ratios. 
Declining profits 
Inevitably, the ability to generate profit is vital to 
long term survival. In satisfying this criterion, Altman 
considers not just the annual ability to generate profit 
but the impact of retained profits in the form of 
reserves. Taffler considers profit in the context of the 
ability to generate profit to ensure that liquidity is 
sustained. Both researchers give the profit based ratio 
the highest weighting. 
Declining working capital 
Robertson argues that declining profits will lead to a 
declining working capital, exacerbated if a loss 
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situation develops. He also emphasises the impact of 
expansion of fixed assets at the expense of working 
capital. Altman partially satisfies this criterion by 
using gross working capital :tota1 assets. Clearly, if 
this ratio declines, then the resultant Z-score will 
decline and as such, it is certainly indicative of a 
trend towards failure. Taff1er is probably closer to what 
Robertson envisages, in that he considers working capital 
in three of his ratios. First, he considers the ability 
of the current assets to cover the total liabilities, and 
if this ratio declines. then the trend will be towards 
failure characteristics. Secondly, there is the current 
1iabi1ities:tota1 assets ratio. which could also move 
adversely if there is over investment in fixed assets, or 
there is increased working capital from slow moving 
stocks or slow paying debtors. This ratio also would be 
affected by the Tamari view that in the context of 
possible failure. credit lines from suppliers get cut 
off. The third use of a working capital based ratio is in 
the no-credit interval, which if negative, will cause a 
deterioration in the score. but the full impact of this 
deterioration is lost if cost structures in relation to 
profits and losses are high. In this context, the Taffler 
ratios all tend to lack an obvious independence, 
especially since current liabilities is used both as a 
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numerator and a denominator in the formula. 
It should be noted that Tamari (1978) makes an important 
comment in regard to working capital ratios. something 
that Robertson curiously appears to ignor. Tamari 
accepts that a declining working capital situation 
manifesting itself in a hand to mouth operation, 
struggling from day to day is symptomatic of an "at 
risk" or failing company. However. he also envisages 
a situation where deteriorating stock turnover ratios 
are compensated by increasing debtors turnover which, 
coupled to a reduced level of current liabilities would 
actually increase the working capital however defined. 
Nonetheless, whatever the shortcomings may be inherent 
in working capital based ratios, they find considerable 
support among other workers such as Blum (1969,1974) who 
favours working capital :total assets in the same way as 
Altman and Edminster (1972) who employed working 
capital :sales. 
Increase in borrowings 
Robertson sees increased gearing as a means whereby 
profit will be further reduced by increased interest 
charged. In this context, Altman considers total debt, 
controversially in the context of market value, or later 
in the context of total book value. Clearly, the emphasis 
is on security and the ability to sustain debt. However, 
Altman gives the ratio the lowest weighting. 
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Taffler only brings gearing into the total liabilities 
ratio, anxious to see if these liabilities are less than 
the total gross working capital. This again harks back to 
the original American banking view of allowing debt up to 
one half of the gross working capital only. 
While it may be debated that Robertson has not formulated 
any theory of prediction, he has at least suggested 
possible criteria along which any MDA model may be 
provisionally developed, although the following points 
should be noted. 
Few writers seem to favour sales based ratios, and it 
remains to be seen if such ratios are effective 
discriminators. One obvious limitation is the extent to 
which any product is sensitive to industrial trends and 
the economic climate. Clearly, the ability to generate 
profits, increase corporate wealth and pay debts when 
they become due must remain at the centre of any future 
development of predictive models. Working capital is 
subject to the constraints indicated by Tamari. but 
remains a popular ratio. Impact of increased borrowing, 
like sales, may reflect the business sector or the 
current cost of capital. 
(ii) Z-scores are based on hindsight 
In the forefront of this line of criticism is Ohlson 
(1980). More recently, this view has been supported by 
Wood and Piesse (1987, 1989). Ohlson is basically 
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critical of the over-estimation of the predictive 
reliability of the Z-score figure, especially when 
collapse is coming close. The last accounts are often 
late, and are filed much less than a year before the 
failure. This is the essence of the Wood and Piesse 
argument, in that the accuracy measures claimed for the 
Z-score models are based on ex post outcomes I.e. known 
data and as such, the accuracy is artificial and 
subjective and of questionable information value. By 
contrast, Ohlson's criticism argues that there must be 
the same number of companies in the analysis. This 
approach is the basis of the paired sample analysis used 
by Altman and others but is criticised by Lev. Reality is 
that the MDA approach remains valid in the absence of 
paired samples. 
(iii) Z-score superiority 
The original historical research developed a use of a 
number of ratios because it was considered that one 
single ratio was restrictive and potentially misleading. 
Collections or combinations of ratios purport to improve 
the accuracy of ratio prediction. There is, however, 
increasing evidence that this is not the case. Gupta 
(1983) made a systematic comparison of Altman and Beaver 
and found that Beaver's method was definitely more 
reliable than that of Altman. The results over a five 
year period are summarised in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 Beaver versus Altman 
Percentage error in Prediction 
Years before :Researcher: 
colla~se :Beaver Altman 
% % 
1 13 5 
2 21 28 
3 23 52 
4 24 71 
5 22 64 
Clearly, Ohlson's criticism notwithstanding, Altman is 
ostensibly more accurate in the final years, the Beaver 
approach gives a less erratic and possibly more reliable 
long term warning. In addition, Wood and Peisse have 
compared Altman single ratios and found that the combined 
Z-score is no better a predictor than the single ratio. A 
further critical approach in this area has come from 
research that has compared financial market assessment 
with accounting Z-score models. Here the conclusion has 
been that the models do not outpredict the market. 
(Westerfield 1970; Aharony, Jones and Swary 1980) 
Concluding Remarks 
From this historical review, it is apparent that the 
methodology has developed purely on a needs basis using 
empirical evidence. Apart from the tentative efforts by 
Robertson, there has been little attempt to answer 
Lev's plea for a theoretical basis. Rather, the pattern 
has been one of trial and error, ratios being selected 
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because they served the purpose required. The pattern 
seems to be that first individual ratios have been 
identified, then to counter the inherent danger of a 
single ratio, groups of ratios selected. This has been 
followed by combining ratios, and finding an acceptable 
combination. 
Once found, the combination itself has been subject to a 
variety of tinkering exercises, to suit individual 
industry groups, corporate size and possible national 
characteristics. The over-riding problem does not appear 
to have been satisfactorily answered, that of the fact 
that this is all based upon past events, and as 
information in its truest form, has limited value. 
Cognizant of these limitations and doubts, this 
dissertation will evaluate the two major models and then 
the individual ratios will be tested, to see which are 
the most reliable. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE SURVEY 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the main 
contributions to the literature on discriminant 
analysis in the financial field. The emphasis is upon 
the authors other than Altman, Taffler and Beaver. 
whose writings are of particular relevance to the 
study. Nine major research papers will be considered. 
beginning with Blum. This will be followed by a 
consideration of the behavioural approach, centred 
mainly on the findings of John Argenti. 
1 Blum 
Blum (1969, 1974) developed a "failure-prediction" 
model based on accounting and share price data. Blum 
advocated that a prediction model must have a 
theoretical basis and is critical of Altman for his 
lack of such a basis. However, despite the criticisms 
raised by Lev (1974), he used MDA and paired samples, 
computing ratios for 115 companies. Blum's results 
claimed that his model correctly classified potential 
Table 3.1 Major Pioneer Researchers using Mulitvariate 
Analysis 
Author Altman :Taffler:Beaver:Blum :Tamari 
Year 1968 1977 : 1966/8: 1969 : 1964 
No of ratios 
evaluated 22 80 30 12 : 10 
No of companies 33 79 :115 :28 
Years under 
review 1946-55: 54-64:54-68 :58-60 
Country studied USA UK :USA :USA :lsrael 
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Table 3.2 Ratios shown to be good discriminators in 
Multivariate studies 
Current ratios 
Current assets: 
Al tman Taffl er _B~aver' 81 urn Tamari 
V 
Total liabilities 
Net quick assets: 
stock* 
Current 
liabilities:total 
assets 
Capital structure 
Net worth:total 
assets 
:liabilities 
Reserves:Assets 
Market value:Total 
liabilities 
Asset structure 
Working capital: 
total assets 
V 
v 
V 
PBIT:total assets V 
Profit:Sales 
PBIT:Current 
liabilities 
Return on equity 
Sales/Costs 
Sales:Tota1 assets V 
Sales:Oebtors 
Value of prod:stock: 
Value of prod:Wcap : 
No credit interval : 
Cashf10w:Tota1 debt: 
V 
V 
V3rd 
V2nd 
V 
V 
Vlst 
V 
V 
v 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
failures with an accuracy level of 93-95% within a 
year, 80% within two years, and 70% prior to that. 
However, Blum also compared his Failing Company model 
against Beaver's single ratio, and found surprisingly 
little improvement. The ratios that Blum selected are 
listed above in Table 3.2 which also shows the ratios 
used by Altman (1968) and Taff1er (1977) together with 
the ratios Beaver found to be the most consistent 
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predictors on their own. In addition to the single 
ratio, Blum also placed emphasis upon a "trend break", 
i.e. where a variable has a less favourable performance 
than in a previous year - identifying a pattern of 
ratio deterioration. 
Blum has the same perception of the firm as Beaver, 
i.e. a reservoir of assets supplied by inflows and 
drained by outflows. Solvency and ultimately survival, 
depend upon the probability that this reservoir will 
continue to be supplied. Thus, Blum agrees with Beaver 
about cash flow, reinforced by measures of liquidity, 
asset resources and the ability to generate profit. It 
is noteworthy, however, that despite making some 
attempts at moving towards a theoretical base, Blum 
does not appear to either anticipate or answer any of 
Lev's criticisms of the MDA methodology. 
2 Tamari 
A second researcher at this time was the Israeli 
economist, Tamari. In his initial research he compared 
ten ratios calculated from the accounts of 28 Israeli 
industrial companies which had either been declared 
bankrupt, or had been given consolidation loans or 
granted a moratorium, but were, in effect virtually 
bankrupt. Although this definition is close to that of 
Altman, it is a move away from the strict definition 
quoted by Dev (p61) i.e. "inability to pay its 
obligations as they fall due." From his analysis which 
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he called an Index of Risk, Tamari identified:-
- three ratios that exhibited the most marked adverse 
trends, (Table 3.2) 
- ratios which when compared were markedly worse than 
those of the particular industrial sector, 
- and that a large proportion of companies have at 
least one weak ratio thus concluding that the analyst 
cannot rely on one single ratio in measuring the degree 
of risk. By adopting this stance, Tamari is immediately 
perceived as being at odds with Beaver. 
Tamari's best three univariate discrimators are 
interesting in themselves. In identifying net 
profit:sales, he agrees with Ramser and Foster in 
seeing the importance of healthy margins. However, in 
identifying the quick or acid test ratio. he has 
selected FitzPatrick's "4th best". In addition, his 
third ratio, net worth:total liabilities is joint 
third in popularity among the pre-war univariate 
discriminators, as well as being FitzPatrick's "3rd 
best". 
From the univariate study, Tamari went on to develop a 
risk index by assigning weights to discriminate between 
successful companies and failures. This was fairly 
successful in discriminating between companies that 
subsequently failed within the period studied and those 
that did not. He emphasised that the index was not 
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built on the basis of actual data building up to an 
equation, <such as Altman's) but rather on subjective 
and theoretical considerations which, it was suggested, 
would make the index more applicable to different 
sample firms. The ultimate rankings and weights 
allocated to the ratios selected, were derived from 
extensive interviews with credit managers and financial 
analysts in Israel and the United States as to which 
ratios had proved most valuable in indicating ultimate 
failure. 
Although six ratios appear in his Index of Risk, three 
ratios are considered the most important, and are given 
70% of the weightings. These are:-
Equity and capital reserves:Total capital, 
Profit:sales - but with an emphasis on consistency 
of performance over a three year period, 
Current ratio 
The equity ratio was considered to be an important 
indicator. A low ratio, especially where there is low 
investment by the owners was indicative of a potential 
failure and a possible large loss. The trend element 
was introduced into the profit ratio to eliminate the 
potential distortion inherent in an isolated large loss 
at a point in time. To further dampen down any further 
potentially misleading aspects of over-emphasis on 
profits before tax in isolation, consideration was 
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given to trends in value of production. This in turn 
would give an indication as to the size of the firm and 
whether unsold stocks were accumulating. 
Both Altman and Beaver found that the traditional 
current ratio had little to contribute to the 
predictive power of financial ratios, although others. 
for example, Horrigan (1956) and Foulke (1986) suggest 
that it is a good indicator of short term solvency. 
(This may well have influenced the American banks in 
the early years of ratio analysis.) Tamari nonetheless 
retained the ratio, fully aware of the obvious inherent 
defect, i.e.:-
- assets actually increasing because of unsold 
inventories or uncollectible debtors compared with 
reduced creditors because of credit rejection. 
Irrespective of this apparant distortion, the fact 
remains that a ratio of less than 1:1 still means that 
a company is unable to meet its current obligations 
without selling fixed or long term assets. In such a 
situation, a firm can be regarded as financially 
bankrupt, even if not legally or factually. 
In defence of Tamari's seemingly almost obstinate 
stand, Lev cites Altman in emphasising that the most 
successful prediction equation takes into account the 
interactions among the variables, and the variables 
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themselves are not always the most significant when 
utilised individually. Tamari also emphasised that 
that none of these ratios are linked in anyway to the 
industrial sector in which the company operates. High 
gearing. consistent losses and poor liquidity all 
point towards inevitable failure. The three other 
ratios, which require reference to the sector are:-
Value of production/inventory 
Sales/Trade debtors 
Value of production/working capital 
Tamari later collaborated with Parosh to develop a 
statistical model based on regression analysis (1977). 
This approach was favoured in preference to an MOA-
based model because of alleged greater ease of 
availability. greater suitability for use with unquoted 
companies and it required no reference to industrial 
sub-sector or size of firm. This latter attribute, made 
the resultant model more useful in economies where 
sector data and credit worthiness information is not 
readily available. 
The results obtained based on the regression analysis 
based on empirical research on a population of large 
Israeli manaufacturing firms, and containing a batch of 
33 companies that ultimately failed was:-
v = 0.43 + 2.204Xl - O.2X2 + O.371X3 - O.078X4 + 
O.204X5 
where Y = 1 for firms which ultimately failed in the 
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late 1960s and 
Y = 0 where they did not. 
and Xl = profit status 1 for losses in the year 1964 
o for profit in the same year 
X2 = equity/total assets 
X3 = profit trend 1 where losses increased or 
profit/equity declined relative to previous 
years, 0 where the profit or the profit/ 
equity ratio rose 
X4 = current ratio 
X5 = inventory/sales ratio 
The value of R squared was 0.481. 
The use of a profit trend reinforced an earlier study 
quoted in the 1978 text where it was found to be more 
meaningful. This anticipates the Robertson approach of 
nearly two decades later. It also reinforced Beaver's 
view. 
The research endorsed the view held by both Altman and 
Beaver that the current ratio did not give much 
indication as to the future longevity. This is because, 
as collapse approaches, unsold inventory levels may 
increase and debtors likewise increase, reflecting 
either a "sales at any cost" policy or a reluctance of 
debtors to pay up, having heard of the company's 
situation. At the same time, it is likely that current 
liabilities will go down as the company has greater 
difficulty in finding suppliers who will give credit. 
Such a situation would reduce the potential for 
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liquidity based ratios such as the traditional current 
ratio and the quick or acid test ratio to effectively 
discriminate between potentially successful companies 
and those that are likely to fail. 
The approach was found to be a reliable indicator of 
both potential failure and success. However, to 
reinforce the validity of this model it was further 
tested over a period from 1968-1972. The notable 
difference was that while the first research had been 
undertaken during the period of recession and war, the 
the post 1968 period was a time of economic growth. The 
result suggested that the approach was valid 
irrespective of population and economic conditions. In 
adopting this approach, favoured by Watts and 
Zimmerman, Tamari may have been anticipating the 
criticisms raised later by Richardson and 
Davison.[1983J 
3 Robertson 
Although discussed earlier in the context of some 
attempts at conceptualisation, we now review this 
recently developed UK approach of John Robertson 
(1983). Like Altman, Robertson has developed an 
empirically-based multivariate analysis model. However. 
in an attempt to be different, the conclusions are 
based on the rapidity of change, with a perceived bias 
towards the future, rather than the score per set In 
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essence, this approach is akin to the trend-approach 
favoured by Tamari, and the continuum approach (Lau 
infra). Robertson is also critical of the many earlier 
approaches, arguing that in many cases, the formulae 
are based on fairly traditional ratios. (c/f Watts and 
Zimmerman above.) 
The ratios Robertson finally selected were:-
Sales - Total assets 
Sales x 0.3 
Profit before tax x 3.0 
Total assets 
Current assets - total debt x 0.6 
Current liabilities 
Equity - Total borrowings 
Total debt x 0.3 
Liguid assets - Bank overdraft x 0.3 
Creditors 
Following the Tamari approach, Robertson monitors the 
trend of the total score, looking particularly at large 
changes in excess of 20%. As an early warning of 
collapse, Robertson claims from his research, that the 
first major deterioration could have been as early as 
five years before collapse. The in-sample results of 
his study using 48 companies of varying categories 
and size, but excluding specialised finance 
institutions and property companies. are shown in Table 
Robertson thus argues that 87% of the in-sample 
companies he surveyed, had warnings at least two years 
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Table 3.3 Summary of Robertson's Results (1983) 
Year before failure Deterioration of Total Score 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
(Greater than 30% for the first 
time.) 
18% 
20 
22 
27 
13 
before the final collapse. However, he does not appear 
to have performed any out-of-sample tests, as performed 
by Tamari and advocated by Watts and Zimmerman. 
4 Edminster 
One of the criticisms levelled at the models developed 
in the 1960s, was that the firms were perceived as 
large and usually listed on some Stock Exchange. As a 
result, the potential for use among small and possibly 
unlisted companies was limited. Since many failures 
occur among the small developing companies this was a 
serious defect (Argenti and Infant Mortality 1976). 
Although Altman himself ultimately addressed this 
problem by developing a modified Z-score procedure, 
(supra) Edminster developed a model aimed specifically 
at small businesses in 1972. It is important that it is 
considered in the context of this thesis since USM 
companies are "small" by contemporary standards. 
Edminster's study of small US businesses defined a 
"small business" as one which had taken out a loan from 
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the Small Business Administration. 42 loss borrowers 
(failures) were compared with 42 non-loss borrowers 
over the period 1954-1969. Edminster used 19 ratios, 
some of which had already been proved before. He 
eventually produced a Z-score formula based on seven 
ratios, although it is noteworthy that none of the 
ratios selected were chosen by other contemporary 
workers in the field (Dev p71). 
The formula is:-
Z = 0.951 - 0.423Xl - 0.293X2 - 0.483X3 + 0.277X4 -
0.452X5 - 0.352X6 - 0.924X7 
where the variables used are non-linear integer 
mappings onto [0,1] of the following ratios:-
Cashflow:Current Liabilities --) Xl 
Equity:Sales --) X2 
Net Working Capital :Sales --) X3 
Current Liabilities:Equity --) X4 
Inventory:Sales --) XS 
Quick ratio/Industry Average Quick Ratio --) X6 
Quick ratio/Industry Average Quick Ratio --) X7 
The raw data i.e. the financial figures are not 
inserted into the model as such. Rather, four ratios 
(X3 - X7) are compared with industry average ratios, 
and if less than the appropriate sector bench mark. is 
valued as 1, otherwise it is zero. X7 is taken as 1 if 
the quick ratio:sector quick ratio shows an upward 
trend, otherwise it is zero. Finally, ratio Xl is taken 
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as 1 only if its ratio value is <0.05 and if X2 is 
<0.07 then it is taken as 1, otherwise it is assigned 
the value of zero. Using a cut-off of 0.53 (below which 
failure was certain) a 93% accuracy rate was claimed. 
The use of data transformation in the formula is 
complicated to apply and may even appear rather 
subjective and even spuriously accurate. It would thus 
be subject to severe criticism from Robertson who 
argues that any formula should be easy to apply. 
However, the level of accuracy is quite good and the 
technique does attempt to alleviate the problems of a 
wide scatter of ratios inherent with small companies. 
Altman (1983), commenting on this particular prediction 
model, notes that whereas other models developed for 
the larger companies, can give an indication based upon 
one year's published accounts, this particular 
technique demanded three consecutive yearly statements 
for an effective analysis. 
Like Altman, Edminster came up with three categories. 
What he called "white ll equates to Altmans >2.9, and as 
such was a good loan risk. "Black" was a business that 
had been rejected on the grounds that the risk of 
failure was too high. In between came IIgrey" where 
further investigation might be neccessary. 
Despite being frequently quoted in the literature, 
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Edminster's model has gained little acceptability even 
with the Small Business Administration. (Kharbanda and 
Stallworthy p125) 
5 Lau's Contimuum Approach 
A more recent approach, argued as an extension of the 
traditional methods of Altman, Beaver and Ohlson is 
advocated by Lau (1987). Instead of the conventional 
failed/non-failed dichotomy, financial states are 
identified, and the model evaluates the probability of 
entering one of these financial states. The financial 
states comprise a fivefold continuum along which a firm 
may move:-
o - financial stability - the company is ostensibly 
healthy 
1 - omission of dividends - an possible early indicator 
of deterioration. 
(N B This has been defined elsewhere as a distinct 
indicator of a deterioration in financial health by 
Gentry et al (1985, 1987) and essentially, Lau is 
developing their earlier views.) 
2 - default on loan payments - this may be in line with 
the Dev definition of failure, but may perhaps 
relate to a request for time. 
3 - Chapter X/Xl filing under US Bankruptcy 
Legislation. Since there is no equivalent UK 
legislation this has little value in the UK. 
Possibly the nearest equivalent is the 
reorganisation of a company, whereby arrangements 
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are made for the company to reform itself and 
to survive with new management and funding. 
4 - Bankruptcy, attempts to formulate a successful 
rescue package or survival strategy under Chapter 
XIXI having failed. 
Both 1 and 2 above are consistent with Beaver's very 
wide definition of failure. 
One obvious drawback with the Lau approach, is that it 
is failure orientated, having no winner criteria. A 
successful or surviving company would be presumed to 
remain at point O. A further limitation within the UK, 
comes from legislation about distributable profits. The 
need to comply with CA1985 and SSAP8 plus the impact of 
non-recoverable Advanced Corporation Tax would 
influence the decision to pay a dividend. 
In arriving at her continuum, Lau uses a number of 
mixed variables, i.e. trends, single figures and ratios 
listed under three headings. Under the first, financial 
flexibility, are:-
Xl - restrictive loans and rates 
X2 - debt equity ratios that are possibly out of step 
with the industry (My italics) (C/f Tamari and 
Edminster) 
X3 - working capital :debt (elf Taffler) 
X4 - share price trend (elf Altman) 
X5 - operating expenses (elf Taffler) 
X6 - payment of dividend - trend in dividend payments 
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X7 - liquidity (Tamari) 
Secondly, under the heading trends come:-
X8 - Capital expenditure (C/f Tamari) 
X9 - Working capital (Altman and Blum) 
Thirdly under the heading current financial state comes 
X10 - omission of dividend 
Both X7 and XIO represent what Gentry et al (1985, 
1987) described as funds flow components, corporate 
long term viability depending upon funds available to 
cover a dividend, circulation of receivables and money 
being invested in the business to build it up. 
The ratios are then used to calulate probabilities of 
being in one particular stage of the continuum and the 
likelyhood of moving into the next one. Using logit 
analysis, the final formula developed was:-
Z = bjlxl + bj2x2 ••••••• bjl0xl0 
where bj represents the coefficients and probalistic 
scoring from 0 to 4, and the values of xl ••• x10 the 
ratios cited above. 
As an indicator of financial failure. Lau claims a 
success rate better than those of Altman (1968 and 
1977) Beaver and Ohlson. However, it would appear to 
be a somewhat longwinded approach, which mixes trends 
in ratios with trends in other variables. with only 
marginal increases in prediction accuracy over simpler 
models. Further, although it ·appears to present a 
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progressive grey area, in the light of views expressed 
by Watts and Zimmerman, the time scale may be very 
short. and companies move so rapidly along the 
continuum, that the outcome may appear all too obvious. 
The real value of this piece of research is the 
inclusion of the dividend component, which provides an 
extra criterion when evaluating the characteristics of 
failing firms. 
6 The Bank of England/Marais Model 
The Bank of England has developed its own model which 
is based on the model developed by Marais (1979) dnd it 
takes the form of: 
Z = bO + blXl + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 
where Xl = current assets:total gross asset (Altman) 
X2 = reciprocal of gross total assets 
X3 = cash flow:current liabilities (elf Blum) 
X4 = funds generated from operations:net increase 
in working capital to total debts 
bj = regression weights 
The model was developed from 38 failed companies and 53 
non-failed listed companies. This approach partially 
answers Lev's criticism that there is no apparent 
practical reason why the control group cannot be much 
larger than the failed sample. Indeed, the main 
advantage of such a large control group wi 11 be the 
decrease in sampling errors of the estimates of solvent 
firms economic characteristics, and hence an 
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improvement in the reliability of the results. Over a 
three year period it was found to be more accurate than 
earlier models. The results were then verified using 10 
more failed companies and 19 non-failed companies. This 
complied with the Watts and Zimmerman view of 
methodology. Although the Bank admits to be reasonably 
satisfied with the working of its model, it emphasises 
that:-
(1) Any model is subject to accounting procedures 
inherent in a company or industry. The Bank noted that 
it was particulary unsuitable for:-
(i) shipping companies who have special provisions 
under CA1985, 
(ii) contracting companies who might have special 
problems in complying with accounting standards, 
(iii) unlisted companies who would not make available 
all the information required of listed companies. On 
the latter point, such an admission may enhance the 
validity of the improved Altman small company score and 
the more complicated model of Edminster. 
(2) More important however, is that the score is 
derived from the latest data of a company. Z-scores 
cannot be readily calculated from published interim 
statements, so source data has to be derived from the 
annual accounts. This means that the data may be at 
least four months old, and if there are problems, 
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likely to be late anyway. (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) 
The advantage perceived by the Bank is that it is a 
starting point for further analysis, especially where 
there is a falling trend in the Z-score.(C/f Robertson) 
Falling trends almost inevitably indicated a impending 
collapse. Again, this is also close to Taffler's view, 
that the final score from the ratios indicates that the 
company exhibits certain characteristics, and if the 
score is low; those exhibited characteristics are of 
companies that have failed in the past. 
7 Ohlson 
In 1980, Ohlson published a paper in which he based on 
corporate financial data from the 1970s. This study 
identified four major features in affecting the 
probability of failure:-
i the size of the company (just starting up and hence 
small - USM companies are likely to be of similar 
size) 
ii the measures of financial structure (C/f Robertson 
on change of gearing, but there are USM companies 
that are highly geared.) 
iii measures of performance 
IV measures of current liquidity.(Still deemed 
important despite misgivings and potential inherent 
drawbacks.) 
Ohlson was critical of earlier studies because they 
assumed that the final statements for the year of 
collapse are disclosed before filing for bankruptcy. 
Reality, he argues, is often the reverse. Indeed, the 
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accounts are often late, and bankruptcy may already be 
inevitable by the time the results are declared, and 
the very lateness is in itself a characteristic of 
impending doom. Thus this erroneous assumption causes 
the overstatment of the model's 'forecasting ability. 
Methodologically, Ohlson uses financial data from firms 
10-K SEC reports, because he can determine when these 
reports are likely to be available. Data availability 
is important to Ohlson, reinforcing the view that 
models must be able to work on data such as the Hambro 
Guide that is relatively cheap and readily available. 
In the final Logit-based model t nine variables were 
eventually used and no new or exotic ratios developed. 
Like Altman, he selected working capital:tota1 assets, 
and net income (profit):tota1 assets. In addition, 
elements of change and trends are also introduced. (C/f 
Tamari and Robertson) For the sample, he took 2058 non-
failed firms from the Compustat file and a bankrupt 
sample of 105. This not only academically responds to 
Lev's view, but also relates the proportions of 
companies vis-a-vis success and failure. An obvious 
inherent difficulty in any analysis of bankrupt firms 
is that there are so few of them in comparison to the 
total commercial population. This problem is 
exacerbated as the firms progress and become larger. 
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Ohlson did not find that his model improved the 
accuracy of prediction. Rather he concluded that more 
factors may be required if sUbstantial improvements in 
classification were to be achieved. This in turn would 
create a far more complicated model including non-
accounting factors and based on the procedure suggested 
by Neter (1966). 
It would seem from Ohlson and the Bank of England 
experience, that there may be an optimum whereby the 
marginal cost of improving the model to obtain more 
reliable results is not Justified due to the increased 
complexity. The Bank's pragmatic view that such models 
are, at best, initial indicators, coupled to the view 
that companies with low Z-scores exhibit the 
characteristics of companies that have collapsed 
before, would seem to be the guiding rubric. 
8 Bar-niv and Raveh(1989) 
This study presents a new approach to the prediction of 
financial distress. The authors criticise MDA and other 
techniques because they are an adaptation of models 
developed and used for other purposes and can be 
perceived as lacking robustness. Much of the problem 
seems to stem from a non-normality of initial data. 
Their response has been to develop a continuous scoring 
system based upon a nonparametric model which they have 
tested empirically across differing US industry 
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groupings. The paper reports on the testing of the 
methodology of approach, but does not attempt to 
finally produce the most accurate and efficient 
definitive model. The main advantage derived from this 
approach is a reduction in misclassifications arising 
from overlap - the area where non-failures are classed 
as failures and vice versa. Another point advocated was 
that other variables may prove more effective in 
classifying companies. This in part answers Taffler, 
who was conscious of "conventional" or "traditional" 
ratios being vulnerable to manipulation, and the 
true situation and hence score being obscured. In 
testing the approach, much of the data used was 
supplied by Altman. A number of variables were tested, 
with eventually 10 being selected. It is not surprising 
that a marked similarity with Altman's original ratios 
can be seen. 
The ratios were:-
Xl = Net income/Total assets (Altman) 
X9 = Current Assets/Total Assets (Altman) 
X16 = Log(Total Assets) 
Xl? = Market Value of Equity/Total Capitalisation 
Xl? is similar to Altman's ratio that also uses Market 
Value. 
These four ratios were considered the most important. 
In addition there were, 
X3 = Current assets/Total Assets (Altman) 
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X6 = Cashflow/total debt (Beaver 8. Blum) 
X2 = Quick assets/Total assets (Taffler) 
X10 = Quick Assets/Total liabilities (Taffler) 
X14 = EBIT/total assets (Altman) 
X20 = 10g(Interest Coverage + 15) 
The writers claim a similar success rate in the year 
before bankruptcy but an improved performance three 
years before the collapse. This, it could be argued, is 
the major advantage. Early Altman models were highly 
erratic three years before collapse and the 
availability of data in the final year may well mean 
that the collapse is visible before the accounts are 
published. 
9 Wood and Piesse (1989) and other contemporary 
research 
In a paper presented at the British Accounting 
Association conference in Brighton in September 1989, 
Wood and Piesse reported on their specific analysis of 
the UK automobile components industry. In this 
analysis, they identified 24 listed companies over the 
period 1974-86. During this time, four were acquired by 
predators, two had definitely failed, and one, Dunlop, 
went through a major reorganisation and was eventually 
taken over by BTR. The extent of the reorganisation was 
such that the company could be regarded as a failure. 
They tested the Altman, Taffler and Marais model and 
their findings were critical of the quality of 
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information efficiency available from Z-score analysis, 
since the accuracy claims are on an ex-post basis. In 
addition, when they compared the performance of 
individual ratios, there was little improvement. 
Among the other more recent research in this area is 
work advocating Multidimensional Scaling and also logit 
analysis (Mar-Molinero and Ezzamel 1986). Logit 
analysis has the advantage of being statistically 
correct in contrast to many of the Z-score models, 
particularly those of Tamari and Edminster, where 
either/or variables are introduced. In the research the 
companies had to have been able to present financial 
data for at least 5 years, and be either in 
receivership or compulsory liquidation. Twenty-seven 
firms were identified as in this category, and 170 non-
failed firms were compared with them. In selecting 
ratios, no underlying theory was developed, and the 
emphasis was upon ratios popular in the literature. 
(c/f Beaver 1966 and Robertson 1983) Despite the 
complexity of mathematics employed, the authors argue 
that the results can be readily and easily 
interpretated. In addition, they accept that there is 
no clear set of financial ratios that can be used as a 
representative data set for measuring the health of a 
firm but that there is some indication five years 
before the end, with marked deterioration in liquidity 
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and profitability in the final year. 
Inevitably, this is not an exhaustive review. The 
authors detailed above have been selected for their 
potential contribution to the methodology of the 
research. 
Other models have been developed, either because they 
are specific to an industry or geographical locality. 
For example, Mason and Harris (1979) have concentrated 
on the building and construction industrYt while banks 
and financial services, have been the subjects of Meyer 
& Pifer (1970) and Copeland and Ingram (1983) and the 
commercial credit sector by Apilado (1974). From the 
geographic standpoint, van Fredericklust (1978) has 
developed a Dutch model, and a highly comprehensive 
study based upon legally required corporate returns, by 
Ooghe and Verbare study has led to the development of a 
a Belgian model.(1985) 
The Contribution of the Behavioural Aspect 
No review of the literature would be complete without 
some reference to the behavioural contribution. It has 
validity since, while most failure prediction models 
rely exclusively on financial data, the validity of 
non-financial data and behaviour cannot be discounted. 
Indeed t Lev (1974) in his evaluation of prediction 
techniques through ratio analysis calls for a more 
systematic comparison of the financial data with the 
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non-financial (p150). 
The behavioural writers have therefore drawn attention 
to the qualitative and managerial aspects of corporate 
collapse. Formost in this field within the UK has been 
John Argenti (1977, 1983), who has argued that failure 
is a complex process which is unlikely to be modeled 
successfully by one equation such as a Z-score 
function. Rather, he believes that failure is something 
that takes many years to complete. As such, (and like 
Lau above) he identifies three distinct stages:-
i) There is something inherently wrong with the 
management especially in its response to change. 
ii) They then make a major mistake. 
iii) Finances start to deteriorate. 
Clearly, Argenti is looking at a longer time cycle than 
perhaps the purely financial models would suggest. 
Indeed, it could be suggested, that (i) and (ii) above 
may occur fairly way back in a firm's history, and 
(iii) is the eventual result. 
In the light of this, and after studying the aftermath 
of the Rolls-Royce collapse in 1971, Argenti has come 
up with an A-score based upon the premise that:-
- Ratios even when combined can be misleading. 
- There will always be problems of different companies 
even in the same industry. 
- There will be change within the mix of ratios. 
In adopting this latter premise, Argenti has recognised 
the Tamari view, and is to some extent anticipating 
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Robertson and Lau. Equally, cognizance of the 
shortcomings of ratio combinations is acknowledging the 
perceived statistical shortcomings that have been the 
subject of the more quantitative approaches to the 
corporate failure problem. 
Argenti's resultant list contains seven essential 
factors -
(i) "Top management ll consisting of an autocratic or' in 
the context of the USM, charismatic, combined chairman 
and chief executive surrounded by lIyes" men. Non 
executive directors are passive, primarily interested 
in keeping their seats on the Board. 
(ii) A lack of adequate accounting information, 
epitomised in a weak or even non-existent financial 
director, poor accounting systems, inadequate budgetary 
control, inadequate monitoring and control of cashflow 
and inadequate costing systems. 
(iii) A lack of IIdepth of management ll • Instead of 
experienced operations managers, the team consists of 
IIpaper pushers II and men promoted beyond their level of 
competence. 
(iv) The resistance to change and lack of the skills 
to adapt to change. 
(v) Possible manipulation of the accounts:- window 
dressing, creative accounting, and an overall lack of 
consistency rather than blatant "fiddling." 
(vi) A history of rapid, almost too rapid expansion. 
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This may be particularly important in considering the 
type of company that has come to the USM. 
(vii) The economic cycle may have an effect. This may 
be relevant in considering companies growing and 
progressing through the 1980s. Certainly, out of sample 
studies, or repeating the exercise as Tamari did. goes 
some way to vindicating this viewpoint. 
Perhaps in adopting this approach, Argenti. as per 
Robertson, is partially responding to the Lev appeal to 
identify determinants of failure and then develop a 
system of scoring. Inevitably, since qualitative 
characteristics are introduced, there will be a strong 
subjective element within the final score. 
Nonetheless, Argenti has developed his A-score. the 
outline of which is summarised in Table 3.4. In 
essence, it awards points for managerial defects, 
managerial mistakes and symptoms. The total score is 
100, with anything above an overall of 25 giving early 
warnings of danger. It will be seen from Table 3.4, 
that whatever misgivings Argenti may have about relying 
exclusively upon quantitative accounting data, his 
"score" really relies upon a straightforward use of 
univariate analysis of the accounts, a subjective 
interpretation of the accounting and managerial 
inadequacies already outlined, .and the use of Altman's 
original Z-score albeit "adjusted" to suit a perception 
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Table 3.4 Computation of Argenti's "A score II 
Managerial defects (pure) 19 
(accountancy) 24 (to pass, the sub-total had to be <10) 43 
Managerial mistakes 45 (pass <15) 
Symptoms Bad Z-score 4 
"Creative accounting" 4 
Non-financial signs 3 
Terminal signs 1 
Total 100 
of UK conditions. At best, all that Argenti has 
achieved, is to suggest possible lines for 
investigation after discovering a poor Z-score. In 
that, he is crudely anticipating the approach adopted 
by the Bank of England with a fully quantitative model. 
Most analysts would follow such a methodology anyway 
and the efficacy of such an approach in the context of 
failure has been verified by Killough and Koh (1990). 
Other behavioural symptoms identified in the literature 
are:-
Miller (1977) a Canadian who describes:-
(i) "Running Blind ll - an impulsive, expansionist and 
ambitious power hoarding chief executive. (C/f Argenti) 
(ii) "The Stagnant Bureaucracy II - the firm full of 
paper pushers dominated by an autocratic chief 
executive. This is similar to Argenti's resistance to 
change symptom. 
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(iii) liThe Headless Firm" - A lack of definite 
leadership at the top with a consequent lack of Fayol's 
coordination. In the context of the USM, this could 
always arise from a succession crisis. 
(iv) "Swimming Upstream" in the wake of past fai 1 ures. 
This follows on from Argenti's concept of a major 
mistake, but compounding it, rather than trying to 
rectify it. A complete lack of overall strategic 
planning is also evident. 
By contrast, another behavioralist, Homan (1984) 
identifies five major categories under which he groups 
a number of minor symptoms:-
(i) Frivolous signs: 
(c/f Argenti) 
(ii) Weakness in 
management 
(iii) Technical or 
commercial 
problems 
(Argenti) 
(iv) Financing 
(v) Faulty or 
"creative" 
accounting 
Out of 16 e.g personalised number 
plates on the company Rolls, 
obsession with tax avoidance, no 
accountant on the board. 
(elf both Miller and Argenti) 
Volatile products, over 
dependence upon one particular 
market, poor pricing and 
costing systems. This could be an 
inherent problem with 
niche-market USM companies. 
possible over-gearing, or high 
gearing in terms of norms for the 
sector, (Robertson) inadequate 
finance to expand, poor cashflow 
cashflow (Gentry et al) and 
deteriorating debt collection 
record. Adverse rates of debt 
finance are likely to be in this 
list also. (Watts and Zimmerman) 
late accounts, changes in policy 
to remove consistency, inadequate 
or excessive information. 
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Three of the points highlighted above deserve comment 
in the context of companies on the USM. First, USM 
companies tend to be niche-market orientated. Thus, 
almost by definition, the companies are likely to be 
very dependent upon one or a very few particular 
specialist market(s). Secondly, USM companies are 
likely to have inherent financing problems. Many have 
come to the market specifically to gain long term 
finance and to reduce debt. Thirdly, late accounts are 
almost symptomatic of collapse in themselves and have 
been described as having a serious detrimental effect 
upon the credibility of the Z-score procedures.(Watts & 
Zimmerman) 
More recently still ,(1987) R S Norgard has identified 
15 symptoms, which he has classified under two main 
headings. 
Operational 
Overtrading 
Margin erosion 
The "Big" Project 
High gearing 
Corporate inertia 
Changes to the business 
Problem borrowing 
Decline in service standards 
Financial 
Financial ratios 
Lack of cashflow 
forecasting 
Lack of financial 
information 
"Creative Accountingll 
Undercapitalisation 
Too much easy money 
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History of continuing losses 
Some of the so-called "operational" symptoms could be 
considered under the financial category. EquallYf some 
of the symptoms are unlikely to apply to USM companies. 
Most of these qualitative approaches share a number of 
similarities. It is worth noting f however f that the 
Norgard approach is linked to a proprietary 
quantitative model known as FES which gives both a 
score and risk rating f a computer summary of key 
figures and ratios and facilitates manual credit 
assessment procedures. This has been developed into 
TIMES - (Total Integrated Management Evaluation System) 
by KMG Japan. Like Ooghe and Verbare's Belgian model 
referred to abovefthis has a certain amount of direct 
access into company information and can even get into 
day to day transactions, to give an almost continuous 
update. 
Since this dissertation is concerned about success as 
well as failure f it is relevant to describe a 
qualitative success formula. The Peters and Waterman 
(1982) Success/Excellence model lists eight qualitative 
characteristics of success, some of which may be 
relevant to appraising successful performance. 
(i) A bias for action and getting on with it. 
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(ii) Close to the customer - learning from the people 
they serve - unparalled quality service and 
reliability. 
(iii) Autonomy and entrepreneurship - innovative 
(iv) Productivity through people - good labour 
relations. 
(v) Hands on value driven, top management close to 
the operations. 
(vi) "Stick to the Knitting" - an aversion to 
conglomerates and concentrating on what the 
business does best. This is likely to be 
important to niche orientated USM companies. 
(vii) Simple form, lean in staff organization. Very 
small corporate headquarters. 
(viii)Simultaneous loose/tight properties. Such 
companies recognise that there is a case for both 
centralisation and decentralisation. There is 
decentralised operational autonomy, but highly 
centralised strategic philospohy. 
This model was developed based on the research into 62 
American companies over a wide range of industries and 
services. In that respect, it is similar to both the 
graduate population and the sample population of USM 
companies under consideration. There was quantitative 
financial growth included in this research over the 
period 1961-1980. The USM in its current format has 
only been in existence since 1981, however, the points 
raised may prove to be of relevence. 
Concluding remarks 
These come under three basic headings. 
(i) Improved Models 
From this survey of the literature, it is evident that 
a lot of research has been undertaken in order to 
I 
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correct perceived shortcomings of the pioneering Z-
score models. Attempts at improvement have focussed on 
models with apparently greater accuracy, and/or models 
that have greater statistical credibility. The results 
have been at best, indifferent. Models have become more 
expensive and the marginal increase in accuracy and 
reliability questionable. Indeed, the view of Killough, 
Koh and Tsui (1989) is salutary. They compared the 
discriminant analysis approach, with its recognised 
statistical shortcomings with the logit and probit 
based models and found that there was no consistent 
superiority in any of the methods over the others. 
Perhaps the pragmatic view of Marais and the Bank of 
England needs to be reiterated, that discriminant 
analysis provides a useful starting point for further 
examination and objective evidence of potential trouble 
ahead (Killough and Koh 1990). 
(ii) Information Value 
Schools of thought have criticised the information 
value of the models, especially since much of the 
research has been on an ex post basis. Other criticisms 
have stressed the over emphasis on the techniques 
without any thought to the need to develop an 
underlying theory. Little progress seems to have been 
made in this direction. A further viewpoint suggests 
that the high cost is not justified, since the results 
are little better than those achieved by single ratios. 
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(iii) The Behavioural Input 
The input from the behaviouralists indicates that 
prediction of corporate performance, and of failure in 
particular may contain non-financial criteria. This 
responds to Lev's view and Argenti certainly makes a 
strong case for considering the wider implications of 
managerial decision making and ski 11, a view endorsed 
by Kharbanda and Sta1lworthy. In the context of USM 
companies, the behavioural view may give indicators of 
reasons for survival that are based on culture and 
t i g h t e r m 0 r ere s p 0 n s i v e " top - dow n" con t r· 0 1. Howe v e r , 
such strengths, combined with a charismatic 
entrepreneurial flair may also contain inherent 
weaknesses, not least in problems of succession. 
In developing future models, it may be that the 
approach adopted by Mar-Mo1inero and Ezzame1 may hold 
the answer. A spectrum or map of characteristics, 
combining the indications of Z-scores and changes, 
managerial decisions and ski 11, and possibl y even the 
changes in the economic climate. This latter point may 
vindicate the view that there is no universally 
applicable Z-score model, since different business 
sectors respond in different ways to economic changes. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE NATURE OF THE USM 
Historical Background 
The USM was established in 1980 to provide a formal 
market to meet the needs of less mature and smaller 
companies that would be unlikely or unable to apply for 
a full listing. At the same time, the requisite Stock 
Exchange regulatory control would be maintained under 
Rule 163. Rule 163 provided for occasional bargains 
matched by brokers. The USM was created to fit in 
between the official IImain board ll or fully listed 
companies and the Rule 163. 
In considering the nature of companies entering the 
USM, the use of the term IIl ess mature companies ll in the 
Stock Exchange Green Book is important. It may help to 
develop a hypothesis about the inherent nature of 
companies still extant in the USM. 
Historically, the concept of a IIsecond tier ll market is 
not new. It was first recognized as desirable in 1931 
when the MacMillan Committee on Finance and Industry 
reported with a specific emphasis on the importance of 
small firms to the economy, and the need to provide 
such firms with access to adequate means of finance. 
The response to this was the establishment of the 
Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation. Further 
investigations into the need of small firms to finance 
their growth have been the Radcliff Committee Report in 
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1959, the Bolton Committee Report in 1971 and the 
Wilson Committee report of 1979. 
In the United States, the Small Business Administration 
was set up in 1953 to provide assistance to small 
firms. This assistance included the provision of long 
term loan finance. Later, in the wake of the Federal 
Reserve Report to Congress in 1958, Small Business 
Investment Corporations were set up to fill a perceived 
equity finance gap. The advantages of this, plus the 
establ ishment of an Il over the counter" type market in 
the United States has enabled small companies to 
benefit from wider access to financial resources. 
(Davies and Pointon 1984) 
As a result of this, in 1978, the Stock Exchange began 
publicising the availability of such arrangements to 
deal in unlisted securities under the thirty year old 
Rule 163. Many of these companies were from the Oil & 
Gas sector, who were anxious to raise funds for 
"fringe" oil and gas field exploration, without the 
complicated regulations of the American market, took 
advantage of Rule 163. 
The creation of the USM in November 1980 was a response 
to both the perceived threat from the Over the Counter 
Market and the Wilson report of 1979. This report had 
highlighted the slump in stock market floatations 
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during the 1970 and the need for something to be done 
for small companies. It was perceived that many 
companies were not coming to the market because of the 
increased cost and formalities. plus the problem of 
size. The practical economic minimum size for a company 
to come for a full listing is about £5 million market 
value and a pre-tax profit of £0.5 million. figures 
which many USM companies satisfy with some considerable 
margin. The interesting aspect of this criterion is 
that it makes the typical USM company of similar size 
to Altman's companies, when considered in historical 
cost terms. although when measurements are made In 
constant price terms, they are normally smaller than 
Altman's original companies. 
In the event, out of the 443 companies listed as having 
entered the market by 31.3.1986. some 144 had entered 
the market in the years to 1982. The need under the 
Stock Exchange regulations for a "track record II of 
three years indicates that these companies were tradIng 
and registered as "unl isted" prior to 1980. Of the 144. 
76 were trading in 1980-81 and therefore were trading 
in 1978 when the Rule 163 facility was made more 
available. Expansion (Table 4.1) has been rapid as a 
result of publicity highlighted the demand from small 
companies and investors as well as creating the 
inevitable problem of investor protection. 
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Table 4.1 Number of Companies Admitted to 
the USM each year 1980 1989 
Year Number 
1980 23 
1981 60 
1982 63 
1983 85 
1984 98 
1985 96 
1986 91 
1987 72 :Source: KPMG Peat Marwick 
1988 87 :McLintock USM Quarterly Report 
1989 51* :Oecember 1988 
* Based on year to date figures, September 1989. 
Although the pattern of entry is not important in 
the context of this study, the number of Rule 163 
entries fell away sharpl y after 1981. In 1980, there 
were 10, and they were 43% of all the entries. In 1981, 
there were three, (5.2%) and in 1982 and 1984. one 
each. There have been no Rule 163 entries since 1984. 
The Present Situation 
The present situation is thus a three-tier system with 
a formal market outside the official listing. The USM 
occupies the second of these tiers:-
Tier 1 is the traditional full listing. 
Tier 2 is the market for companies which wish to have 
their shares dealt in regularly. Such companies are 
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required to meet certain criteria on entry and be 
subjected to continuing regulation, but do not have to 
meet all the stringent entry requirements for a full 
official listing. 
Tier 3 contains the traded "Over the Counter ll stocks 
that may be only rarely traded, although with the 
creation of the "Third Market .. , some of these 
securities are now traded on a more regular basis. In 
1990, in order to comply with E E C proposals for 
proposals for restructuring European capital markets, 
there are plans to merge most of the Third Market into 
the USM. 
Chartered Accountants Robson Rhodes see the ideal 
candidate as having a trading profit of consistently 
above £100,000 per annum and a potential for long term 
growth. However, they do emphasise that the long term 
projections will be looked at thoroughly, since this is 
the key to success. It may be that this emphasis on 
potential rather than past performance explains why a 
number of USM companies show an indifferent Z-score 
before coming to the market, but the score improves 
substantially about entering the listings. (Cucksey and 
Medland 1984, Hutchison, Meric & Meric 1988) 
Public relations literature about the USM emphasises:-
- young businesses that are growing quickly, 
- dedicated and committed management that in most cases 
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have retained on average 70% of the equity after the 
f 1 oa t , 
- joined the market within the last seven years, (This 
is inevitable since the market has only been in 
existence for rather less than 10 years.) 
- growing companies, highly UK based. 
(The USM Magazine Press Release post October 1987.) 
Two points need to be added to the idealised profile 
above. First, the comment about retained equity may 
have some bearing on the continued existence of 
companies which ought to have failed. In fact, there 
are examples (such as Merrydown and Federated 
Housing) where the directors' and founders holdings 
have been reduced. The converse is also true, failures 
or likely failures where the holding remained high, 
(BiD-Isolates and Castle GB) and successes where the 
holding has remained high. Secondly, dedicated and 
committed management may equate with charismatic and 
entrepreneurial management which may be difficult to 
replace. The long term ability to surVive the passing 
of the founder management and to accept an injection of 
new professional management may be critical to the 
eventual survival of USM companies.(C/f Argenti) 
The Debate about Advantages and Disadvantages of the USM 
Much of the publicity literature produced by the major 
accounting and advice firms anxious to gain valuable 
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business from successful USM introductions contains a 
list of advantages and disadvantages that can be derived 
from a USM listing. While much of this is irrelevant to 
the thrust of this thesis. a few points are relevant. 
1 In the area of advantages:-
The advantage of access to additional funds reduces debt 
and is likely to have an advantageous effect on any score 
especially where there is emphasis on debt capital. In 
addition. since the lack of growth is seen as a 
characteristic of possible future failure, any means to 
stimulate growth such as the ability to make acquisitions 
by means of a share issue, can only be seen as 
advantageous. That the shares may come to the market at a 
premium will increase the reserves and possibly market 
value, both which could influence a subsequent score 
rating. 
2 In the area of disadvantages:-
Inevitably, management becomes subject to constant 
scrutiny by the press and investors. Almost any event can 
become newsworthy, bad trading results, boardroom 
conflicts. even personal problems can influence the 
perception of the company, and possibly cause the shares 
to be depressed below the net asset value. which can in 
turn reduce the company's ability to operate and increase 
its vulnerability to a predator. This has two 
identifiable consequences. Firstly and almost inevitably. 
a volatile element is brought into the share price which 
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could effect the Altman score, while secondly, it may 
have an exacerbating effect from the standpoint of 
Argenti·s A score. 
This may be an inherent problem. The very nature of a 
significant proportion of the companies that have come to 
the market renders them prone to enjoy the publicity 
element but very vulnerable to the impact of adverse 
publicity. Two of the more spectacular examples of this 
unfortunate aspect of corporate life in the USM have been 
Pineapple, an early entrant which has had to undergo a 
major but ultimately unsuccessful reorganisation to 
survive and Sock Shop (dealings suspended with £16 
million debts February 1990). 
Profile of the Typical USM Company 
Typically, the USM candidate has initially achieved the 
status of a public limited company having passed the 
resolution under $43 of the Companies Act 1985. From a 
financial standpoint. the £500,000 minimum market value 
will have also been satisfied. However, there has been 
wide fluctuations in size, from Midsummer Inns with a 
mere £551.000 to Acorn with £13.7 million. Ironically, 
the latter has been one of the USM·s less than happy 
histories. Up to 1985. Chartered Accountants and USM 
specialists KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock reported 20 were 
capitalised over £12 million, with a median range of £3-4 
million. 
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Financial advisors Hoare Govett perceived such companies 
as being dynamic, cash hungry, young but not infants, and 
as such are unlikely to be vulnerable to the mortality 
rating inherent with infant companies. Commercially, the 
emphasis on the high technology manufacturing sector and 
emerging specialist services. Many of the early 
candidates were identified as coming from management buy-
outs, old firms starting with a new lease of life, rather 
than completely greenfield start ups. Indeed, Rawsley 
(1984) argues that such companies performed indifferently 
in the early years of the USM's development. The 
predominance of older firms in the early years was shown 
in 1984, in that while 22% of the USM companies were 
younger than 5 years, 37% were over 15 years old. 
(Bannock and Doran 1985) 
From a qualitative standpoint, would-be investors were 
perceived to be concerned about:-
- managerial ability and the impact of reorganisation 
- range and depth of managerial skills and continuity 
- managerial succession and service contracts 
- impact of the burden of the new reporting demands 
In addition, the trading risks that the company would be 
likely to face were considered important. Under this 
heading were dominant contracts, customer base, supplier 
base, product range, exposure to innovation and technical 
change, competitors and ease of market access. workforce 
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and labour relations, management organisation and asset 
replacement. It is worth noting that the lack of many of 
the above criteria make up Agrenti's "A" score 
(1976, 1977) • 
Type of Company Entering the USM 
The guiding philosophy of the USM is to provide finance 
for small but growing companies who might never otherwise 
reach the situation where they readily qualify for, or 
justify, a full listing. In the light of the comments 
made by Hoare Govett it is not surprising to find 41% of 
the companies entering the market come from only four 
clearly specified industrial sectors. (Table 4.2) 
Table 4.2 Analysis of Type of Company Coming to the USM 
Industrial Sector Number 
Hire Purchase etc 3 
Beers, wines etc 8 
Building etc 14 
Chemicals 7 
Drapery 8. Stores 29 (6.5% of total) 
Electricals 91 (20.5% of total) 
Engineering etc 4 
Food 8. Groceries 21 
Hotels 8. Caterers 11 
Industrials (Misc) 87 (19.6% of total) 
Insurances 5 
Leisure 30 (6.8% of total) 
Motors 8. Aircraft 7 
Paper 8. Printing 36 (8.1% of total) 
Property 26 
Textiles 1 
Investments etc 16 
Oi 1 8. Gas 31 (7% of total) 
Plantations 2 :Source: KPMG Peat 
Miscellaneous 14 :Marwick McLintock .!...!T!..!o2t~a~1:.....!....!....E..!~~=------;;4~4-;:::3---7: USM Qua r t e r 1 y Sur v e y 
: Ap r i 1 1986 
The table above shows a domination of only four sectors, 
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electricals, (the largest single sector) drapery & 
stores, leisure and publishing. Very few come from what 
might be regarded as traditional capital goods 
manufacturing sectors. This would make the typical USM 
company somewhat different from the type of company 
analysed by Altman and indeed to a lesser extent, by 
Taffler also. 
Just as the emphasis on electricals confirms Hoare 
Govett's description of emphasis upon the high technology 
manufacturing sector, "Miscellaneous" embraces a wide 
variety of esoteric specialist services. Under that 
heading would come specialist design houses - Blanchards, 
Bluebird Toys, and John Michael Design, (now the JMD 
Group), thoroughbred horses [British Bloodstock] private 
professional education [Chart Tutors - (taken over 1986) 
private health care (Swindon Private Hospital and West 
Yorkshire Independent Hospital). This in itself 
eloquently demonstrates the change in UK commercial life, 
where against a background of entrepreneurial 
inventiveness and opportunism, there has been 
considerable expansion in electronics, a rising use of 
sub-contract specialists, a growing demand for services, 
due to greater leisure and spending power in terms of 
disposable income for eating out and keeping healthy. 
Additionally, the areas where market entry requires a low 
level of initial investment have been focussed upon. This 
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creates a pattern that contrasts markedly with the kind 
of commercial profile that attracted Altman in his 
ini t ial surveys. 
Comparison of USM Companies with Altman·s Original 
Research 
Altman·s initial 66 companies were traditional 
manufacturing based corporations. Indeed, his original 
model, when transferred to capital intensive service 
industries i.e. railroads, was less successful and other 
ratios were found to be needed. (Altman 1973) By 
contrast, the USM is poorly represented in what might be 
described as the traditional manufacturing areas. As 
Table 4.2 illustrates, there are only seven in the 
chemical sector, fourteen in building and construction, 
and only four in engineering, although the latter sector 
has increased substantially since 1986. Additionally, 
while there is a dominance in electrical/electronic, 
"industrials" and paper and printing, these sectors 
contain a wide variety of related activities, primarily 
distribution and support services rather than mainstream 
manufacturing or assembly. As a result any investment is 
likely to be lower than in the traditional Altman company 
and there may be an inherent bias within the USM for low 
initial investment easy entry type companies. A further 
aspect that needs to be considered is the relative size 
of USM companies. Altman looked at $25 million asset 
value in the mid 1950s. To appreciate the size 
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difference, Table 4.3 lists some USM companies as at 
1985, and scales down the data to 1955 values. The 
calculations are based upon OECo/UNO deflator price 
gross national product indices. 
Table 4.3 Comparison of Size between USM companies 
and Altmanfs typical company 
Company Turnover Gross Asset Value Total Debt 
£ $ $: £ $ $: £ $ $ 
1985 1955: 1985 1955: 1985 1955: 
Merrydown: 8.8 11 .5 3.2: 4.0 5.2 1 .4: 2. 1 2.8 0.8: 
Oceonics :70.4 91 .5 25.3:50.5 65.7 18.1:34.8 45.2 12.5: 
Castle GB: 15.7 20.4 5.6: 9.9 12.9 3.6: 8.0 10.4 2.9: 
Fed House:27.9 36.3 10.0: 7.5 9.8 2.7:11.6 15. 1 4.2: 
McCarthyS:37.9 49.3 13.6:77.6 101. 27.7:41.4 53.8 14.9: 
Body Shop: 9.4 12.2 3.4: 4.8 6.3 1 .7: 3.2 4. 1 1 .2: 
Robt Horn: 123. 160. 44.2:52.7 68.5 18.9:34.0 44.2 12.2: 
Carlton C:38.1 49.5 13.7:42.6 55.4 15.3:19.2 24.9 6.9: 
M i c r 0 9 en: 23. 1 30.0 8.3: 11. 1 14.5 4.0: 8.0 10.4 2.9 : 
£1(1985) = $1.30 Source: Hambro Company Guide 
It will thus be apparent that most USM listed companies 
are smaller than the companies originally analysed by 
Altman, but not dramatically so. Those that are closest 
in likeness to the original profile, such as Builders and 
manufacturers of Paper and Paper Products are in fact 
similar in size. 
Profile of Typical USM Companies 
In order to obtain an appreciation of the nature of a 
typical USM company, general profiles of the four types 
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of company discussed in this dissertation are now 
presented. 
Profile of the Graduate 
From analysis of data In the Hambro Company Guide, it 
will be observed that at the end of 1987, a typical USM 
graduate company is likely to have:-
- a turnover of between £25 and £100 million 
- a gross asset value of between £10 and £25 million 
- a profit before tax:turnover ratio of greater than 10% 
- a total debt below £25 million if not below £10 
million, 
- a negative no credit interval, and 
- an acid test ratio of <1:1 
In addition, the Hutchinson, Meric, Meric (1988) study 
finds that USM companies have experienced an acceleration 
in turnover growth rates, might use more debt finance and 
have less investment in current assets. 
It is likely that USM companies graduating to the main 
list on the Stock Exchange will come from one of the five 
major sectors identified in Table 4.2 with graduation 
taking place between 2~ and 3 years after first entering 
the listings. It is worth adding that some of the 
graduate companies have achieved ranking among the very 
best of UK companies. Graduate USM companies that have 
achieved this status from among the traditional sectors 
are Bespak, McCarthy & Stone, and the Robert Horne Group, 
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(taken over by Buhrmann Tetterode NV Summer 1990) while 
Carlton Communications and Microgen Holdings are 
graduates which are much more typical of the type of 
coming to the USM. 
In addition, it is possible to guage the perception of 
the standings of such companies from the Hambro 
Performance Rankings Guide. This shows how companies 
compare within both their sector and the market in terms 
of performance percentile rankings (with 1% implying at 
the top, and 100% near the bottom) based on performance 
measured in terms of inter alia turnover, pre-tax profit, 
growth and liquidity. From the 1988 edition, it is 
evident that during 1986-1987, a typical USM graduate 
company is likely to be ranked as shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Performance Ranking of a Typical USM Graduate 
1986-87 
Measure 
:Turnover 
:Growth 
Position 
:Second quartile 
:Second quartile :Source:Hambro Performance 
Rankings Guide 1988 
:Top guartile 
Thus, in terms of the criteria tabulated above, a USM 
graduate company will rank within its industrial sector 
and the total market between 26-50% in terms of turnover 
and profit, and between 1-25% in terms of growth. That 
such companies should be among the top for growth 
vindicates both the Robson Rhodes and Hoare Govett 
perception of potentially successful USM companies. 
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Conversely, it should be noted that a USM Graduate is 
very unlikely to be ranked below 75%. 
Profile of the Non-graduate USM Company 
This describes a USM company which, while not a graduate, 
is still successful and has a history of profitability. 
Typically, from data in the Hambro Guide, such a 
company can be identified as being characterised by 
having:-
- a turnover of between £10 and £25 million, somewhat 
smaller than the graduate USM company, 
- a gross asset value and total debt of less than £10 
million each, 
- likely to have a negative No-credit Interval, 
- an Acid Test Ratio of <1:1, 
- a net profit before tax:turnover ratio )10%. 
Since such a company is smaller than the graduate, it 
will be substantially smaller than the classic Altman 
company. When compared with a graduate, it is likely to 
be less spectacular in its performance rankings. Indeed, 
there are no clear cut groupings of non-graduate 
companies as there are with the graduates. The only 
ranking that comes anywhere near is capital employed in 
that USM graduates are ranked in terms of capital 
employed between 26-75% while non-graduates are typically 
ranked between 51-100%. 
Non-graduation should not be perceived as a short coming 
or even a failure. Two surveys conducted in 1983 and 1985 
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by Chartered Accountants Spicer and Pegler revealed that 
while such companies may have a full listing as a future 
long term objective, there were good reasons for 
remaining in the USM, namely cost of a full listing, 
investors perceptions that they are too new and anxiety 
about the 25% holding, for remaining in the USM. These 
reasons are summarised in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Reasons for Successful USM Companies not 
seeking a Full Listing 
Reason Very Reasonably Not 
sisnificant sisnifianct sisnificant 
% % % 
1985 1983 1985 1983 1985 1983 
Expensive 35 42 29 30 36 
Too new 22 17 25 15 53 
25% public 
holdins 20 7 12 8 68 
Source: Going Public The USM and OTC Experience 
Spicer and Pesler 1985 
Profile of an "At Risk" Company 
28 
68 
85 
As part of the analysis and the review of methodology, 
a number of companies deemed to be "at risk" have been 
identifed. Such companies have not necessarily fai18d, 
but have turned in low Z-scores, had persistently poor 
profit and liquidity records, needed possible 
reorganisations and even changed quite considerably. In 
some cases, their very survival would seem to vindicate 
the qualitative view advocated by Argenti, that survival 
may be the result of good management making the right 
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decisions at the right time. Where the company benefited 
from the drastic managerial action, it was subsequently 
excluded from the analysis. Such "at risk" companies can 
come from both the graduate and non-graduate groupings. 
graduate groupings. Table 4.6 summaries these companies. 
Table 4.6 "At Risk" Companies 
Name Group Event/Characteristics 
BiD-Isolates Non-grad Persistent bad Z-scores 
Entertainment P S Non-~rad Reorganised 1988 
Greenwich Comm Non-grad Indifferent performer 
Reorganised 
Pineapple/Prospect Non-grad Reorganised 1989 
Paul Michael Non-grad Reorganised 1987 
Britannia Security Graduate Indifferent performer 
Mellerware Graduate Needed to reorganise 1987 
Microfocus Graduate Indifferent performer 
Oceonics Graduate Indifferent performer 
Anglo-Nordic Graduate $425 merger 1987. 
Air Call Acquired 1986 
Humberside Chapter 7 Reorganised 1988. 
Wm Morris Chapter 7 Reorganised 1988. 
Crown Reorganised 1988 
Healthcare Successfully reorganised 
1983-4 
John Michael Reorganised 1988 
Reorganised 1988 Thorpac 
-------------------------------------------------------
Note: The references to Graduate, Non-graduate and 
Chapter 7 in the Table 4.6 above indicate that the 
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company has been analysed under one of those headings. 
The five not allocated to one of these groups were added 
because of later events. 
Profile of a Failure 
Table 4.7 profiles the pattern of failures, defined by 
KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock as those companies which have 
been suspended or had their quotation cancelled. 
Table 4.7 Pattern of Suspensions/Cancellations 
Year Entries Suspended/Cancelled Cumulative 
Year Cumulative Year Cumulative % 
1980 23 23 3 3 13.0 
1981 60 83 4 7 8.4 
1982 63 146 4 1 1 7.5 
1983 85 231 8 19 8.2 
1984 98 329 3 22 6.7 
1985 98 427 2 24 5.6 
1986 90 517 2 26 5.0 
1987 72 589 1 27 4.6 
1988 87 676 2 29 4.2 
1989* 51 727 2 31 4.3 
* Cumulative to September 1989 
Source KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock USM Survey 
As at the end of September 1989, 31 USM companies had 
failed as defined above. The percentage shows the 
cumulative pattern of failures, as a proportion of 
companies coming to the USM. Inevitably, as the market 
has progressed, the failure percentage has declined. A 
cumulative percentage failure of 4.6% at the end of 1937 
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and 4.3% by September 1989, compares well with the 
generalised failure expectation of Taffler (1982) of 10% 
but does not appear to correspond with the Altman et al 
(1977) 1% annual rate. In the bullish economic 
conditions, with perceived potentially successful 
companies, that the percentage is small and better than 
expectations is not perhaps surprising. As to 
characteristics, it is likely that the symptoms suggested 
by Robertson (1983, 1984) may be a dominant feature of 
the typical failure, and this is discussed in Chapter 7. 
Concluding remarks 
The outline profiles provide a good indication of the 
type of company under examination. The companies are 
typically small indeed much smaller that those tested in 
Altman's initial research, but nonetheless well 
established. All have youth, so the comment that failed 
companies tend to be younger than non-failures (Lev 1974) 
does not apply. Being well established removes any 
possibi 1 i ty of fai 1 ure arising from Ar'gent i' s "infant 
mortality". There is no obvious pattern of size, or even 
industrial sector as Table 4.8 shows. Equally, with only 
31 failures out of 727 entrants and 458 still extant 
within the market, is suggestive of an ability to survive 
that may be better than average for listed companies. 
Indeed, when Table 4.8 is compared with Table 4.2 above, 
·it is inevitable that the pattern of suspensions and 
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cancellations reflects the sectors where the USM 
companies are prevalant, i.e Leisure, Other Industrials 
and Electricals/Electronics. However~ at present~ no 
sector appears disproportionally represented among the 
Table 4.8 Suspensions/Cancellations 
Industrial Grouping 
Grouping 
Contracting 
Electronics 
Motors 
Number 
2 
4 
2 
Other Industrial 4 
Food (Manufact) 1 
Food (Retail) 1 
Health 1 
Leisure 4 
Stores 3 
Agencies 2 
Conglomerates 2 
Miscellaneous 2 
Oil 8. Gas 1 
Property 2 
Other Finance 1 
Total 31 
Source KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock USM Survey September 
1989 
casualties. What may ultimately prove interesting as the 
economic climate changes, will be to see how extant USM 
companies and the Graduates perform within the sectors 
most at risk~ such as Drapery 8. Stores and Leisure. 
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CHAPTER 5 TESTING THE ALTMAN AND TAFFLER 
MODELS ON THE GRADUATE COMPANIES 
For this chapter and the two that follow, the Altman 
and Taffler models are tested to see how well they 
classify companies in line with an expected hypothesis. 
Within the overall population of USM entrants, three 
groups of companies have been identified:-
1 The Graduates - companies that have transferred to a 
full listing. 
2 A sample of USM companies who have not made the 
transfer. (These are discussed in Chapter 6.) 
3 The "failures ll which are discussed in chapter 7. 
This chapter will deal exclusively with the Graduates. 
The Graduates - Definition and Characteristics 
The Graduates are the 108 USM companies [as at 
31.12.1987J that have transferred from the USM to the 
Full Listing and therefore have satisfied the 
requirments laid down by the Stock Exchange for a full 
listing. It should be noted from chapter 4 that 
"Graduation ll in itself is not a single featur'e of 
success. Rather, to have graduated to a full listing, 
such companies will have had to have satisfied the 
rules laid down by the Council for the Stock Exchange: 
- the "Yellow Book ll • The book gives little guidance as 
to the performance criteria that need or perhaps ought 
to be satisfied. However, some quantitiative criteria 
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are quoted. 
As an indication of size. (and an implied success 
arising from the proportion of share premium and hence 
goodwill). the "Ye11ow Book" expected market value of 
the securities for which listing is sought must be at 
least £700,000 in the case of shares. A lower figure 
will. however, be accepted if there is an adequate 
market for the securities. 
In addition to the £700.000 requirement. there is a 
similar requirement for information with respect to the 
profits and losses. assets and liabilities, financial 
record and position in the form of an audited 
accountants' report. The most significant aspect of 
this prerequisite is that it is for the 5 years 
preceding the appl ication for the listing, and the 
earnings per share details for the three years 
preceding the application for listing. 
Thus. while it is no indicator of inherent success 
within itself, "graduation" does indicate a reasonable 
period of longevity. satisfying the criterion outlined 
in "In Search Of Exce11ence" (1982) and the requir'ement 
for retained profit in the Altman Z score. 
Inevitably, not all the graduates have been listed on 
the USM for the full duration of the five year period 
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under review. However. the 32 that have, exhibit an 
average growth in turnover during the period of 5.8 
fold, indicating an average annual growth of around 
16%. However, it is evident from the Hutchison, Meric, 
and Meric (1988) study that the likely pattern is to 
show acceleration in growth after coming to the USM. 
with some further acceleration after graduation to the 
full listing. In addition to growth in turnover, a 
similar pattern for asset value can also be 
identified. Here the average for the five year period 
is 7.5 fold, indicating an average annual growth in 
assets of 50%. 
However, when the scores for the graduates are 
analysed, this pattern of growth and progress is not so 
patently evident. Part of the reason for this is that a 
substantial proportion of the graduates had come to the 
before the period of the study i.e. pre-1983 and 
therefore few pre-issue scores were available. As such, 
only 14 were identified as fitting the criterion of 
having scores which showed improvement after coming to 
the market, while post graduation produced a slightly 
larger group of 21. However, there was evidence that 
if the Altman score was taken in isolation, a larger 
group was identified, suggesting that the Altman score 
was more sensitive to the changes. This may be due to 
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the fact that the Altman score includes growth measures 
such as asset value and sales turnover, the latter 
being a numerator. Finally. it should also be noted 
that the Altman score contains a market price element. 
which would be boosted by a successful issue and 
graduation. However, in a number of cases, the reverse 
happened. Either there was no obvious improvement in 
Table 5.1 Analysis of the Industrial Categories of the 
USM Graduates (31.12.87) 
Industrial Sector Number % 
Hire purchase 2 
Building 2 
Drapery & Stores 2 
Chemicals & Plastics 2 
Electricals 21 
Engineering 1 
Hotels & Caterers 4 
Industrials 18 
Food & Groceries 2 
Leisure 7 
Paper/print/ publish 18 
Motors & aircraft 1 
Property 13 
Financial services 
Oil and gas 
9 
6 
108 
1 .8 
1 .8 
1 .8 
1 .8 
19.5 
0.9 
3.6 
16.7 
1 .8 
6.6 
16.7 
0.9 
12. 1 
8.4 
5.6 
100.0 
Source: KPMG Peat Marwicks USM Market Surveys 
April/May 1986 & December 1988. 
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the score, or the score actually declined. 
Approach to the AnalYsis 
The total number of companies selected covers most of 
the industrial sectors wherein USM companies might be 
found. The analysis by industrial category is to be 
found in Table 5.1 above. 
Methodology 
The companies were analysed using Altman 1968 and 
Taffler Z-scores for the five year period from 1983 to 
1987 using the published data from the Hambro Company 
Guide. Non-availability of data for 31 companies, plus 
the exclusion of oil and gas. insurance, property and 
investment companies reduced this figure down to around 
68 companies. The exclusion of such companies was 
because it was felt that since they derive their 
profits and turnover from capital growth rather than 
conventional trading, they would not be typical. 
Indeed, insurance companies frequently do not have a 
turnover in the accepted sense. 
The slight variation in the number of companies from 
year to year was due to some companies not coming to 
the USM until after 1983 and hence no data being 
available. while others had been acquired and hence 
deleted from the listings before the end of 1987. The 
mean and standard deviation figures are summarised in 
Table 5.2. 
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Analysis of the Results 
To begin to test the initial hYPothesis, Table 5.2 
gives a summary of the mean Z-scores under review. It 
is apparent. as might be expected, that the Taffler 
score consistently averages >0.0 and indeed >0.3, while 
the Altman mean is consistently >2.9. Since Taffler's 
successful companies have to exhibit positive Z-scores. 
it was inevitable that all the scores should be 
Table 5.2 Summary of Taffler and Altman Results. 
Taffler Altman 
Year: 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987:1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
n 61 66 68 65 63 : 61 66 68 65 63 
w : .352 .384 .397 .405 .409:4.41 4.63 4.68 4.69 4.70 
(J : • 169 • 169 • 170 • 190 .245: 1 .91 1. 78 1. 77 2. 10 2. 12 
u-2(J: .014 .046 .057 .025 -.08:0.59 1.07 1.14 0.49 0.46 
t :16.2 18.5 19.3 17.2 13.3 :5.99 7.89 8.26 6.86 6.72 
* Based on the hypothesis of an 0.3 cut-off. 
positive. Indeed, from Table 5.2 above. in all years 
except 1987, the value of (u - 2(J) was >0.0. This was 
to be expected, since by the very nature of the 
position as graduates, such companies would be 
perceived successful, and as such have a positive 
Z-score. The hypothesis that these companies exhibited 
Z-scores greater than zero was formally examined via 
Student's t-test. In all instances, highly significant 
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test statistics were obtained, confirming our 
expectations. 
The Taffler score was also tested to see if the 
graduates exhibited a consistent pattern above )0.3. 
While this is above Taffler's 1982 suggestion of 0.2 as 
a cut off for exhibiting the characteristics of 
collapse, the results nonetheless revealed that the 
graduates were largely successful, unlikely-to-fail 
companies, exhibiting Z-score means in excess of 0.3. 
Student's t-test was applied to both sets of data to 
confirm that the results were statistically 
significant. Even so, whatever the cut-off point. be it 
0.0 as in the 1987 Taffler paper, 0.2 or 0.3, it may be 
possible to imply that there is a grey area for the 
Taffler score between 0.0 and around 0.3. 
For Altman, graduate companies would expect to be 
scoring )2.9, since they could be presumed as unlikely 
to collapse. Again, the t-test was employed to test 
this contention and expectations were confirmed. 
However, closer examination of the raw data showed that 
although the overall means were greater than 2.9, there 
were still companies in each year with scores below 
even 1.8. 
The pattern of the results in Table 5.2 is to be 
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expected. Overall. the means are characteristic of 
successful, growing companies. However. it should be 
noticed that while the means tend to increase. so are 
the standard deviations and this is affecting the lower 
limit of (u - 2~). Both scores indicate a wide spread 
in the first year. 1983, caused by some pre-USM entry 
figures being included in the analysis. with 1984-1985 
being the best. 1986-87 show evidence of an increase in 
the spread again, possibly due to the early signs of 
economic slow-down in the UK economy. This impact of 
this apparant general trend is discussed later in the 
present chapter. 
Since both the Altman and Taffler Z-score models 
purport to show the same thing, i.e. a pointer towards 
future continuing survival or collapse, it is logical 
to examine the correlation between the two sets of 
results. The results of the Pearson's correlation 
coefficients between each year are listed in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Correlation values Taffler/Altman 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
R : .6127 .6487 .6140 .6526 .6942 
These coefficients are all significantly different from 
zero. Hence, there is a suggestion that the two sets of 
scores are linearly related in a positive sense year by 
year. The strength of this association generally 
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increases from 1983 to 1987 with the highest figures in 
1986 and 1987. This may be due to a greater inherent 
stability as the companies progress away from first 
entering the listings and move through graduation. 
In addition to the correlation exercise, the SPSS 
package was used to perform factor analyses on the 
data. The essence of this technique is to replace the 
original variables. in this case the Taffler and Altman 
scores by a small number of "underlying" variables. 
Broadly speaking, the object IS to reduce the 
complexity or dimensionality of the data. The use of 
factor or cluster analysis is not new to the analysis 
of financial data. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) cite 
research undertaken by Kaplan and Roll (1972) that 
identified associations in investment tax credit 
changes in one particular year, while changes in 
depreciation were found in three years. Other studies 
have been undertaken by Gupta and Huefler (1972) who 
investigated growth in turnover ratios, and Gombola and 
Ketz (1983) who researched financial ratios and 
corporate liquidity. 
The results in Table 5.4 show that both Taffler 83-85 
and Altman 83-85 possess a high common features 
reflected in factor scores. This is identified 
mathematically as "Factor 1". These six variables have 
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thus formed a cluster correlating highly with each 
other, yet remaining distinct from the remaining 
variables. "Factor 211 produces a second cluster 
involving Taffler 86-87 and Altman 86-87. Consequently, 
without a significant loss of information, our data may 
be reduced to two sets: [iJ the years 83-85 and [iiJ 
the years 86-87. These two sets of data are similar 
amongst themselves, but dissimilar between the two 
sets. It maybe significant that the higher degree of 
linear correlation in Table 5.3 is emphasised in the 
clustering in Table 5.4. A contributing factor to the 
1983-85 cluster pattern may be the impact of newer. 
Table 5.4 Results of Cluster Anal~sis 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Eigenvalue 4.92 2.37 
Cumulative %: 
of variance , 49.2 72.4 I 
:Vear: 
Taffler: 83 .78553 .07601 
84 .85093 .32308 
85 .67475 .55576 
86 .22801 .81971 
87 .01400 .85470 
Altman 83 .83097 : -. 17185 
84 .82957 .13358 
85 .71221 .26278 
86 • 18126 .85195 
87 .08018 .89392 
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more euphoric companies entering the listings in a 
bullish economic environment. Clearly. 1984-85 were the 
years when the most entrances were made, and 1983-84 
when the largest proportion "graduated." Conversely, 
the 1986-87 cluster may also reflect that conditions 
for USM Graduate companies were beginning to show 
changes which impinged upon their performance. and it 
was these changes that were beginning to emerge in 
1986-87. 
Assessment of the Reliability of the Models 
To test the efficacy of the hypothesis and hence the 
models still further, the classification of the 
companies by the models needs to be analysed. Table 5.5 
summarises the initial results. Correct classification 
implies that as Graduate USM companies they should be 
successful and as such, have scores that reflect 
success. In addition, however. it should be expected 
that there may be companies that are at risk, i.e. in a 
grey area, and any potential failures recognised. Thus 
the table below identifies the proportion of the annual 
population correctly classified as being unlikely to 
fai 1, "at risk" or a potential fai lure. 
From Table 5.5 the initial results reveal that 
Taffler's model correctly classifies USM graduates as 
successful companies on average just over 80% of the 
time. There is a trend for the results to improve from 
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Table 5.5 Summary of Initial Classifications 
Taffler :Vear: 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
n = 61 
Unlikely >0.3: 46 
"At risk ll 
>0 - 0.3: 14 
Possible 
failures 1 
Total %: 75 
Altman 
Unlikely >2.9: 50 
"At risk " 
>1.8 - 2.9: 9 
Potential 
failures 
Total 
2 
%: 82 
66 
51 
14 
1 
77 
56 
9 
1 
85 
68 
57 
11 
84 
63 
4 
1 
93 
65 
54 
10 
1 
83 
65 
12 
82 
63 
54 
8 
1 
86 u - 81.0% 
63 
7 
2 
86 b! - 85.6% 
below 80% in 1983-84 to almost 90% in 1987. Altman has 
a similar level of performance. but although the 
overall average percentage of expected correct 
classifications is 86% the pattern of the results is 
more erratic. 
However, the reliability of the models to classify 
companies per se is an essential part of this analysis. 
This means that the classification should be able to 
identify the successes and any misclassifications must 
be explained. This means the scores must classify any 
failures or potential failures that may be among the 
graduate population. To do this. first. we can adjust 
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for any companies that fall into the Hutchinson Meric 
Meric analysis, i.e. show low scores either before 
coming to the USM and/or before graduation, on the 
basis of their hypothesis that entry to the markets 
stimulates growth which will be reflected in an 
improved Z-score. As explained in chapter 4, market 
analysts and promoters look for long term potential 
rather than just the historic performance when 
assessing candidacy for the listings. Thus a probable 
entrant could exhibit a Z-score that is lower than the 
cut offs, but not indicative of failure. Since failure 
could only by judged objectively by using the revised 
Altman model for private companies described in 
Kharbanda and Sta11worthy (1985), it becomes pertinent 
to add back the companies whose low score could be 
construed as relating to pre-USM entry. Inevitably, 
such an adjustment will have considerable impact on 
the Table 5.5 results in the earlier years, notably 
1983 and 1984. In addition, any failure classifications 
can be identified. Table 5.6 shows the results of this 
adjustment, there being no warnings of collapse 
indicated by the parameters. 
The second adjustment that can be made reflects the 
possibility that the fixing the Taff1er cut off at 0.3 
may be too high. Since Taffler 1982 advocates a 0.2 cut 
off, it is reasonable to consider that accuracy of 
120 
classification can be improved by adopting that cut-off 
level. Table 5.6 shows the classification results after 
allowing for any apparant misclassifications that 
Table 5.6 First Revised Taffler Assessment 
Year :1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
n = 
Per Tab 5.5 
Adjust for non: 
61 
46 
66 
51 
68 
57 
entrants 10 4 1 ~---.:..------=-
Revised total 56 55 57 
Revised ~ 92 83 85 
65 
54 
54 
83 
63 
54 
54 
83 !J = 85.2% 
can 
be explained by Hutchinson Meric Meric. while Table 5.7 
shows a revised Taffler Assessment, introducing the 
impact of adopting an 0.2 cut-off point. 
Table 5.7 Second Revised Taffler Assessment 
(based upon Taffler 1982 cut-offs) 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
n = 61 66 68 65 63 
Z = >0.2* 54 61 62 61 60 
Pre-USM 4 1 
Potential 1 2 3 2 1 
failures 
---------------------------
Revised total: 59 
Revised 98 
64 
97 
65 
96 
63 
97 
61 
98 !J = 97.3% 
*Note: Some of the new entrants had scores between 0.2 
and 0.3. Since these companies have been successfu~ 
since, they have been incorporated into the non-falled 
group. 
-------------------------------------------------------
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This clearly improves the Taffler classification rate 
substantially. However J such a cut off is insensitive 
to the one major collapse among the graduates during 
the 1983-87 period J that of Anglo-Nordic, and the 
warning scores (i.e. <0.2) are equivocal, merely 
suggesting the possibility of collapse to a small group 
of companies. none of whom have actually collapsed yet. 
This is in keeping with the basic Taffler conclusion, 
that companies are displaying characteristics in 
keeping with companies thatJ in the past, have 
ultimately failed. 
Turning now to Altman J the same exercise can be 
performed, firstly to allow for any adjustments for the 
Hutchinson Meric Meric analysis, and secondly for any 
identifiable adjustments for misclassifications. Table 
5.8 summarises the results of this exercise. 
Ostensibly, as with Taffler, there is an apparent 
improvement and when compared with Taffler, a slight 
edge still remains. However, the improvement is not as 
marked as in Table 5.7, when the Taffler 1982 cut-off 
is employed. What is more significant is that the model 
has. unlike Taffler, indicated the ultimate demise of 
Anglo-Nordic, given an early warning about Leisure 
Investments, and the need of Mellerware/Beacon to 
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Table 5.8 First Revised Altman Assessment 
Year : 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
n - 61 66 68 65 63 
Unlikely 50 56 63 :13 54 
HMM 5 2 
"At risk ll 1 1 
Failed 1 1 
Re-organised 1 1 
Revised total: 55 58 63 56 57 
Revised % 90 88 93 86 90 JJ - 89.5/0 
undertake an urgent re-organisation. 
Two other possible modifications can be considered. 
Altman revised the top cut-off point down to 2.7 and it 
is this cut off point that Wood and Peisse (1989) use 
in their appraisal. Equally, Argenti. (1983) in his 
interpretation of Altman, altered both cut offs. 
producing an upper limit of 2.0, and a lower limit of 
1.5. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 summarise the results of this 
analysis. 
Again there is an apparent improvement. the correct 
classification percentage increasing to 91.2%. The only 
failure is identified and a warning given to a company 
that eventually failed sometime after the period under 
review. The only real impact that adopting the 2.7 cut-
off has is to take out the top of the "at risk" 
grouping (i.e. 2.7 - 2.9) companies which may have a 
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Table 5.9 Second Revised Altman Assessment 
(Based upon Success >2.7) 
Year :1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
n = 61 
Unlikely 
(Tab 5.5 above): 50 
Impact of 
Revision 
HMM 
IIAt risk" 
Failure 
Revised Total 
Revised % 
1 
5 
56 
92 
66 
56 
5 
2 
63 
95 
68 
63 
63 
93 
65 
53 
1 
2 
56 
86 
63 
54 
1 
1 
1 
57 
90 JJ = 91.2% 
better long term future. Argenti's interpretation of 
Altman removes much of the need to adjust the results 
for the impact of the Hutchinson, Meric, Meric findings 
since the failure and success cut-offs are so low. 
Table 5.10 The Impact of the Argenti Interpretation 
Year 
n = 
Unlikely 
(Table 5.5) 
Impact of 
Revision 
HMM 
:1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
61 66 68 65 63 
50 
8 
2 
56 
9 
1 
63 53 54 
4 8 5 
Revised Tota1~:~6~0 __ -=6~6 __ -7677-__ 6~1 __ ~5~9 
Revised % 98 100 98 94 94 JJ = 96.7% 
However, the few remaining misc1assifications are, ln 
fact all incorrect. Potential failures that have yet to 
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fail are identified. while the two ultimate failures 
among this population of graduates are not identifed. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
Taking an overall view of the results. there is no 
apparent evidence of any sector being dominated by. or 
even having an excessive number of apparent mis-
classifications. There is a 23~ apparant mis-
classification of electrical companies by the original 
Altman, but much of this is due to five companies 
having persisently low scores. This may vindicate an 
opinion that the cut-offs for the electrical sector may 
need adjusting. The other sector where there is a 
a possible high proportion of mis-classifications is 
Leisure, where both models show a group of companies 
that have persistent bad scores. There is no apparent 
trends among these sectors or any others to warrant 
detailed analysis at this stage. 
The apparant "falling back" of the performance of both 
Z-score models may be a reflection of the change in the 
economic climate. 1983 and 1984 were still early days 
for both the market and many of the companies. Even so, 
the models perform adequately when allowance is made 
for the Hutchinson Meric Meric pre-entry factor. 1985 
was the year when there were the most entrants. Since 
then there has been a general slowing down. and the USM 
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itself is less active. Slightly fewer companies have 
come to the market, and acquisitions and graduations 
have fallen away almost to a trickle. with none at all 
in the 21 months after December 1987. At the same time, 
a more steady trend of failures is beginning to emerge. 
It can be concluded that the models appear to correctly 
classify companies with a high degree of success. 
However, the success rate is based upon successful 
companies rather than failures, appearing to vindicate 
the criticisms levelled at Z-score methodology. Such a 
view would certainly find support among the memebers of 
the "paired sample school II of methodology. That the 
the misc1assifications do appear to occur in certain 
specific sectors may confirm the critical view that 
either Z-scores do not have universal application, 
or, as the score patterns in certain sectors might 
suggest, there may be inherent behavioural or cultural 
factors that keeps a company, and a USM company 
especially, ostensibly viable in complete contradiction 
to the financial figures when these are taken in 
isolation. This would vindicate Lev'S view, that 
must go beyond the pure financial data. What may also 
be true is that the misclassifications are too small in 
number, and the populations too small for any 
significance to be concluded. This may confirm the 
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Watts and Zimmerman viewpoint. 
Further overall concluding remarks are at the end of 
Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 TESTING THE ALTMAN AND TAFFLER 
MODELS ON THE NON-GRADUATES 
This chapter analyses a random sample of approximately 
60 out of the 324 (i.e approximately 20%) USM companies 
that were on-going as at the August 1988 Quarter issue 
of the Hambro Company Guide. The method of selection 
was to take the published list9 number the companies 
and select using random number tables. The four 
industrial sectors excluded from the earlier graduate 
analysis (Chapter 5 above) were also excluded from this 
analysis. A summary of the companies and their sectors 
is shown in Table 6.1. InevitablY9 it is likely that 
some of the companies will have since graduated 9 been 
acquired 9 or had their quotation suspended or cancelled 
since August 1987. 
Table 6. 1 Summar~ of Non-Graduate Com~anies 
b~ Industrial Sector 
Sector :Number Percentage 
Motors & Garages 2 3.3 
Industrials 22 36. 1 
Drapery & Stores 1 1 18.0 
Electrical 6 9.8 
Paper & Print 6 9.8 
Engineering 2 3.3 
Food 2 3.3 
Leisure 8 13. 1 
Brewi n9 & Wines 2 3.3 
Total 61 :100.0 
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Hypothesis 
These companies are ostensibly non-failed, but in the 
main have not moved into the full listing. Therefore we 
should expect to find:-
- Altman (1968. 1983) scores of )2.9 (2.7) and Taffler 
(1977, 1982) scores of )0.3 ()0.2) 
- Any graduates will have consistently high Z scores. 
- The average (~Z) should be lower than graduates both 
overall and if relevant, in the sectors. 
- The value of the standard deviation may also be 
higher than that of the graduate, indicating a more 
erratic spread of scores. 
- Any that have failed, or are possibly "at risk" will 
be down around or below the Altman 1.8 or Taffler 
Zero. 
Initial Results 
Inevitably, since the companies were chosen at random 
at August 1987, there will be changes in the sample 
from to year due to some entering after 1983 and others 
"leaving" before 1987. The summary of the results i.e 
means and standard deviations is shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Summary of Results 
Taffler Altman 
:Vear 83 84 85 86 87 83 84 85 86 87: 
:JJ : .29 .35 .25 .25 .34 :3.9 4.5 4.4 4.0 4.4: 
:0- : .35 .26 .61 .55 .19 : 1 .4 1 • 7 1 . 7 2.5 2.5: 
:n 
, 46 56 59 61 58 46 56 59 61 58: , 
Comments upon the results in relation to the hy~othesis 
In the main, the first part of the hypothesis was 
correct, in that for each of the five years under 
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review, the average score was >2.9 and well above the 
revised score of 2.7. However, the Taffler 1985-86 
scores which show averages below the 0.3 could be 
perceived to be in the risk area. However, if the 
Taffler (1982) cut-off of 0.2 is adopted, then the 
hypothesis is satisfied. All the Taffler scores show 
very high standard deviations reflecting a very wide 
range of results from this group. In contrast, the 
Altman scores are consistently above the 2.9 and are 
comparable to the scores of the graduates. (Table 6.3) 
Turning to the four graduates, as might be expected, 
three of the four graduates within the sample all had 
consistently high scores, i.e Taffler >0.3 and Altman 
>2.9. The exception was the Parkfield Group, which had 
scores indicative of an "at risk" company both both 
Taffler and Altman in 1983 and Taffler again in 1984. 
The earlier scores may reflect Parkfield's performance 
as Parkfield Foundries, prior to its change in policy 
to a more diversified product range. 
Table 6.3 makes the comparison with the Graduates. 
Again, the results in general confirmed the hypothesis. 
In four of the five years, (1983-86) the Taffler mean 
for the Graduates was greater than that of the Non-
graduate companies and both the standard deviation and 
range for the Non-graduates were substantially larger 
than those for the Graduates. However, in 1987, the 
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Table 6.3 Com~arison of Z-score Means 
Graduates versus Non Graduates 
Author: Taffler Year 83 84 85 86 87 
JJG .36 .39 .39 .40 .39 
JJNG .29 .35 .25 .25 .36 
(JJG - JJNG) .07 .04 .14 .15 .03 
o-G .17 .17 .17 . 19 .25 
o-NG .35 .26 .61 .55 .19 
(o-G - o-NG) 
-. 18 -.09 -.44 -.36 .06 
Range G 1 • 1 1 .0 1 • 1 1 .4 1 . 1 
Range NG 2.6 1 • 7 5.6 4.4 1 .0 
------------------------------------------
Author: Altman Year 83 84 85 86 87 
JJG 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 
JJNG 3.9 4.5 4.4 4.0 4.5 
(JJG - JJNG) 0.5 O. 1 0.3 0.7 0.28 
o-G 1 .9 1 .8 1 .8 2. 1 2. 1 
o-NG 1 .4 1 • 7 1 . 7 2.5 2.5 
(o-G - o-NG) 0.5 O. 1 O. 1 -0.4 -0.4 
Range G 11 .6 8.4 8.6 13.4 13.2 
Range NG 6.7 8.6 8.4 22.0 15.3 
two populations exhibited very similar results i • e . 
mean value was almost the same, a very narrow range and 
the value of o-ZG actually greater than that of o-ZNG. By 
contrast, the Altman scores were not quite as expected. 
While the values of JjZG were consistently greater than 
that of JJZNG, only in 1986 and 1987 were the values of 
o-ZG less than that of o-ZNG. Additionally, the ranges 
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also exhibited an erratic pattern. Only 1986 and 1987 
were the Graduate ranges significantly lower than those 
of the Non-graduates. Thus, from this standpoint, the 
Taff1er scores were more in keeping with the 
hypothesis. The Altman data tends to suggest that the 
Graduates may not be a suitable "successful" subsample 
for a discriminant analysis, i.e. the Altman Graduate 
profile is not significantly different from that of the 
Non-Graduate. 
As regards the hypothesis concerning failures, the 
sample contained three companies which eventually can 
be classified as having failed. Although the correct 
classification of failure is the subject of chapter 7, 
it is worth commenting at this stage that two of the 
three failures exhibited warnings of danger with scores 
below the threshold and below any means but, apart from 
one instance, inside the value of (~ - ~). Their 
results are tabulated in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 
Year 
~ 
(~ - 0") 
Company 
Failed Non-Graduate Company Scores 
compared with the Sample Mean 
: Taff1er : Altman 
: 83 84 85 86 87: 83 84 
: .37 .37 .29 .25 .34:3.9 4.5 
: .35 .26 .61 .55. 19: 1 .4 1. 7 
: .02 .11 -.32 -.3 .15:2.5 2.8 
85 
• 
86 
4.0 
2.5 
1 .5 
87: 
4.4: 
2.5: 
S7 :B I Air: * * .2# .3 .3: * * 2.8# 3.5 3.6: 
S39:GodwinW: .42 .45 .41 -.01 .23:3.6 4.0 4.0 2.9 2.3: 
S59:Pineapp:.5 .21 -.05 -.58+.29:4.6,2.2 2.1+ ~.6 2.2: 
Note: # Score reflects performance prIor to comIng to 
listing. 
+ Bold print identifies the one examp1e,of an 
ailing company plotting <~Z and (~ -~)Z: It mIght be 
interesting to consider that they are dIfferent years. 
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Further analYsis. 
As with the Graduates, factor analysis was performed. 
and three cluster patterns were identified. Again, the 
main objective is to see if there is evidence of 
commonality between the two Z-score models. However, 
unlike the Graduates, there were no related patterns. 
The Taffler scores clustered for 1983-85, there was a 
cluster similarity between Taffler 1986 and Altman 
1986, which was the only cluster that transcended the 
two models and the third showed a similarity between 
Altman 1983-85. <Table 6.5) 
Table 6.5 Correlations and Cluster Patterns 
Cluster Patterns 
Author Taffler Factor 1 
1983 .81786) 
1984 .89921) 
1985 .89292) 
1986 .10295 
1987 .67293)-: 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Altman 
. 19987 
-.11893 
.38951 
.11406 
.63587)-: 
Factor 2 Factor 3 
-.20342 .08028 
-.02444 .21919 
.02182 -.01734 
.88288 .03761 
. 46086) - : . 21671 
.15832 .78844) 
.03625 .87505) 
- . 101 91 . 72241 ) 
.96222 .01312 
.39375)-: .14233 
------------------
---------------------------------
Correlations Year: 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
0.2044 0.1540 0.4727 0.8256 0.7097 
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As might be expected from the cluster patterns, 
correlation results between the two models was also 
poor. Only 1986 and 1987 produced significant 
correlations of .8256 and .7097 respectively. In the 
light of the clustering between Altman and Taffler in 
1986, the high correlation can be regarded as almost 
inevitable. The factor 1 cluster did however show a 
result of >0.6 for 1987 and factor 2 was >0.4 to give 
some support for the high correlation for 1987. (Table 
6.5) 
Misclassifications 
As with the graduates, an analysis was undertaken to 
see if there were any companies ostensibly 
misclassified, on the assumption that if the score was 
either <0.3 (Taffler 1977) or <2.9 (Altman 1968) then 
they were potentially at risk or potential failures. 
Since the original hypothesis about the Non-graduate 
population was that they should be successful 
companies, correct classification must imply scores 
indicative of success. Table 6.6 summarises the 
results. 
From the table, it will be apparant that the Altman 
score seems to be marginally more reliable at 
confirming these USM companies as potentially unlikely 
to fail. However, if the emphasis is switched from a 
hypothesis assuming success and hence non-failure Z-
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score ratings to appraising the Z-score per se further 
analysis of the unexpected results revealed some 
noteworthy patterns. In all, 32 companies revealed 
scores which were below the expected Taffler's 0.3 or 
Altman 2.9 in at least one year. However, only 19 were 
identified below the Altman 2.9, and only one, 
DebforlSherwood was so identified by Altman alone. Of 
Table 6.6 Summary of Expected Results 
Taffler :1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
n :46 
Success >0.3:30 
IIAt risk" 
>0 - 0.3 : 14 
Potential 
failures <0 : 2 
% correct :65 
Altman 
Success >2.9:36 
IIAt risk" 
>1.8 - <2.9 8 
Potential 
failures<1.8: 2 
% correct :78 
56 
43 
1 1 
2 
77 
51 
4 
1 
91 
59 
40 
14 
5 
68 
48 
9 
2 
81 
61 
41 
14 
6 
67 
50 
7 
4 
82 
58 
41 
14 
3 
71 !.J = 69.6~-:; 
46 
10 
2 
79 bJ = 82.2% 
the 32, 12 that were "below the cut-off" had scores 
based on data derived from before they had entered the 
USM further vindicating the Hutchinson, Meric, Meric 
(1988) conclusions about the favourable impact of 
coming to the listings upon corporate performance. At 
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the same time, a further 6 were identified as 
eventually needing reorganisation or ultimately did not 
survive. Thus, these can be regarded as having been 
correctly classified as possible failures, or at least 
exhibiting early symptoms of possible future trouble. 
From this additional background knowledge, we can now 
reassess the performance of the Z-score models in the 
context of correct classification of the sample 
companies. 
The Reassessment 
To make the reassessment, three adjustments are 
required. First, since Taffler (1982) indicates a 0.2 
cut-off, it becomes pertinent reintroduce to the 
assessment companies in the band 0.2 - 0.3, since 
Taffler perceives such companies as displaying the 
characteristics of companies that have not failed. This 
adjustment has also been incorporated into Table 6.7, 
and makes a substantial contribution to the improved 
performance. Likewise, an assessment can be made of 
the consequences of using Altman's revised upper cut-
off of 2.7. Secondly, there has to be consideration of 
data derived from prior to USM entry. Since it was 
noted in Chapter 4 that future prospects were as 
important as historic performance, it is likely that 
companies before entering may have low Z-scores. Since 
the Hutchinson Meric Meric study revealed that firms 
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entering the USM derived considerable gains and boosts 
to their performance. and this thesis is about the 
contribution of USM listed companies, then. as with the 
Graduates. it becomes pertinent to add back results 
do not reflect the benefit of joining the USM, 
irrespective of future outcomes. Thirdly, consideration 
must be given to correct identification. The score may 
be below the cut-off line because it is correctly 
classifying a company that is at risk or heading 
towards failure. Equally. a misclassification in this 
area must count against the overall performance. 
Table 6.7 Reassessment of Taffler Z-score performance 
Year :83 84 85 86 87 
n 
Number correct 
(per hypothesis) 
:46 56 59 61 58 
:30 43 40 41 41 
Add back pre USM (HMM) :10 4 4 1 1 
Add revised (1982) 
cut-off 2 3 2 6 5 
Add failures/ 
reorganised 2 2 4 4 2 
Deduct failure (not 
recognised) 
Revised total 
Revised % 
( 1 ) ( 1 ) 
:44 52 50 51 48 
:96 93 85 84 83 u = 88.1% 
The failures/reorganised category are those companies 
which scored below 0 and eventually collapsed and/or 
needed a reorganisation. The non-recognised failljre is 
British Island Airways, where the Z-score gave no 
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indication of potential problems up to the end of 1987. 
Indeed, further analysis of British Island Airways 
after 1987 only reveals a deterioration of scores into 
the grey areas somewhat vindicates the Ohlson (1980) 
and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) criticism of early 
research into Z-score methodology. The assumption that 
failed company data are available one year before the 
final collapse is erroneous, and has lead to 
overstating of the accuracy of the prediction results. 
Companies which required a reorganisation and/or failed 
which moved, albeit temporarily, back into the grey 
area, are only shown when they are in the failure zone. 
Among the remaining data, are two further companies, 
both which needed eventual reorganisation and one even 
having its dealings temporarily suspended, but never 
scoring below the zero cut-off. Thus, where they are 
in the failure zone and eventually failed, they can be 
regarded as potential failures, and the Z-score has 
given an early indication. 
There is one final aspect relevant to the assessment of 
the Taffler score in the context of the USM companies 
and the initial hypothesis. This is that based on the 
0.3 cut-off, there was a substantial number of 
ostensibly misclassified results in certain major 
sectors. Revising the cut-off down to the 1982 0.2 had 
little impact upon this pattern. Since the three 
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sectors involved embrace 25 (41%) of the 61 companies. 
i.e. 41% of the total t this may call into question the 
validity of using a model which purports to be 
u~iversally applicable on a particular sector within a 
particular financial listings market. However, it 
should also be noted, that while these three sectors 
have made a significant impact upon the growth of the 
USM, C20.5~~ of all entrants up to April 1986.) they 
also have a tendency not to be among the Graduates. 
Table 6.8 summarises the results derived from the total 
number of scores calculated for the individual 
companies over the five year period, and the proportion 
of misclassifications with each sector. 
Table 6.8 Major Sector Misclassifications - Taffler 
Sector :Total :Total :Misclassifying Scores 
:Number of:Number of: Number % 
:Companies:Scores ______ _ 
Drapery Be S 11 47 11 23.4 
Paper BePrint: 6 
Leisure 8 
30 
35 
8 
23 
26.7 
65.7 
We can now move onto the Altman re-assessment.CTable 
6.9) 
It will be observed from Table 6.9 that, apart from 
1983, where the improvement is due to adjusting for 
companies that had not yet entered the USM, there is no 
marked change. Furthermore, Altman does not so clearly 
classify the apparent failures, which may give some 
support to the Inman (1982) view and indeed to 
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Table 6.9 Re-assessment of the 
Altman Z-score Performance 
Year 83 84 85 86 87 
n 46 56 59 61 58 
No correct 
(per hypothesis) :36 51 48 50 46 
Add Pre-USM entry: 4 1 1 1 1 
Revised cut-off 
Failures/ 
reorganized 
Deduct failure 
(not recognised) 
Revised total 
Revised % 
2 3 2 
111 1 
* * * (1)(1) 
:40 52 52 54 49 
:87 93 88 89 84 w - 88.2% 
to Argenti's (1976, 1983) earlier analysis of 
Rolls-Royce. What is perhaps more noticeable when 
Altman is assessed and compared with the Taffler 
results in both Tables 6.7 and 6.8 is that Altman 
confirmed the hypothesis about scores being 
commensurate with success for the Drapery & stores 
sector, confirmed the Taffler pattern of a high number 
of potential mis-classifications for the Paper and 
Print sector and halved the number in the Leisure 
sector. In complete contrast. of the 98 reddings in the 
large industrial sector, 14 (14.29%) were ostensibly 
misclassifications. More to the point, what appears to 
emerge, is a significant number of companies that 
appear to keep going in the Altman grey zone, making 
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identification of failures somewhat difficult. What is 
evident, that from the sample analysed here, is that 
the early warning claims may be somewhat suspect. 
Preliminary conclusion: 
It would appear that both models can reasonably 
classify the winners, with Altman having the edge. 
Overall classification would seem·to be reasonable, but 
the grey area is a problem and early warning claims are 
highly suspect. The three companies "performance" vis-
a-vis the scores is summarised in Table 6.10. The table 
shows that British Island Airways gave the first 
indications in December 1988. Since published accounts 
do not appear on the year end date, the lead time 
Table 6.10 Assessment of Failure Prediction 
:Author: Taffler 1977/1982 
:Company/Year 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
:S7 :B I Airways: * 
* 
.2# .3 .3 .1 * I 
:S39:Godwin W .42 .45 .41 -.01 .23 * 
~:~S~5~9~:~P~i~n~e~a~p~p~1~e~~~.~5~~.~2~1 -.05 -.58 .29 * * 
:Altman 1968 and revised 
:S7 :B I Airways: * * 2.8# 3.5 3.6 2.4 * I 
:S39:Godwin W :3.6 4.0 4.0 2.9 2.3 * 
* 
Notes I Indicates year of collapse or first admission 
of trouble i.e. hoping to find a rescuer. 
* Indicates data not available, or in the case of 
Pineapple, irrelevant. . 
# Result reflects the HMM conclusIons. 
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between date of accounts and eventual collapse in this 
case was about 14 months with both models. All was 
ostensibly well during 1988. Godwin Warren gave first 
warnings in 1986 year end accounts, i.e. sometime 
during 1987. Taffler was below cut-off on all measures, 
and Altman showed a dramatic change. The 1987 figures 
reinforced the picture. With liquidators called in 
during February 1989, the leadtime was, at best, 26 
months. Pineapple turned in bad results, and hence gave 
warnings, at the end of 1985. The company responded 
and diversified away from total Leisure to be 
reclassified under Paper & Publishing by early 1988. 
If, in keeping with the Argenti (1976, 1983) viewpoint, 
the effect of the response is the critical criterion 
criterion, in that the company either survives or 
fails, then Pineapple had a two year warning. Another 
view might be that the scores give a lead warning which 
may result in the correct managerial response. Improved 
subsequent scores may confirm this. However, ultimate 
failure suggests that even a correct Argenti-style 
response can prove to be the proverbial "too 1 ittle, 
too late." Whatever, only having three examples makes 
it difficult to come to any realistic conclusions as to 
whether the early warnings are reliable, or the lead 
warning times as long as is claimed. 
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CHAPTER 7 SUSPENSIONS AND COLLAPSES. 
As of 31 December 1987, 589 companies had come to the 
Unlisted Securities Market. Of that 589, 28 (a mere 
4.75%) had been categorised as suspended or had had 
their quotation cancelled. Since this definition is 
rather wide, it is worth noting that at the end of 
1988, the number was only 26, since at least four of 
those classified as "suspended" in 1987, had been 
reorganised and had re-entered the market during 1988. 
Inevitably, others had joined this group. The big 
change from 1987 to 1988 was in companies "re-
organised." This had increased from 10 in 1987 to 24 at 
the end of 1988 (Table 7.1) and to 31 by the late 
autumn of 1989. Even the 26 have not been entirely 
deleted from the listings, at least eight are still 
extant in some form. 
This must reinforce the Argenti (1976, 1983) view. 
Since Taffler (1982) argues that companies are only 
displaying symptoms of collapse, the the Argenti view 
of possessing adequate depth of management to respond 
is valid. Collapse in the sense of final bankruptcy or 
failure may result from an inherent inability to 
respond or a lack of confidence on the part of third 
parties to respond to the declared symptoms. By contrast, 
it should not be forgotten that while a reorganisation 
may avoid collapse, it can still imply a substantial if 
not total loss in equity for the current shareholders. 
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Methodology of Approach 
For this part of the testing exercise, 20 companies 
have been selected for analysis. The reason for the 
number and choice of company is outlined below. This 
Table 7.1 Industry Category of USM Companies Suspended 
or Cancelled 1987 1988 
Category 1987 1988 
NUMBER Number % 
Building 1 
Drapery 3 
Electricals 4 
Food 1 
Industrials 11 
Leisure 2 
Paper etc 1 
Property 2 
3.57 
10.72 
14.29 
3.57 
39.29 
7. 14 
3.57 
1 
2 
5 
9 
2 
1 
7.14 2 
3.87 
7.69 
19.20 
34.60 
7.69 
3.87 
7.69* 
Trusts etc 1 3.57 1 3.87* 
Oil & Gas =2~ ______ ~7~.~1~4 ____ 3=-___ 1~1~.~5=2~* 
TOTAL 28 100.00 26 100.00 
----------------------------
----------------------------
Source: KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock USM Survey 
December 1987-88. 
* Indicates Industrial Sector excluded from the analysis. 
---------------------------------------------------------
compares with the 24 identified by Wood and Piesse and 
are listed in Table 7.2 and can be categorised as 
belonging to four specific groupings. 
Explanation of the choice of 20 
In table 7.2 below, the first nine are drawn from the 
28 companies who were in the suspended or cancelled 
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Table 7.2 Twenty Companies Failed/Cancelled/Suspended 
Entry:Oetails No Name 
1 Adam Leisure 
2* Castle G B 
3 Promotions House 
4 Access Satellite 
5 Ecobric 
6 Imtec 
7 Metal Science 
8 Mnemos 
9* Xyllyx 
10 B I Airways 
11 Godwin Warren 
12 
13 
14 
Pineapple/ 
/Prospective 
Anglo-Nordic 
Humberside 
Electronics 
Year 
1983 :Cancelled 1987 
:Reorganised as 
:as Hawthorn Lesl ie 
1983 :Cancelled 1987 
1983 :Cancelled 1986 
1982 :Ostensibly OK Cancelled 
: 1988 
1982 :Cancelled 1988 
1983 :Still extant 
1983 :Cancelled 1988 
1983 :Cancelled 1989 
1984 :Suspended 1985 
1986 :Collapsed 1990 
1983 :In liquidation 1989 
1982 :Reorganised 
:Acquired/Rescued 
:winter 1989/90 
1982 :$425 merger 
1981 :Reorganised Quote 
:suspended 1988, and 
:cancelled 1989. 
15 Wm Morris/Lincoln 1984 :Re-organised 1988 
16 Pavion 1985 :Under administrators 1990 
17 Federated Housing 1983 :Quoted suspended Receiver 
:appointed 1990 
18 Leisure Industries 1985 :In receivership 1990 
:Rescued In takeover 1990 
19 Midsummer Inn 1982 :Facing a predator 
20 MBS 1982 :Reported as struggling in 
:financial press. 
* Identified as suspended in the April 1986 KPMG Peat 
Marwick McLintock USM Survey 
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category outlined by the Peat Marwicks Quarterly survey 
in December 1987. Some have been deleted from this group 
because the suspension was for legal reasons other than 
potential collapse. In selecting the the companies for 
analysis, availability of data from either the Hambro 
Company Guide and or Companies House was an important 
consideration. In addition, the cancellation or 
suspension had to have taken place during the five 
year period under review or immediately after it. Thus 
the eleven companies who had had their quotes 
suspended/cancelled in the period 1980-1982 are 
immediately excluded from the listed 31. However, four 
additional suspensions or cancellations in the period 
January 1988 to September 1989 are included bringing 
the total to 13. This includes two post 1987 collapses, 
a $425 merger and a reorganisation of a company which 
would have otherwise failed. 
The second group, Nos 14-16, are companies derived from 
the Non-graduate Sample (Chapter 6) who were found to 
have poor Z-scores. This group initally consisted of 7 
companies_ of which the three selected have either 
collapsed or had to undertake a major reorganisation. 
The other four companies are still listed as on-going 
and must be deemed to be non-failures. 
Numbers 17 and 18 are graduates where problems have 
arisen since the end of the period under review. These 
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are brought in to test the early warning claims of the 
Z-score models. As with the Non-graduate group, there 
are a number of graduates with poor Z-score showings 
that are still extant in the listings. 
The final group, Nos 19 and 20 are the result of out-
of-sample analysis. The surveys and reports were 
scanned for any other companies who had been excluded 
from any other analysis, but were found to have been 
reorganised. In adopting this approach, the precedent 
established by Wood and Piesse has been followed. Like 
Wood and Piesse, the models will be tested on these 
companies to see if the classifications are correct, 
and if there is a reasonable length of warning. The two 
companies identified were MBS plc, formerly Micro-
Business Systems plc, and Midsummer Leisure plc. The 
former company has had a poor record for growth, profit 
and liquidity with losses turned in in 1985 1988/89. 
Turnover actually fell in the years 1987-89 and there 
has been no dividend since 1987. The Hambro Performance 
Rankings Guide gave the company some very poor rankings 
during 1987/88. On the basis of indicators suggested by 
Robertson, Lau and Gentry, the company should be a 
prime candidate for failure. Midsummer Leisure was 
included because of very poor « 0.2) Taffler scores in 
the years 1983-87. In addition, the Hambro Performance 
Rankings Guide gave it some very poor rankings for 
productivity, gearing and liquidity in 1987/88. It was 
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thus perceived as at least exhibiting many of the 
characteristics of companies that had failed in the 
past. 
Taking the Group as a whole, it may be significant that 
of those 20, 15 date from the early euphoric years of 
the USM, i.e 1980 through 1983. In addition, to be 
consistent with the principle laid down in the study of 
both the Graduates and the Non-Graduates, (Chapters 5 
and 6) the Insurance, Property, Financial Services and 
Oil & Gas sectors have been excluded. Thus, of the 
original 31, this excludes 5 (6 as at end 1988) 
companies from these sectors had fallen into the 
category of having been suspended or had their 
quotation cancelled. (Table 7.1) 
Hypothesis 
Since this is an essentially empirical study, we would 
expect to find: 
(i) All 20 initiallY to be below the Altman 1.8 score. 
A second review will be undertaken to see if the 
Argenti modifications with a revised lower cut-off 
of 1.5 improve the results. It will also be 
interesting to see of any of Altman's prediction 
patterns are valid for the years prior to the 
suspension or cancellation. This is likely to prove 
difficult since many of the companies will have 
only been listed within a relatively short time and 
( i i ) 
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would not have achieved the listing had their 
previous results been suspect. Thus. the profile of 
such a company is one of initial apparent 
followed by fairly rapid deterioration. 
success 
Taffler's index to show (a) at least negative 
figures. 
(b) a score <0.2 based on the 1982 conclusions. 
Again, the comments made in regard to Altman in [iJ 
above, and the duration of trading on the USM still 
apply. 
The results from the 20 companies were classified as:-
(i) 1 ikely to fail, 
(ii) "at risk" because they are in the "grey area", 
(iii) misclassification. 
A misclassification could be for two reasons. Firstly, 
due to Z-scores giving either no indication of the doom 
to come or a Z-scores predicting doom in a company that 
had still survived. Secondly, the data may relate to the 
period prior to entry to the USM, where a pattern of low 
scores has already been observed, (Chapters 5 and 6) and 
from the Hutchinson Meric Meric 1988 study. where entry 
to the USM is followed by a substantial improvement in 
performance and hence Z-score. 
The crude results suggest that apart from the Taffler 
1982 revision, neither model is a very good predictor 
per se of failure. It thus becomes pertinent to measure 
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how soon the warnings came. To do this, the date of the 
"critical event" I' .e.' . major re-organ1sation or suspension 
Table 7.3 Failure Classification 
Z-Score Model :Failed At Risk Misclassification 
Altman 68 n = 9 5 6 
25 30* % = 45 ~~------~~----------~~ 
Altman/Argenti n = 6 8 6 
40 30* % = 30 ~~------~~----------~~ 
Taffler n = 6 9 5 
45 25** % = 30 ~--------~~----------~~~ 
Taffler 82 n = 12 3 5 
15 25** % = 60 ~--------~~-----------=~~ 
*/** Contains one/two apparent misclassifications which 
related to years prior to entry to the USM.(HMM) 
h~~-t;-b;-id;~tifi;d~-~~d-th;-~~;r;~-~~~ly~;d-f;r-th;----
preceding years. 
However, in identifying this II cr itical event", it must 
be recognised that the company may have ceased trading 
at an earlier date, and so the last year in which 
accounts were prepared will become important. Two dates 
can possibly be identified, (i) the first year to show 
an lIat risk ll or grey area score, and (ii) the first 
year to show a likelY to collapse score. In addition, 
only 18 companies can be included in this analysis, 
since two are still ostensiblY non-failures. The 
results are shown in Table 7.4. In the table, the 
differences in the value of In are due to some 
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companies having an early warning II at risk lJ score but 
no failure score, and vice versa. 
The obvious pattern that seems apparent from the table 
below is the extremely erratic pattern of prediction 
timings. In addition, the warnings of failure appear In 
both cases to be too late, a year at best, and often 
Table 7.4 Analysis of Length of Warning 
Z-Score Model: Altman 
Time (Years) :At Risk :Failure 
: n %* n %* 
5 3 23.1: 1 5.9 
4 1 7.6: 1 5.9 
3 3 23.1: 3 17.6 
2 2 15.4: 1 5.9 
1 2 15.4: 4 23.5 
0 2 15.4: 7 41.2 
: Taffler 
:At Risk 
n %* 
4 57.1 
1 14.3 
2 28.6 
:Failure 
n %* 
2 13.3 
1 
1 6.7 
3 20.0 
6 40.0 
2 13.3 
r n : 13 100. 0 : 1 7 100.0 7 100.0 15 100 · 0 
* % indicates the proportion of total identified 
companies given a warning and the length of that warning, 
i.e. only 5.9% received a five year warning of collapse 
on the Altman basis. 
l~~~-th~~-~-y~~~-b~f~~~-th~-f~il~~~-i~-d~~l~~~d~-S~~h---
findings would seem to vindicate the views expressed by 
Gupta, Watts and Zimmerman and Wood and Piesse. In 
addition, the view expressed by Kharbanda and 
Stallworthy, that very early warnings are needed, if 
the models are to be credible. they must give reliable 
warnings well beforehand. 
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Implications for Theory 
Before drawing any conclusions from this chapter and 
the two preceding it, consideration must be given to 
testing the contribution of any attempts at developing 
an underlying theory. The twenty companies tested for 
classification by Z-score analysis will now be 
similarly appraised on the basis of the ideas put 
forward by Robertson, Lau and Gentry. This will enable 
a clearer profile to be developed of a perceived ailing 
company, and as such, will replicate the methodology 
suggested by Argenti. This will be particularly useful 
from the standpoint that while Table 7.3 did not give 
significant unequivocal conclusions about failure, a 
significant proportion of the companies were not 
obviously successful, and certainly warrant further 
analysis. Table 7.5 summaries the results of 
analysising the twenty companies in the light of the 
four criteria advanced by Robertson, and the second 
stage of the Lau continuum. 
Some of these results are inevitable. Since both the 
Altman and the Taffler models rely heavily upon 
profitability or the lack of it, it is almost 
inevitable that Robertson's declining profitability 
should feature as the most dominant criterion. In 
addition, of the four companies that did not conform 
with this criterion as at the end of 1987, two displayed 
little indication of what was to impending. The other two 
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Table 7.5 Company Profile Analysis 
Robertson 
Criterion:Trading :Profit :Oeclining'I ~a~/~entry 
-------- :Stability:ability:Working ,ncreased.Dlvldend: 
Company 'I :Borrowing: Passed 
- - I :Capital : 
1 Adam L 
2 Castle 
3 PromotH: 
4 Access : 
5 Ecobric: 
6 Imtec 
7 MetalSc: 
8 Mnemos 
9 Xyllyx 
10*BIAir 
11 Godwin: 
12 Pine 
13 A Nord: 
14 Humber: 
15Lincoln: 
16 Pavion: 
17FedHous:** 
18Leisure: 
19Midsumm: 
20 MBS 
Total 
v 
V 
v 
v 
v 
V 
V 
v 
8 
v 
V 
v 
v 
V 
v 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
v 
16 
V 
V 
v 
v 
v 
V 
V 
v 
v 
v 
V 
v 
12 
V 
v 
V 
v 
v 
v 
v 
V 
8 
v 
v 
v 
v 
V 
v 
v 
v 
v 
v 
v 
v 
13 
% 40 80 60 40 65 
Source: Hambro Company Guide 
* Data includes post 1987 events. The 1988 
dividend was not passed but substantially reduced. 
** No indication at all of impending trouble. 
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were Access Satellite which was eventually suspended for 
no obvious financial performance related reason, and 
Promotions House, whose quotation was likelwise cancelled 
for reasons that included those other than financial 
standing and performance. 
The Lau/Gentry view about dividends appear to be 
vindicated since this ranks second. While this could be 
regarded as sound cashflow management to pass dividends 
and within the UK avoid the complications of Advanced 
Corporation Tax, the work of Gentry et al, and the 
conclusions of the Lau continuum analysis indicate that 
it may be preceived as an ultimate vote of confidence. 
Decline in working capital was defined using the gross 
working capital of Altman. That this was over 50% calls 
into question the conclusions of Tamari (1978) who warned 
about the possibility of working captial actually 
increasing because of an inability to turn over inventory 
and reduced credit control in order to obtain sales at 
any price. That every company who registered a decline in 
trading stability also recorded a decline in working 
capital may suggest that inventories and receivables are 
at least being managed in accordance with the revised 
turnover levels. Conversely, that seven of the companies 
did not satisfy both the trading stability and the 
declining working capital criteria may give some credance 
to the Tamari viewpoint. 
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It may be worth adding that the Tamari viewpoint may be 
reinforced by the low proportion of companies satisfying 
the trading stability criterion anyway. However, what 
may be peculiar to the USM type of company is the low 
proportion of companies increasing their borrowing. From 
the profile analysis in Chapter 4, it is evident that 
companies frequently tend come to the USM on order to 
raise additional external equity for the specific purpose 
to reduce borrowings. As a result, there is a marked 
tendency towards low gearing. What may be more 
interesting is that the one graduate company that 
eventually failed in 1990, only satisfied this criterion 
in 1987, while the three Leisure sector comapnies all 
showed dramtic increases in borrowings. In the light of 
the changing UK economy, and high interest rates, it may 
be that this criterion will feature in future collapses. 
(Chapter 9) 
Problem of Sample Size 
The inherent problem of any study into failure is the 
small number of actual failures. It has already been 
noted that in the period 1980-1989 only 31 companies have 
had their quotation suspended/cancelled out of 727 
entries into the listing, a cumulative percentage of 
4.3%. Although others have been suspended/cancelled since 
September 1989, the percentage would appear to be below 
the Taff1er (1982) and Altman et a1 (1977) generalised 
failure expectation of 10%. and below the general annual 
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failure rate of 1%. This makes for very small samples, 
and thus any attempts at generalisation difficult. Table 
7.6 summarises the pattern. In such a situation, the only 
tentative conclusion that might be drawn is that USM 
companies may have a greater resiliance to failure, may 
be better managed, or have an inherent ability to inspire 
confidence. 
Table 7.6 Pattern of Suspensions/Collapses 
Year of :Number of :Cumulative :Suspended/ :Cumulative 
Entry :Entrants :Number :Cancelled* :Percentage 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989** 
23 
60 
63 
85 
98 
98 
90 
72 
87 
51 
23 
83 
146 
231 
329 
427 
517 
589 
676 
727 
3 
7 
1 1 
19 
22 
24 
26 
27 
29 
31 
13 
8.4 
7.5 
5.6 
5.0 
4.3 
Source: 
KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock USM Survey September 1989 
* Cumulative to date 
** Up to September 1989 
Conclusions 
We are now in position to draw some conclusions about 
the performance of the models in classifying USM 
companies. From chapter 5, both models adequately 
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classified the average graduates as successful 
non-failing companies companies, but there were 
individual graduates who had poor Z-score results. 
Among the warnings, both Anglo-Nordic and Leisure 
Investments were correctly classified but the other 
graduates with poor scores, namely Oceonics and Quadrant, 
were still on-going as at May 1990. None of the graduates 
in the grey or warning zone had shown any symptoms of 
further deterioration. There was no warning evident of 
the problems that would eventually face Federated Housing 
and Midsummer Leisure. 
Among the non-graduates, a more erratic pattern of 
results was observed. Non-failures, were in the main, 
correctly classified, but the success rate on warnings 
and failures was indifferent. There was little warning UP 
to 1987 of the future for British Island Airways, and 
only a grey area warning in 1986-87 for Godwin Warren. 
Despite continuing losses up to end 1988, International 
Media (Formerly Entertainment Production Services), Bio-
Isolates (losses and poor score up to 1987) and Greenwich 
Communication (losses and a re-organisation) continue to 
survive. In short, seven companies exhibited poor Z-
scores, but only three actually could be described as 
having failed. Thus, on the failure side, the models are 
not very reliable since they do not take into account 
corporate resiliance, the culture of USM companies which 
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may contribute to an inherent ability to maintain 
confidence. This reinforces the Lev and Argenti view, 
that failure is not entirely the result of events that 
can be measured in terms of financial criteria. 
Of the 20 recognised "failures", Table 7.3 indicate'~ 
substantial proportions of mis-classifications, and where 
there are correct classifications, the timing i.e the 
length of warning was too short. Such results vindicate 
the view of Ohlson (1980) that earlier models exaggerated 
their accuracy, and again that data other than pure 
accounting data may be needed. (Watts and Zimmerman 1986. 
clf Argenti 1977) At best, the conclusion must be that 
the data and the models are useful but other data is also 
required. The small sample, and high error rate, 
especially in length of warning, also calls into question 
to some extent the value of the models. It must be 
concluded that at best, they give warnings, and it is a 
function of the calibre of the management as to whether 
the warnings are headed and the company ultimately 
survives. 
The Robertson/Lau/Gentry grid (Table 7.5) gives a useful 
indicator, albeit with an element of stating the obvious. 
16, i.e 80% of the companies identified as exhibiting 
failure symptoms had declining profits. This vindicates 
the Beaver view of the ability to generate cash is vital 
to long term survival. The models both placed major 
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emphasis on the ability to generate profit and hence 
cash. With the largest weighting, falling profit or 
losses are going to influence the final score. Equally. 
the choice of a working capital ratio, indicative of the 
ability to cover liabilities asset and possibly inspire 
confidence is also important. However, Altman ranked this 
ratio after his retained earnings ratio, which emphasises 
the historic ability to build up reserves as a result of 
sustained profitability. Indeed, opinion is divided in 
the literature as to the merit of such a ratio, but 
clearly, if this ratio is in decline, there is a warning 
being given. That a decline in this area should be second 
to a passing of the dividend may vindicate the view of 
those who discount working capital based ratios. However. 
the passing of a dividend, In order to conserve cash, 
(Lau 1986, Gentry et al) does have a serious impact upon 
confidence and in a quoted company environment, will 
ultimately effect the share price. This will thus cause 
the market to revise down its longterm view of a 
company's performance. This may well add further evidence 
to the view that accounting based models. however 
successful they may claim to be. do not appear to out 
predict the market, and that the market has identified 
its winners and loosers long before any accounting based 
model has produced a warning. (Chapter 9, Westerfield 
1970, Aharony, Jones and Swary 1980) 
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CHAPTER 8 THE USE OF SELECTED RATIOS 
IN DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
Now that the evaluation of the Altman and Taffler Z-
score models in relation to the USM companies has been 
completed, it becomes pertinent to ascertain if any 
individual ratios are better discriminators than an MDA 
model. This will be done using material selected from 
the data that has already formed the basis of the 
analysis in chapters 5-7. The discriminant analysis 
methodology employed will be similar to that performed 
by Houghton and Woodliff (1987). From chapter 2 above, 
it will be recalled that discriminant analysis enables 
mutually exclusive groups to be classified on the basis 
of a set of characteristics and identify which of those 
characteristics or disriminating variables are the most 
powerful set of discriminators and develop a procedure 
for predicting group membership for cases where 
membership is at present undetermined <Klecka 1980, 
Cos hal 1 1 990) • 
The Methodology of Discriminant Analysis 
Before commencing the actual analysis, a brief 
discussion on the methodology of discriminant analysis 
is necessary to help in the understanding of the final 
results. Discriminant analysis produces linear 
combinations of the independent or predictor variables 
and uses them as a basis for classifying cases into one 
of the groups. In the case of this thesis, the groups 
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wi 11 be the successful USM companies. companles 
perceived as being lIat r'isk", and potential failures. 
For discriminant analysis to be lIoptimal " in the sense 
that the probability of a misclassification is 
minimised, the variables should be samples from normal 
populations. However, there is evidence that even inthe 
case of dichotomous var'iables (e.g. of the "yes"j"no" 
type) the linear discriminant function often performs 
reasonably well (Coshall 1990). 
In discriminant analysis and other multivariate 
statistical procedures, the emphasis is on analysing 
the variables together. By considering the variables 
together, we are able to incorporate information about 
their relationships. In discriminant analysis, a linear 
combination of the independent or predictor variables 
is formed and serves as a basis for assigning cases to 
groups. This is the basis of the models such as the 
Altman and Taffler models already discussed and 
appraised. The linear discriminant equation is: 
o = B1Xl + B2X2 + ••••••••• BpXp 
where Xi are the values of the independent variables 
and the 8i are the coefficients estimated from the 
data. If this linear function is to distinguish between 
groups of successful and unsuccessful companies, these 
two groups will differ in their 0 scores which are 
referred to as discriminant scores. Hence. the values 
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of Bi are computed so that the values of the 
discriminant function differ as much as possible 
between the groups. The Bi are called discriminant 
function coefficients. The SSPS/PC package used for 
this analysis reports the value of Bi in standardised 
form i.e. all the variables are first standardised to 
have a zero mean and unit variance. Using the D scores. 
SSPS/PC computes the probabilities of each case 
belonging to the various groups identified in the 
thesis. Finally, it should be emphasised that only one 
discriminant function is necessary to distinguish 
between two groups, two discriminant functions for 
three groups etc. This will be relevant in the approach 
to the analysis, since we will first analyse on the 
basis of straightforward success/fail and then 
introduce the lIat risk" element as a third group for a 
second phase of analysis. 
Discriminant analysis produces three statistics that 
assess the adequacy of any discrimination achieved. 
These are: 
- The square of the canonical correlation which 
represents the proportion of total variance in the 
discriminant scores explained by the differences 
between the two groups. 
- Eigenvalues which represent the ratio of between 
groups sums of squares and within groups of sums of 
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squares. Conventionally, an eigenvalue of ~1 IS 
regarded as a satisfactory result. 
- Wilks' lambda (/\) which is the proportion of the 
total variance in the discriminant scores not 
explained by the differences among groups. 
In the context of this thesis, therefore, the use of 
such discriminant analysis will enable the companies 
selected to be classified according to the gathered 
variables and to identify and rank the most significant 
ratios used in the classification. However, one 
important principle must be emphasised. This is thai 
the classification is based on exhibited 
characteristics. i.e companies are discriminated on the 
basis of exhibiting characteristics of a failed or 
successful company. Thus this is similar to the Taffler 
(1977. 1982) conclusion and the view expressed by 
Johnson (1970) that results showed that a company was 
exhibiting the characteristics which had led to failure 
of other companies in the past, or that the ratios wer~ 
sUbstantially different from other successful 
companies, and hence more in keeping with companies 
that had eventually failed. 
Approach to the Analysis 
For the purpose of the analysis. thirteen'accounting 
ratios were identified as possible discriminating 
variables. These are listed in Table 8.1. This choice 
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of thirteen ratios compares with Tamari's 10, (l q 64) 
Table 8.1 Summary of Choice of Ratios 
Ratio Worker Dates 
Working capital/Total assets Altman. Blum 
Retained earnings/Total assets Altman 
1968, 1969 
1968 
Profit before tax/Total assets Altman 1968 
Beaver 1967 
Robertson 1983 
Zimmer 1°80 
Houghton 
& Woodliff 1987 
Market value/Total debt Altman 196':' 
Sales/Total assets Altman** 1968 
Profit before tax/Current 
liabilities 
Working capital/Total debt 
Current 1 iabl ities/total 
assets 
No credit interval/Operating 
costs 
Cash flow/Total debt**** 
Total debt/Total assets 
Curr'ent ratio 
Acid test ratio 
Taffler 
Edminster 
Taffler 
Taffler 
Taffler 
Beaver 
Beaver. Blum 
Beaver 
Tamari*** 
Tamari 
Edminster 
Zimmer 
Houghton & 
1977, 19':'2 
1972 
1977, 1982 
1977. 1982 
1977. 1982 
1967 
1967, 19.:='9 
1967 
1964 
1964 
1972 
1980 
Woodliffe 1987 
Notes: 
* Both Altman and Robertson give this maximum 
weighting. 
** Robertson has a similar ratio, and Edminster also 
uses a sales based ratio. 
*** Robertson's Liquid assets - Bank overdraft 
Creditors 
is similar in concept to this. 
**** Both Zimmer and Houghton and Woodliff use the 
reciprocal of this ratio i.e Total Debt 
Cashflow 
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Altman's original 22 (1968), Edminster's 19 (1?7=). 
Blum's 12 (1969) and Beaver's 30. In selecting the 
ratios. it will be evident that the ratios finally 
selected by both Altman and Taffler have been included. 
along with Beaver's cashflow/total debt andtotal 
debt/total assets and the traditional current ratio and 
acid test ratio favoured by Tamari (1964), Zimmer 
(1980) and Houghton and Woodliff (1987). This approach 
enables a wide range of discriminating ratios to be 
tested. However, it should be added that despite the 
views expressed by Lau (1986), no dividend based ratio 
was included. In the light of the Houghton and Woodliff 
conclusions, it was felt that such a ratio in this 
context was likely to be inconclusive. 
As with the evaluation of the Altman and Taffler 
models, the five year review period (1983-1987) was 
examined. As before, the number of companies varies 
slightly. due to entry into the listings after 1983 
and/or exit before 1987 due to acquisition or demise. 
Table 8.2 lists the sample number of companies used for 
each of the five years under review. The Graduates and 
and the Non-graduates represent populations of known 
successful companies, while those that have failed 
(i.e. quotation suspended/cancelled) or are considered 
at risk, are perceived as unsuccessful. The ratios will 
then discriminate between them. 
16:' 
Table 8.2 The Numbers of Com~anies 
Used in the Exercise 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Graduates 32 33 33 33 33 
Non-graduates 12 14 14 14 14 
Failed 7 1 1 1 1 9 5 
"At Risk" 13 14 16 16 14 
I 64 72 74 72 66 
From Table 8.2. two points need clarifying. Primarily. 
the number of Graduates and Non-graduates used in this 
MDA research was smaller than that in chapters 5 and 6 
as only consistent Ilgood performers" over the five yeqr 
period under review were incl uded in the "'::,uccessful ll 
group. This produced a population of 33 Graduates and 
14 Non-graduates characterised by consistently good 
performance defined as consistent growth in turnover 
and profit performance over the period under review. 
Secondly, in view of the criticisms made by Eisenbeis 
( 1977), t he 
(1977), the term "At Risk" may need some clarification. 
They are not companies that give rise to doubts in 
classification. Rather, in view of Altman's 
identification of a " gr- ey area", a third similar such 
distinct category was felt to be needed. As such. th~ 
"at risk" category' wi 11 include:-
(1) - companies that have needed to go through some 
form of managerial reorganisation. Where this was 
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successful. and the company returned to growth 
and profit, it was excluded from any subsequent 
analysis. This enabled the testing of the Argenti 
(1976, 1983) view that survival depends on good 
management decisions. If, however. performance 
did not improve. then the company was deemed to 
be still at risk. and was retained in the 
analysis. This group also included a small number 
of out of sample companies reported as having 
having been reorganised either during the five 
year period under review or during 1988. 
(2) - have displayed bad Z scores in the earlier Z-
score analysis but are still in existence. 
(3) - are still extant. but are listed as suspended. 
Thus, by adopting this approach. (i.e. identifying 
economic criteria) we are paralleling the views 
expressed by Robertson (1984), and attempting to 
respond to the suggestions of Lev (1974). 
Methodology of Approach 
The data were analysed using Lotus123 and SPSS/PC 
computer packages. For each of the five years reviewed. 
the data were run through the procedure twice, first 
Page 3219.9 
without the 14 "at risk " companies and secondly 
including them. This was done to identify firstly 
simple success/and failure. comparing known successes 
and known failures and to see if the companies were 
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corr'ectly classified. Secondly, the "at risk" category 
was then brought in to see how the analysis procedure 
would classify the companies. 
Success/Failure 
Since 1985 is the mid-point year of the review period. 
it will be regarded as the base year. These results 
wi 11 be examined in detai 1, (Tabl e 8.3) and the other 
years compared. 
Table 8.3 Summary of Results 1985 
Eigenvalue:Canonical :Wilks· :Chi :OF:Significance 
:Correlation :Lambda :Square: (p) 
2.431 :0.8417 : 0.2915: 59.79:13: 0.000 
Pooled within groups correlation between discriminating 
variables and canonical discriminant functions 
Discriminating 
ALT33 
TAFF53 
BEAVERCFD 
ALT14 
ALT10 
CR 
ALT12 
TAFF13 
ALT06 
BEAVERDA 
TAFF18 
TAFF16 
ATR 
Variable Function 
.524 
.448 
.444 
.345 
.203 
• 101 
.056 
.034 
.035 
.027 
.025 
.003 
.002 
The canonical correlation squared indicates that 71% of 
the variance in discriminate scores is exp1ained by the 
difference between groups. The standardised linear 
equation which established the scores was: 
168 
Dstand = - O.138(ALT12) + O.036(ALT14) - 3.127(ALT33) 
+ O.392(ALT06) - O.407(ALT10) - 4.328(TAFF53) 
+ 1.454(TAFF13) - O.31(TAFF18) + O.888(TAFF16) 
- 2.123(BEAVCFD) + 1.4(BEAVDA) - 1.932(CR) 
O.389(ATR) 
The variables designated ALTl2. TAFF53 etc .• refer to 
the original Altman and Taffler ratios, (Chapter 2) 
identified by their original discriminant function 
coefficients as follows:-
Altman: ALT12 = Working capital :Total assets 
ALTl4 = Retained earnings:Total 3ssets 
ALT33 = Earnings before tax:Total assets 
ALT06 = Market value of equity:Book value 
total debt 
ALTlO = Sales:Total assets. 
Taffler: TAFF53 = Earnings before tax:Current 
liabilities 
TAFFl3 = Current assets:Total liabilities 
TAFF18 = Current liabilities:Total assets 
TAFFl6 = No credit interval 
The four additional variables are:-
BEAVCFD = Beaver's Cashflow/Total Debt 
BEAVDA = Beaver's Total Debt/Total Assets 
CR = Current Ratio 
ATR = Acid Test Ratio 
Since the variables are correlated it is not readily 
of 
possible to assess the importance of an individual 
variable. The contribution of an individual variable is 
thus better expressed by examining the correlation 
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between the value of Ostand and the values of the 
original variables. This identifies the pooled within-
groups correlations between the discriminating 
variables and canonical discriminant functions and they 
are shown in Table 8.3. In short, the higher the 
correlation between the value of Ostand and the 
individual ratio the more reliable the ratio is as a 
discriminator. 
The subjective cut-off line has been drawn where the 
size of correlation drops below 0.4. It is significant 
that the early indications point towards the ratios 
that involve profit, both Altman's Profit before 
tax:Total gross Assets and Taffler's Profit before 
tax:Current Liabilities show the highest correlation, 
along with Beaver's Cashflow:Total debt. Clearly. 
therefore, the major discriminators would appear to be 
the ability to sustain profit generation and hence 
maintain a liquidity level to meet payments as they 
fall due. (Oev 1974) However, the Altman retained 
profit:total assets has been deliberately bold printed 
since it occurs high on the list in subsequent 
analyses. 
All the perceived successful/non-failure companies were 
correctly classified, but two of the expected failures 
were classified as successes. Oisprob 1 and Oisprob 2 
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indicate the probability that the particular company 
should be classified either as a failure or a success 
(Table 8.4). It should be emphasised that there is no 
traditional Altman/Taffler cut-off point. Rather, the 
analysis assumes a mean of O. and discriminates on the 
basis of distance from the mean. That the company has 
been correctly classified is shown by the probability 
scores. Thus from Table 8.4 Adam Leisure "scored lt 2.9, 
which is subtantially more than the mean of zero. Such 
a score indicates that the company is 99.8% likely to 
be a failure. 
Table 8.4 Summary of the the Known Failure Results 1985 
Company : Oi sc/Scor' 
Adam Leis/HL :2.900 
Castle GB :3.336 
Promotions/GR:0.920 
Ecobric :4.391 
Imtel :4.252 
Metal Sc :2.717 
Mnemos :7.206 
Xyllyx :3.675 
Access Sat : 0.433 
B I Air wa y s : 3.384 
Godwin Warren: 0.189 
:Oisprob 1 Disprob 2 
:Fail Success 
: 0.998 .001 
:1.000 
0.174 
:1.000 
:1.000 
:0.996 
:1.000 
:1.000 
:0.029 
:1.000 
:0.002 
.000 
.826 
.000 
.000 
.004 
.000 
.000 
.971 
.000 
.998 
Note: Bold print emphasises the three 
misclassifications. 
------------------------------------------------
Of the eleven expected failures, 8 were correctly 
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classified as exhibiting the characteristics of 
companies that had failed in the past. Of the three 
apparant mis-classifications, Promotions House was 
within 12 months of having the quotation cancelled, 
having re-organised into the private Grassroots 
Limited, Access Satellite had prepared what was to be 
its last set of published accounts prior to a long 
running and almost bizarre saga leading to the 
quotation eventually being cancelled in 1988 and Godwin 
Warren was showing as a successful company. It 
eventually failed in 1989. That British Island Airways 
was shown as a potential failure in the year before 
entering the listings vindicates the Hutchinson. Merie. 
Meric (1988) viewpoint about entry to the market being 
conducive to eventual success, but also points to 
excessive euphoria being evident in the market place at 
the time. It should be recalled that 1985 was the year, 
when along with 1984, the most (i.e 98) companies 
entered the USM listings. Such a situation begs the 
question if British Island Airways was too attractively 
priced when it came to the market in 1986. Indeed, 
British Island Airways was mis-classified as a long 
term success in every year reviewed. USM New Issue 
price behaviour has been the subject of a University of 
Aston study by Buckland and Davis.(1988) 
Implications for the Other Review Years 
Having looked at 1985 in some detail, emphasis needs to 
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be focussed on the other years. Table 8.5 summarlses 
the results for the other years showing in particular 
the most significant discriminant ratio. From the table 
below, the over-riding indication is that apart from 
1983, the ability to generate profit and hence cashflow 
to meet liabilities was the strongest discriminator 
Table 8.5 Summary of Results for Other Years 
Eigenvalue Canonical Wilks' Chi Significance 
1983 1.227 
1984 1.563 
1985 2.431 
1986 1.838 
1987 1.391 
Correlation Lambda squared 
0.7422 
0.7809 
0.8417 
0.8407 
0.7627 
0.4491 34.02 
0.3902 45.64 
0.2915 59.79 
0.3524 51.63 
0.4183 37.91 
OF (p) 
13 
13 
13 
1 1 
13 
0.0012 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.0003 
Pooled within group correlation between discriminating 
variables and canonical discriminant functions 
Year 
Function Ratio 
Taffler 16 
Altman 
Altman 
14 
33 
Taffler 53 
Beaver CFD 
Beaver OA 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
0.426 
0.582 
0.549 0.524 0.412 0.674 
0.505 0.448 
0.444 
0.553 
Notes: Omissions indicate results for that year was 
below 0.4, and the asterisk <*) indicates that 
an even higher figure was recorded when tht2 "at 
risk" element was introduced. ------------------
among the ratios tested, with the Altman Profit:Total 
Assets appearing to be the most consistent. 
Introducing the "At Risk" element 
The introduction of an "at risk" element evaluates the 
second aspect of discriminant analysis i.e predicting a 
group membership where the situation is currently 
Table 8.6 Summary of Results - "At Risk" Group Included 
Eigen Canonical Wilkes Chi OF Significance 
value Correlation Lambda Squared ( p ) 
Func 1 1.924 0.738 0.328 72.411 26 0.000 
Func 2 0.389 0.530 0.720 21 .386 12 0.045 
Pooled-within-Groups Correlations between 
Discriminating variables and canonical discriminant 
functions 
Ratio Function 1 Function 2 
ALT33* 0.515 0.337 
ALT14 0.426 
TAFF53 0.373 
BEAVECFD 0.349 
ALT12 0.459 
TAFF16 0.432 
ATR 0.331 
*Note: ALT33 identifies the independent variable (e.g. 
Profit:Total Assets and the coefficient. 
Bold print indicates the highest correlations 
and the gaps indicate values that are too low to 
be significant. Such values are omitted for 
reasons of clarity. 
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undetermined. The results are summarised in Tables 3.6 
and 8.7. By definition, the companies are those where 
the conclusions might be somewhat equivocal and the 
statistical data will inevitably reflect the 
hypothesis. As intimated above, the presence of thre 
groups, successful, "at risk" and fai 1, creates two 
equations and two discriminant functions. 
As with the success/failure analysis above, the 
analysis does not assign a Z-score as such. Rather. it 
produces a value which is appraised in terms of its 
proximity to O. On the basis of the values, 
probabilities are assigned to the classification. 
Tables 8.7-8 illustrate this for the deemed failures 
Table 8.7 Summary of Results for the Known Failures 
Company :Oisc5corl:0iscScor2:0isprobl:0isprob2:0isprob3 
:Failure :Success :"AtRi_~ 
AdamL/HL:-O.728 
CastleGB:-1.713 
Promotiol-0.163 
Ecobric :-3.669 
Imtec :-3.908 
Metal 5c:-2.543 
Mnemos : -6.164 
Xyllyx :-3.219 
AccessStl 0.582 
B I Air :-3.628 
G Warren: 0.010 
:-0.775 
:-0.445 
0.722 
0.886 
0.518 
:-0.571 
: 1.497 
:-1.370 
1.223 
1.533 
0.037 
:0.774 
:0.670 
:0.045 
:0.999 
:0.999 
:0.945 
:1.000 
:0.974 
lO.005 
:1.000 
: O. 199 
:0.033 
:0.078 
:0.762 
:0.000 
:0.000 
:0.008 
:0.000 
:0.001 
:0.920 
:0.000 
:0.578 
: o. 19:2 
:0.252 
: O. 194 
:0.001 
:0.000 
:0.047 
:0.000 
:0.0:26 
:0.074 
:0.000 
:0.401 
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and the companies identified as possibly "at ri::k." 
As in Table 8.4, there are two companies which are 
unequivocally classified as possible successes. 
However, the probability has dropped slightly. More 
interesting is Goodwin Warren. In Table 8.4, the 
company was classified with 99.8% certainty as a 
success, now there is less certainty, with success down 
to 57.8% probability, but a 40.1% in the II at risk" 
Table 8.8 Summary of Results for 
Identified "At Risk" Group 
Company :OisScor1:0isScor2:0isProb1:0isProb2:0isProb3 
:Fai 1 ure :Success : "At Risk " 
BioIsolat:-0.654 :-2.050 :0.015 
Entertain: 0.261 :-1.535 :0.002 
Greenwich:-0.772 :-2.932 :0.006 
Pineapple: 0.220 :-2.185 :0.001 
PML :-0.016 : 0.048 :0.022 
Britannia: 0.189 :-1.801 :0.002 
M/Beacon 0.583 :-0.068 :0.002 
Microfoc :-0.274 :-0.580 :0.030 
Oceonics :-0.363 :-0.248 :0.050 
A Nordic : 0.015 :-0.868 :0.010 
Air Call :-0.419 :-1.421 :0.017 
Humbersid: 0.540 :-2.236 :0.000 
WmMLincol :-3.066 : 0.136 :0.994 
Crown 1.218 :-3.511 :0.001 
JMO 2.685 1.414 :0.000 
Thorpac 0.266 0.414 :0.010 
:0.050 
:0.157 
:0.014 
:0.066 
:0.603 
: O. 109 
:0.436 
:0.347 
:0.440 
:0.:298 
: O. 129 
:0.072 
:0.002 
:0.017 
:0.981 
:0.486 
:0.935 
:0.840 
:0.980 
:0.933 
:0.375 
:0.889 
:0.561 
:0.622 
:0.510 
:0.691 
:0 • .353 
:0.926 
:0.004 
:0.982 
:0.01° 
:0.504 
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category. 
As would be expected, 8 of the 16 companies are 
unequivocally (i.e. )80%) classified as being "at 
risk", A further 6 are identified as being within the 
equivalent of the Altman II grey area ll , fairly hiqh 
p r' 0 b a b i 1 i tie s 0 f be i n g s u c c e s s f u lor II a t r i s k ". 0 n e, Wm 
Morris/Lincoln House is identified as 99.4% a potential 
failure, while John Michael/JMD is 98.1% correctly 
classified as a success. Of the expected perceived 
successes, one was classified 3S a failure, 
(Blanchards), while seven were classified as being 
potentially "at risk. 11 
The results remain highly significant, with the pooled 
within groups correlations showing a particularly 
interesting pattern. On Function 1, where the over 75% 
of the variance is explained, the profit/cashflow 
generation based ratios remain the dominant ratios and 
correlate well with the standardised canonical 
discriminant function. However, it should be noted that 
it is the asset based Altman ratio that retains the 
strongest correlation, rather than the profit/cashflow 
based ratios of Taffler/Beaver/Zimmer. The maii, change 
from the straight discrimination between 
success/failure above being the appearance higher up 
the rankings of the Altman Retained Earnings:Total 
Gross Assets ratio. This again emphasises the element 
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of longevity in the companies under analysis. By 
definition. the requirement of the listings would 
indicate that an acceptable level of profitability and 
hence retained earnings would place such a ratio high 
on the list. However, on Function 2. apart from 
Altman's Profit before Tax:Gross Assets retaining a 
slightly higher ranking than the Acid Test Ratio. which 
in turn is only just in front of the Taffler profit 
based ratio, the emphasis shifts from profit and 
cashflow to what might euphemistically described as 
balance sheet strengths. The three ratios cited in the 
Table 8.7 above are Altman's Gross Working 
Capital :Total Gross Assets, Taffler's No Credit 
Interval and the classic Acid Test Ratio. That such 
ratios should correlate with the standardised 
discriminant function points to a vindication of the 
Tamari (1978) view that events such as slow inventory 
turnover. increased debtors from an aggressive sales to 
survive strategy, and withdrawal of credit f3cilities 
may obscure the true picture of a corporations' long 
potential survival. This may also tend to confirm the 
Houghton and Woodliff (1987) view, that the classic 
liquidity ratios correlate highly with success, but 
significantly less well with failures. 
Implications for the Broader View 
On the broader view over the five year period. the 
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results appear as in Tables 8.9 and 8.10. The 1985 
discrimination data are in Table 8.6. 
As before, the results are highly significant, with the 
over-riding indication is that, although the pattern in 
Table 8.9 is slightly more erratic, apart from 1983. 
the ability to generate profit and hence cashflow to 
meet liabilities was consistently the strongest 
discriminator among the ratios tested. (Shown In bold 
in Table 8.10) It is also noteworthy that the 
Altman/Taffler profit based ratios were more consistent 
and with stronger correlations than the Beaver 
Cashflow:Total Debt ratio. Only in 1987 were both the 
profit based ratios and the Beaver ratio significant 
discriminators. Indeed, 1987 had the strongest pattern 
of discriminating data, with liquidity ratios also 
showing up well. In regard to the Altman retained 
profit ratio, this is an inherent ratio, since the 
companies are required to have been in existence for 
some time, and thus built up reserves prior to entering 
the Listings. Thus a failure to generate profits and 
hence an ability to build up reserves would make this 
ratio a good discriminator, but likely to prevent entry 
to the listings, and as such becomes second~ry to the 
primary ability to generate profit and cash. This may 
help to explain why this ratio only appeared as a 
significant discriminator in 1983. 
1983 
FuncUoo ~ 
Eigenvalue 1.10 
% of variance 66.22 
Canonical C1.'P elation 0.72 
Wilks'Lambda 0,30 
Chi-square 65.4 
DF 26 
Significance -J.OO 
T abll"" 8 0 I"., ._i •. ' ",,--,. ". ,'., c·c· ... ,,'" ~~ -t;;:"""A-t R'lskii/Failure .LQl=',-"v~-,-,.~ ... _.,jJ.':'J2;1 In!Dn.1Jv}J~f,"_!,,{_~Y.;1. g~.J..~.':e!1.~ [ .=" =.-:...=-
1984 1nf~~} 
2 1. 2 .1 2 
O.b6 1.16 0.35 1.20 0.40 
33.78 76.78 23.22 74.85 25.15 
0.60 0.73 0.51 0.74 0.53 
0.64 0.34 0.74 0.32 0.71 
24.4 66.37 18.64 71.20 21.41 
12 26 12 26 12 
o .-'or, 
• UL_ 0,00 0.09 0.00 0.04 
.1~8L 
.1 
1.57 
88.54 
0,78 
0.32 
64.26 
26 
0.00 
~ 
~ 
'-0 
2-
0.20 
11.50 
0.41 
0.83 
10.5 
12 
O. ')() 
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Table 8.10 P~ole~ ~ith~n-9roup correlations between 
D~scr~m~natIn9 Variables and Canonical 
DIscrImInant Functions 
Year' 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Function 1 
Ratio 
Altman 33 
Taffler 53 
0.602 0.515 -0.432 0.595 
0.457 0.373 0.501 0.742 
Beaver' CFO 0.350 
Altman 14 0.582 0.362 0.426 
Beaver DIA 
Altman 10 
Function 2 
Altman 14 
Beaver OIA 
Acid Test 
Taffler 16 
Altman 12 
Current 
Ratio 
Taffler 18 
Taffler 53 
Beaver CF/O 
0.394 
0.432 
0.568 0.459 
0.502 
0.342 0.4840 
Implcations for Theory 
0.367 
-0.561 
-0.541 
0.684 
0.366 
-0.461 
0.424 
-0.645 
-0.586 
From the RobertsonfLau and Gentry views, it becomes 
pertinent to see how the most important discriminating 
ratios comply with any attempts at defining theorey. 
Table 8.11 identifies the ratios that relate closest to 
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the theoretical notions of declining trading stability, 
reduced profits moving into losses, declining working 
capital and increased borrowing. This involves the 
ratios that include turnover, profit, working capital 
and debt. The ratios are shown in their rank order from 
the SPSS print-out. The first ranking refers to the 
discrimination between success and failure, the second 
to when the "At Risk" element is introduced. 
From the analysis, it is clear that the most effective 
discriminating ratios are still those based on the 
ability to generate profit and hence cash. It would 
appear that working capital measures are erratic, 
vindicating Tamari's 1978 view, and debt based measures 
Table 8.11 Theoretically good discriminating ratios 
Ratio/Year 
Altman 
Working Capital 
Total Assets 
1983 : 1984 : 1985 : 1986 : 1987 
72 :1110 7 5:13 11: 13 7 
Profit:Total Assets 4 8 : 1 1 1 1: 1 1: 1 3 
Taffler 
Profit 
Current Liabilities 5 10: 2 2 2 3: 2 5: 4 1 
Working Capital 
Total Debt 
Beaver 
Cashflow:Debt 
Debt:Assets 
10 13: 4 5 8 9: 5 4: 9 13 
6 12: 8 11 : 3 4: 3 6: 5 2 
9 3:13 13 :10 11: 6 2: 3 4 
seem to be most effective when combined with the 
profit/cashflow rather than asset cover. It is 
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noteworthy that Taff1er's famous No credit interval, 
and the traditional acid test and current ratios are 
are still not regarded as good discriminators or 
indicators. 
Comments on the Results 
It is now necessary to consider how successful the 
discrimination analysis was. E in Table 8.12 below 
represents the Expectation, based on the data from 
Table 8.2 above. 0 are the Observed results. 01 
standing for the results based on the straightforward 
classification of success/fail, and 02 introducing the 
component of an "At Risk" category. Overall, 
straightforward discrimination between successes and 
Table 8.12 Summary of the Discriminations 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Success :E# 01 02:E 01 02:E 01 02:E 01 02: E 01 02 : 
Grad.Cos:32 31 26:33 33 27:33 33 27:33 31 30:33 33 31: 
Nongrad : 12 12 11: 14 13 13: 14 14 12: 14 14 14: 14 14 13: 
Failed : 7 6 5:11 9 6:11 8 8: 9 7 6: 5 4 4: 
At risk :13 '" 11:14 * 14:16 '" 13:16 '" 12:14 '" 7: 
En :64 49 53:72 55 60:74 55 60:72 52 62:66 51 55: 
Accuracy % 96 83: 94 83: 95 81: 93 86: 98 83: 
~01 = 95.2% ~02 = 85.2% 
Notes: 
'" Indicates that there was no perceived "At Risk" 
category in the analysis. 
# Indicates E = Expected score, 01 = Observed score 
based on success/failure analysis, 02 = Observed 
score based on success/failure/"at risk" analysi-=. 
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failures, with no perceived IIAt Risk ll companies. ~he 
overall correct classification averaged 95.2%. There 
was little evidence that the more recent data produced 
better classifications. After introducing the IIAt Ris~" 
element. the overall average dropped to 85.2%. Again. 
there was no perceptible improvement In accuracy over 
time. 
Comparison with Established Models 
The table above indicates a high degree of accuracy of 
discrimination. To assess how successful the analysis 
is compared with the standard Taffler and Altman 
models, the results obtained in chapters 5, 6 and 7 
above need to be compared. This requires comparing the 
results in the table above with the successful 
discriminations in each of the categories. However, to 
be consistent. the Z-score results for the s~me 
companies must be compared. Thus Table 8.13 takes the 
Graduates that were selected for the discriminant 
analysis and compares the 01 and 02 observed scores 
against Expectation with the Taffler 0.3 and 0.2 cut-
offs and the Altman 2.9 and 2.7. Tables 8.14-15 
similarly summarise results for the Non-graduates and 
the Failures. 
The basis of assessment is to consider Altman against 
. Al t h IIgrwyll or "at the 02 Observations. SInce man as a ~ 
risk" area. In contrast, Taffler has no identifiable 
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Table 8.13 Comparison for the Graduates 
Year :From SPSS T a f f 1 e r : A 1 t ma n 
:Observations :Cut off levels :Cut off levels 
:E 01 
1983 :32 31 97 26 81:32 26 8130 94:32 27 84 28 88: 
1984 :33 33 100 27 82:33 28 85 32 97:33 32 q7 33 100: 
1985 :33 33 100 27 82:33 31 94 32 97:33 33 100 33 100: 
1986 :33 31 94 30 91:33 30 9133 100:33 32 97 33 100: 
1987 :33 33 100 31 94:33 32 97 33 100:33 33 100 33 100: 
98 8 ':1 WI 90 98: 96 98: 
"grey" area, and as such, should be compared with the 
01 observations. The results show that the analysis has 
a higher percentage of accuracy In terms of classifying 
successful Graduates than the Taffler model when the 
cut-off is taken at 0.3, but the the percentage of 
correct classifications equalises if 0.2 is regarded as 
the cut-off. By contrast, when the Altman scores are 
compared. the 02 observations are ostensibly not as 
reliable as either of the Altman cut-off indicators. 
This pattern appears to be consistent over the period 
under review. 
Turning to the Non-graduate data. it must first be 
reiterated that a Non-graduate company is stil~ a 
success, but it may not be as successful as those that 
have graduated. The observations from Table 3.14 when 
compared with the Taffler scores for the same companies 
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revealed that the analysis was more reliable if the 
Taffler cut-off was regarded as 0.3, but if the 1983 
0.2 cut-off was used, then the results were almost the 
same over the five year period. If nothing else, this 
would seem to confirm the Taffler cut-off at 0.2. By 
contrast, the Altman model seemed to be consistently 
more reliable than the observed discriminant analysis 
results. 
Table 8.13 Discriminant Analysis and the Non-graduates 
Year From 8.10 Taffler :Altman 
E 01 % 02 % En 0.3 % 0.2 % En 2.9 % 2.7 % 
1983:12 12 100 11 92:12 8 67 11 92:12 11 92 11 92 
1984:14 13 93 13 93:14 12 86 14 100:14 14 100 14 100 
1985:14 14 100 12 86:14 13 93 14 100:14 14 100 14 100 
1986:14 14 100 14 100:14 14 100 14 100:14 14 100 14 100 
1987:14 14 100 13 93:14 13 93 14 100:14 14 100 14 100 
:u% : 99 93: 88 98: 98 98 
Since the object of this exerCIse was to assess the 
potential for forecasting failures and it was noted in 
chapter 6 above that the pattern of results for the 
Non-graduates was more erratic, the comparison of the 
scores will be a little difficult. The discriminant 
analysis has taken known successes, i.e with consistent 
profitability and growth. Not many satisfy that 
criterion, but those that do, are correctly classified. 
On the basis of known successes. and the lower cut-off, 
the Taffler model is little better than the analysis, 
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while the Altman models appears to perform slightly 
better than the analysis. However. it can be argued 
that both models appear to be able to classify 
correctly with a reasonable degree of accuracy although 
accuracy is improved if the population consists of 
stable rather than erratic performing companies. Such a 
conclusion may vindicate the use of the Bar-niv and 
Raveh approach to improved scores. since it eliminates 
or at least reduces the fringe area where companies 
could fall into differing classification groups in 
successive years. 
In the case of the "at risk" group and the failures. 
the two groups were analysed to see how this approach 
classified the companies. Table 8.15 shows the results 
obtained for the 15 of the 20 failures identified in 
chapter 7. This group consists of a number of both 
failures and "at risk". For each year. column 1 
identifies success or failure. and column 2 success. 
failure or "at risk". Since the assumption is that the 
company is a failure. an entry in that column indicates 
a mis-classification. 
The results show a correct classification of potential 
failure or seriously at risk on average over 80% of the 
time. This compares well with the 70-75% shown by the 
Altman and Taffler modles in Table 7.3. Additionally, 
the warnings come on average about 3 years before the 
187 
final coup de grace. When compared with Table 7.4, 
Altman has 17.6% failures receiving around 3 years 
warning, and Taffler a mere 6.7%. Ostensibly, 
therefore, this discriminatn approach, with its 
emphasis on poor profit and cash generation 
performance, and within the confines of a very small 
Table 8.15 The Failures - Classification and Length of 
Company 
Adam Leis 
Castle GB 
Warning 
Date of 
Deletion 
1987 
1987 
Prmotion GR 1986 
Access Sat 1988 
Ecobric 
Imtec 
Metal Sc 
Mnemos 
Xyllyx 
1988 
1988 
1989 
1985 
B I Airways 1990 
Goodwin Warr1989 
Pineapple 1989 
Anglo Nordic1988 
Humber/Audit1989 
Wm Morris LH1988 
I:n 
Classification and Warning Length 
Year: 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Year s 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
S 
S R 
R S S 
N N 
N N 
2-3 
2-3 
None 
R S S N N N N None 
N N 
S S 
N N 
N N 
N N 
R 
N N N N 
R 
N N 
R 
N N 
12 
S S S S 
R 
S 
R 
R 
24 
R 
R 
R 
R 
26 
R 
N N 
N N 
N N 
S S S S 
R 
R 
R 
24 14 
4 
* 
2-3 
2-3 
2-3 
<2 
<2 
3-4 
2-3 
4-5 
3-4 
% correctly 
classified (u 82.6%)75 87.5 
Key: S = misclassified success, N 
Risk" 
73.1 91.7 85.7 
no data, R "At 
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sample, may prove to be a slightly better method for 
predicting future corporate events. However, as this is 
an in sample test it may not perform as well on out of 
sample data from future failures. 
Table 8.16 The "At Risk" Group - Classification Results 
Company Subsequent 
Event Year 
Airship Cancelled 
Industries 1984 
Camotech Cancelled 
1987 
Bio-Isolat S52* 
Entertain S56* 
Greenwch S57* 
PML Reorgan 87 
Britannia G4* 
Mellerware Renamed 
(G9)* Beacon 87 
Microfocus Gl1* 
Oceonic G14* 
Air Call Acquired86 
Crown Reorgan 88 
Healthcare Reorgan 84 
JohnMichaelReorgan 88 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
F F N N N (Finally 
N 
R 
R 
R 
N 
S 
S 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
N 
N 
R 
R 
R 
S 
R 
S 
N 
S 
S 
R 
N 
N 
N 
R 
R 
R 
S 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
N 
S 
S 
R 
R 
S 
F 
S 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
N 
S 
N 
R 
R 
R 
N 
S 
R 
R 
R 
N 
R 
N 
S 
failed 
1990. ) 
Thorpac Reorgan 88 R R R R S 
Source KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock USM Quarterly Survey 
September 1989 
Note* Indicates company analysed as either Graduate (G) 
or Non-graduate (S) with a poor Z-score pattern. 
Key F = Failed N = No data R = At Risk 
• 
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Turning to the "At risk" group the details are listed 
in Table 8.16. Here the analysis correctly identifies a 
group of companies that can be perceived to be at risk, 
and in Altman terminology, likely to score between 1.8 
and 2.7. The failure of Airship Industries, which had 
withdrawn to the Third Market, was correctly predicted. 
The need for some form of fairly drastic management 
attention, as suggested by Argenti, was again correctly 
predicted in a further five companies. It is too soon 
in the case of four of them to see how successful these 
re-organisations have been. The acquisition of Air Call 
in 1986 would suggest that it was a rescue. However, 
there remains a small hard core of USM companies, of 
which four are Graduates, that remain solidly 
entrenched in the "At risk" category. That two of the 
Non-graduates are from the Leisure sector, and the 
Graduates are all from the E1ectrica1s may be 
significant, but further analysis over a much longer 
period may be required. 
Two final comments are required. The first is in 
relation to how subsequent events have affected four of 
the Graduate companies selected for the discriminant 
analysis. In the light of recent events, (Spring 1989 
and Summer 1990) two Non-graduates have been added to 
the list. Using data from the discriminant analysis 
descibed above, the results are summarised in Table 
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Table 8.17 Post Analysis Period "F . 1 al ures" 
Com2an~ Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Event 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Federated Housing S R S S S S S S S S Receivers 90 
Blanchards S S S S S F S S S S Suspended 89 
Parkfield S S S R S S S S S F Receivers 90 
Michael Peters S R S S S S S S S S Administrator 
1990 
Yellowhammer S S S S S S S S S S Receiver/ 
Rescue 1990 
Midsummer Leisure S S S R R R S S S S Under threat 
1990 
Note: S - Success R - "At Risk" F = Failure 
8.17 above. 
Apart from 1983, which could be attributed to the youth 
of the company and not having had a full year's 
advantages of being listed, Federated Housing gave no 
warning in its accounts until the last two years, and 
then it was stock turnover, that there was any sign of 
serious trouble. It is thus likely that the Edminster 
model (1972) may have identified the problem earlier. 
Equally, Midsummer Leisure, apart from the period of 
uncertainty during the mid 1980s gave no indication of 
the problems looming in 1989-1990. In the case of 
Yellowhammer, where problems did not begin to emerge 
until mid-1989, there was no indicator in 1987, which 
would have increased the length of warning to between 
two and three years. Interestingly enough, the 1989/90 
I 
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interim results exhibited increased turnover, but a 
loss and a passing of the interim dividend. Michael 
Peters exhibits doubts when the lIat risk" companies are 
introduced into the analysis for 1983. This can be 
explained with reference to the Hutchinson-Meric-Meric 
(1988) research, since the company did not enter the 
listings until the end of 1983. All was ostensibly well 
up to the end of 1987, so no 2-3 year warning could be 
claimed. 1988 continued a pattern of increased 
turnover, (up 87%) increased profi t (up 83%) adequate 
liquidity and reserves and market confidence seemed to 
be holding. 1989 however, despite showing dramatically 
increased turnover, profit margins had halved 
<Robertson 1984), there was a deterioration in working 
capital and liquidity, and SUbstantially increased 
gearing. However, the market had begun to loose 
confidence, since the share price trend was down from 
late 1988/early 1989. 
Blanchards showed good Z-scores over the period 1983-87 
with only 1983 Taffler close to the 1982 0.2 cut off. 
On the discriminant analysis only 1985 showed a 
likelyhood of failure which was the year the company 
came to the market. The first two years were ostensibly 
good, although the Altman score dropped in 1987, 
reflecting an erosion of reserves. However the 1987 
profit was down. Losses were turned in for 1988 and the 
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dividend passed~ and 1989 revealed falling turnover~ 
losses, and deteriorating liquidity. During these last 
two years, the Altman score dived down to 1.5 hitting 
0.0 in 1989. The Taffler score similar plunged below 
0.2 in 1988. Blanchards thus exhibited an almost 
textbook profile of impending failure. 
Parkfield is interesting from another aspect. It had 
already been noted that of the sample non-graduates 
selected, it was one of the companies that graduated 
after the sample had been identified. Therefore. it 
should have been amongst the better performers. 
However, it has already been shown in chapter 6 that 
Parkfield was a poor performer in 1983-84. and 
subsequently changed direction. In 1987. when the 
analysis has three choices, Parkfield appears as a 
possible failure. Curiously, with sales, profits and 
dividends bouyant, the symptoms that appeared in 1989 
were deteriorating liquidity (Quick ratio down from 
0.93:1 in 1988 to 0.66:1 in 1989) despite an almost 9% 
increase in debtors turnover, a substantial increase in 
gearing from 8% to 51% and a deterioration in the 
Beaver cashflow/total debt ratio from 26% to 15%. 
The second comment refers to the Altman Market 
Price:Total Debt ratio. Clearly, market price is a 
measure of confidence and hence a reflection on the 
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views of the market on a corporation's long term 
future. Table 8.18 shows, however, that this is a very 
poor discriminator between success, "at risk" and 
failure. In view of the claims made (Ahorany et al 
1980, and Westerfield 1970) about the Z-scores and 
discriminate analysis being unable to out perform the 
market, this is exceptionally interesting and may prove 
a useful area for future research. This wi 11 be 
particularly interesting in the current uncertain 
political climate with depressed stock markets and many 
non-graduate USM companies showing share prices close 
to par value if not below. 
Table 8.17 Pooled-within-group Correlations between 
discriminating variables and canonical 
discriminant functions 
Ratio: Altman's Market Price:Total Debt 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Success/ 
Failure -.041 -.184 -.034 0.640 0.254 
Success/ 
At Risk/ 
Failure 
Function 1 
Function 2 
.246 -.198 
.269 0.138 
0.045 
0.136 
-.050 
-.292 
0.072 
-.306 
The change in the economic climate coupled to depressed 
stock markets, may produce more failures at extremely 
short notice, and distortions in classification, 
despite the low weighting given by Altman to this 
ratio. The overall impact of this can only be assessed 
by research 
1970, 1971, 
similar to undertaken by Tamari (1964, 
1978) and Inman (1988) where different 
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economic conditions and share price ranges were the 
background to the research. It may be that the 
companies identified are the type that might have 
failed anyway, and the economic climate may influence 
the number of failures and the pattern of length of 
warning. 
Concluding Remarks 
This approach to discriminant analysis successfully 
classifies successful companies. It would appear that 
the success rate with both the Graduates and the Non-
graduates is comparable to the Taffler results 
especially when the 1982 0.2 cut-off is selected. 
However, it would appear that the Altman model retains 
its edge over this approach to discriminant analysis. 
However, the companies selected were well established 
and had consistent rates of performance, and it is 
likely that samples containing more erratic performers 
may have produced less conclusive results. This would 
suggest that companies that are new to the listings, or 
perhaps inherently entrepreneurial, may not readily 
lend themselves to the traditional MDA approach, which 
may give more reliable results when based on more 
established companies. Clearly, Altman himself 
recognized this and developed modified forms of his 
original model. (1971, 1983) As to the failures, the 
approach was marginally more successful, with perhaps 
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slightly earlier warnings. However, any conclusions 
about failure prediction must consider the smallness of 
sample size, economic and market climate and the 
inherent culture of the business. A grey area can be 
indentified which could be used to indicate the need 
for drastic management action, but here the potential 
problems might be that management may have already 
responded to internal information, or that it is too 
late anyway. 
While it is clear that the procedure classifies 
companies with a high degree of accuracy, in the light 
of recent events, it will be necessary to test the 
stability of the analysis, by taking an out of sample 
analysis to see if the classifications are still as 
accurate. 
As to confirming any theory as such, it is significant 
that in general, none of the sales, working 
capital/liquidity or gearing ratios provided a 
consistent pattern for discriminating between successes 
and failures. Such results suggest that while such 
trends may be part of the prognosis as to the nature of 
a corporate future, the ability to generate profit. in 
order to increase corporate wealth and hence growth. as 
well as pay creditors when they fall due is the key 
element of survival. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND POINTERS TO FURTHER RESEARCH 
Verdict on the Traditional Models 
From the research reported in chapters 5-7, it can be 
concluded that the traditional Z-score models of Altman 
and Taffler still have a value in the classifying of 
corporations between potential on-going corporate 
successes and failures. The evidence indicates that 
while the models were developed in somewhat different 
conditions and with a different mix of corporations, 
they can be reasonably applied to the classic USM type 
of company. This in part answers the criticism that z-
score models cannot be universally applied. Rather, the 
initial overall conclusion must be that both scores 
classify corporations successfully overall with a high 
()80%) degree of accuracy. Indeed, it should be 
emphasised that Altman in particular has stood UP well 
in comparison to more recent discriminant analysis. 
However, the success level is higher with successful 
corporations than with potential failures. In that, the 
conclusions must be similar to those of Houghton and 
Woodliff (1987) in respect of the traditional IIquick 
ratio." 
Two criticisms may be at least considered. 
First, that the Non-graduates produced a slightly more 
erratic pattern of results, suggesting possibly that 
the revised model, more in keeping with unlisted or 
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private company, might be more reliable. Secondly, 
certain sectors, notably Leisure, may not lend 
themselves quite so readily to traditional Z-score 
analysis. However, when it comes to considering 
failures, while the classification success rate was 
high, the length of warning is, at best, inadequate. 
This is reinforced by the information in Table 8.17 
which shows the failures that occurred during the 
summer of 1990. None of the companies had any real 
indication of the impending trouble in 1986-87. This 
tends to imply that the warnings are well below the 2 
or 3 years originally claimed by early researchers. 
Thus the initial conclusions must be that the models 
are robust and acceptably reliable in the context of 
the USM companies, but the criticisms about length of 
warning expressed in the literature have been upheld. 
Implications for the Use of Discriminant Analysis 
The use of discriminant analysis to see if there were 
single or a group of particularly useful ratios that 
could be employed revealed results that were little 
better than the traditional Z-score models. Altman's 
models retained marginally better classification 
results than the ratios used in the discriminant 
analysis. However, it was found that the ability to 
generate cash through profits was consistently the most 
effective discriminating ratio, closely followed by the 
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Altman-s retained earnings:gross assets. This tended to 
vindicate the original Beaver (1967) view and confirm 
the almost obvious point that survival and growth 
depends upon the ability to generate profit and cash to 
stlstain the increase in corporate wealth. The Altman 
ratio is probably inherent, in that to reach the stage 
where a company is admitted to the Listings requires 
several years of successful trading and hence reserves 
should have been built up. The discriminate analysis 
was marginally more successful in discriminating 
between potential successes and failures, and gave 
slightly earlier warnings. 
In regards to the other measures suggested by 
Robertson, Lau and Gentry, the results produced from 
sales, working capital and debt based ratios were all 
too erratic to be taken as effective discriminants. It 
was particularly noted that the Altman's share price 
based ratio was a very poor discriminator, and this may 
call into question any Stock Market based methods of 
prediction. If, as has been suggested, the Market has 
already identified and marked down a perceived "at 
risk" company, then this ratio ought to be more 
reliable a discriminator. 
Contributions to Theory 
This research has to some extent attempted to respond 
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to Lev's 1974 demand for a more theoretical approach. 
By taking out the "youth factor" it has been possible 
to test a large population and in particular identify 
characteristics which might be symptomatic of possible 
future failure. However, the only economic 
characteristics that have been found to be useful in 
responding to Lev's 1974 appeal are profitablility, 
cashflow generation and the inherent ability to retain 
funds in the business to build it up. It could be 
argued that Lev demanded ten years, and that a ten year 
study of the USM companies under review might produce 
better results. However, such a study would show 
results partially distorted by the post-1987 USM 
doldrums and the effect of the dramatic change in the 
UK economic climate which has resulted in a large 
number of USM companies turning in large losses and 
showing very depressed share prices. 
However, if a theoretical model is to be developed as 
envisaged by Lev, then the indications from the ideas 
suggested by Robertson (1984) and Lau (1986) along with 
the discriminant analysis point to a foundation based 
upon decline in profitability and cashflow, supported 
by a change in working capital rather than pure 
liquidity (c/f Tamari and Houghton and Woodliff 1987) 
and possibily the passing of the dividend. 
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Answer to Criticsm 
Irrespective of criticsms levelled against it, MOA and 
the use of Z-score analysis in financial analysis is 
still to be found and likely to be extended. Recent 
research points to the use of Z-score analysis in the 
context of the audi tors' "going-concern review" (Koh 
and Killough 1990) where Z-score analysis is seen as a 
vital tool in improving the objectivity of existing 
auditing guidelines and procedures in Singapore, the 
United States and undoubtedly the United Kingdom. 
(Using a propretory model imported from the United 
States, StOY Hayward having been developing such 
procedures since the early 1980s.) Elsewhere, Barnes 
(1990) has used a paired sample to predict takeover 
targets, although an actual MOA model was not employed, 
rather the ratios were compared with the sector 
average. 
Indications for further research 
(i) Changing economic climate 
With regard to analysis of the USM, the first priority 
must be to re-test the corporations in the light of the 
changed UK economic climate. This will indicate how 
stability and robustness of both the traditional Z-
score models and the discriminating ratios. In view of 
the depressed state of the the London Stock Market and 
the USM in particular, (over 30% of USM companies now 
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valued below par value) this would be a test similar to 
that performed by Tamari in the 1950 and 1960s where 
the impact of changes in the economic climate were 
compared. 
(ii) Stablised ratios 
The research undertaken by Platt and Platt (1990) will 
have considerable relevance to USM type companies. The 
authors claim a greater stability when corporate ratios 
are compared with industry ratios. Prediction is thus 
based on whether or not a relevant ratio is drifting 
out of line. The nature and culture of USM companies, 
especially in certain specialist sectors, notably 
Leisure, would suggest from the results obtained that 
such a methodological approach will produce a less 
equivocal result. 
(iii) The use of n ratios 
In the light of the claim that the Z-score analysis 
does not appear to out perform Stock Exchange 
predictions, suggests that another line of research 
might be based upon n values and the correlation of 
rates of failure with the n score. This again would in 
part respond to Lev, by identifying a specific economic 
characteristic. 
(iv) Evaluate on the basis of failure 
Much of the research done has been based upon comparing 
successful companies with failures, either by the 
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paired sample methodology or by taking a proportion of 
failures in keeping with the over proportion of 
failures in the market. Indications from the results 
are that the successes are more accurately identified, 
which overstates the accuracy of any prediction model. 
Wood and Piesse (1989) identified 24 failures in their 
evaluation of the information value of Z-score 
analysis, and since Johnson (1970) has argued that 
failed firms have different ratios from successful 
ones, a basis might be to take a large sample of 
failures to identify common characteristic 
discriminating models. 
(v) Identify potential non-starters 
The 1988 Buckland and Davis study emphasised the 
discounting of new issue share prices. The reason for 
any discounting is always to attract investors, and to 
pitch the price so that the issue will not fail. It 
becomes pertinent to ask if there is any correlation 
between the size of discount and any subsequent unhappy 
events. 
(vi) Component sensitivity 
Senstivity analysis in the context of management 
accounting and decision making quantifies how much a 
cost or revenue component is sensitive to economic 
change. Where ratios and scores appear erratic, this 
may be due to change in one or more components. In may 
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thus be helpful in further developing the practical use 
of Z-score methodology to introduce a measure of how 
sensitive the components are to change and hence 
producing a score that is above/below a critical cut-
off. 
Final Way Forward 
Lev emphasised (1974) that effective prediction might 
go beyond the limits of pure accounting and financial 
information. Such a view is undoubtedly supported by 
Argenti (1976) and confirmed by the Keasey and Watson 
(1987) study. If the Robertson view is correct, then a 
theoretically based way forward may be based on a 
statistically developed financial based model set 
against a background of such non-financial/qualitative 
information as sales turnover and relationship to 
market and market share. Such an approach brings in the 
stabilising effect of the total market and sector 
performance. Certainly such an approach would find 
favour with auditing methodology on the appraisal of 
the suitability of going concern accounting procedures. 
However. such an approach may well require a more 
complicated analysis that the MDA model, possibly along 
the lines of logit analysis and multi-dimensional 
scaling suggested by Mar-Molinero and Ezzamel (1986). 
The End 
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